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Independent Orbiter Assessment
Analysis of the Extravehicular Mobility Unlt
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions
for Preparation _f FMEA and CIL, i0 October 1986. The IOA
approach features a o_6p-o_n an-al_is of the-_dware to
determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical
items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished
without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA
FMEA/CIL documentation. Hardware identified for assessment
includes major critical Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and all GFE
hardware. This report documents the independent analysis results
corresponding to the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) hardware.
The EMU is an independent anthropomorphic system that provides
environmental protection, mobility, life support, and communica-
tions for the Shuttle crewmember to perform Extravehicular
Activity (EVA) in Earth orbit. Two EMU's are included on each
baseline Orbiter mission, and consumables are provided for three
two-man EVA's.
The EMU consists of the following elements:
o Life Support System (LSS)
o Caution and Warning System (CWS)
o Primary Life Support Subsystem (PLSS)
o Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP)
o Service and Cooling Umbilical (SCU)
o Display and Control Module (DCM)
o Extravehicular Communications System (EVCS)
o Space Suit Assembly (SSA)
o Hard Upper Torso (HUT)
o Helmet
o Arm Assembly
o Glove Assembly
o Lower Torso Assembly (LTA)
o Liquid Cooling and Ventilation Garmet (LCVG)
o Insult Drink Bag (IDB)
o Urinary Collection Device (UCD)
o Communications Carrier Assembly (CCA)
The I0A analysis process utilized available EMU hardware drawings
and schematics for defining hardware assemblies,
components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was
evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects.
Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect
for each failure mode.
Figures I and 2 present a summary of the failure criticalities
for each of the three major subdivisions of the EMU. A summary
of the number of failure modes, by criticality, is also presented
below with Hardware (HW) criticality first and Functional (F)
criticality second.
Summary of IOA Failure Modes By Criticality (HW/F)
Criticality:
Number i/I I 2/IRI 2/2ii 219 123 3/IR 1 3/2R14 95
313
35
TOTAL
497
For each EMU failure mode identified, the criticality and
redundancy screens were examined to identify Potential Critical
Items (PCIs). A summary of PCIs is presented as follows:
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Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items
Criticality: I i/1 I 2/1 2/2 3/IR
Number : ii 219 _ 123 13
3/2R
24
(HW/F)
TOTAL390
m
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The majority of these PCIs are resultant from failures which
cause loss of one or more primary functions: pressurization,
oxygen delivery, environmental maintenance, and thermal
maintenance. It should also be noted that the quantity of PCIs
would significantly increase if the SOP were to be treated as an
emergency system (as it is so defined in the EMU specifications
document SVHS7800) rather than as an unlike redundant element (as
it is presently categorized by the NASA).
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i2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has
undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment
of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL for completeness and technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL
reevaluation results. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEAs/CILs that is
performed and documented at a later date.
Step 1.0 Subsystem familiarization
1.1 Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
5
Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
m
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2.4 EMU Ground Rules and Assumptions
Due to the unique functions performed by the EMU, the IOA project
determined it necessary to establish ground rules and assumptions
specifically applicable to the EMU (reference Appendix B). These
ground rules and assumptions, in addition to those established
project wide (also provided in Appendix B), are intended to both
complement and supplement those defined in NSTS 22206.
Additional, they ensure that the IOA EMU ana-_-ysis is capable of
being understood by personnel who did not directly participate in
the analysis.
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3.0 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Function
The Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) is an independent
anthropomorphic system that provides environmental protection,
mobility, life support, and communications for the Space Shuttle
crewmember to perform Extravehicular Activity (EVA) in Earth
orbit. EVA has been defined for EMU analysis considerations as
any time the EMU external environment pressure is below 4.0 psia.
A schematic of the EMU is provided in Figure 3.
The EMU has been designed to accommodate an EVA mission with a
total duration of 7 hours maximum, consisting of 15 minutes for
egress, 6 hours for useful EVA tasks, 15 minutes for ingress, and
a 30 minute reserve.
The EMU primarily consists of the Life Support System (LSS),
Space Suite Assembly (SSA), and the Caution and Warning System
(c_w).
I • Life Support Subsystem (LSS) - The LSS subsystem
provides the following for the suited crewmember:
a •
b.
C.
d.
e.
f.
g.
Pressurization
Thermal control
Breathing oxygen
Display and control of Critical system parameters
Humidity, odor, and contaminant control
Electrical power storage and distribution
Communications
The assemblies and hardware which make up the LSS are
described below•
O The Primary Life Support Subsystem (PLSS),
reference Figure 4, is an assembly which normally
provides the crewmember with oxygen for breathing,
ventilation, and pressurization and water for
cooling. Additionally, with respect to the IOA
analysis, the PLSS provides for the storage and
distribution of power throughout the EMU and for
the maintenance of the suit atmosphere•
The PLSS consists of oxygen bottles and water
tanks together with associated regulators, relief
valves, and plumbing. Also contained within the
PLSS are a water pump, an air circulation fan, a
sublimator used for water cooling, and a water
separator used to remove excess moisture from the
ventilation lines. Integral to the PLSS are
several sensors used by the Caution and Warning
System (CWS) in monitoring life support subsystem
function•
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owithin the PLSS, the Contaminant Control Cartridge
(CCC) contains an activated charcoal bed for trace
gas removal, a LiOH bed for C02 removal, and a
particulate filter to remove solid particles. The
CCC is installed in the back of the PLSS and is
replaceable in flight for EMU recharge.
EMU mission power requirements during EVA are
satisfied by the PLSS battery which stores and
provides the electrical power for the operation of
all electric components of the EMU, reference
Figure 5. The battery mounts into the back of the
PLSS, is replaceable in flight, and can be
recharged while installed in the PLSS.
The Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), reference Figure
6, is a functionally independent life support
system, providing the EMU with an emergency back-
up oxygen system for a minimum of 30 minutes. It
provides oxygen for suit loop backup pressure
regulation and an open loop oxygen purge for
removal of heat, C02, and humidity in the event of
a loss of the primary function. The SOP is mounted
to the bottom of the PLSS and employs the same
oxygen delivery path as the PLSS. Due to the
numerous critical functions supported by the SOP,
its operation and hardware are discussed in detail
in the following paragraphs.
The SOP assembly contains two oxygen storage
pressure vessels, a two stage regulator, a dial-
type pressure gauge, a pressure transducer, and an
oxygen fill connector (for servicing the SOP
through Ground Servicing Equipment only).
Oxygen from the SOP is controlled by a two-stage
regulator. The second-stage regulator also acts
as the shutoff valve for this system. The second-
stage regulator is caged when the oxygen actuator
is in the OFF, IV, and PRESS positions. When the
oxygen actuator is placed in the EVA position, the
second-stage regulator is uncaged and oxygen is
allowed to flow as demanded. The second-stage
regulator also has a manual override that provides
for crewmember checkout of the SOP during Pre-EVA
operations.
The first-stage regulator reduces the nominal
supply pressure of approximately 6000 psig to an
interstage pressure of 240 to 280 psig. The
second-stage regulator further reduces the inter-
stage pressure to maintain the ventilation loop at
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3.33 to 3.55 psid over a flow range of 4.51 to
5.26 Ib/hr, 3.33 to 3.9 psid over 1.01 to 4.5
Ib/hr, and 3.4 to 3.9 psid over 0.06 to 1 ib/hr.
If the second-stage regulator fails open, the
outlet of the regulator acts as a flow-limiting
orifice, limiting flow to 7.49 ib/hr, allowing the
suit relief valve to maintain suit pressure. The
second-stage regulator is designed to maintain
suit pressure with an upstream pressure equal to
full tank pressure.
Initiation of the SOP pressure make-up requires no
action by the crewmember. The SOP purge is used
to deliver oxygen or to remove co2, heat, and
humidity from the system and is initiated by the
crewmember manually opening the DCM purge valve.
In this manner, suit pressure is controlled to
3.33 to 3.9 psid and a maximum oxygen flow of 4.9
ib/hr is delivered from the SOP through the helmet
over the body, and then overboard via the purge
valve to remove C02, heat, and humidity. A back-
flow check valve in the PLSS ventilation duct
helps direct all flow to the helmet.
If the purge is initiated by the crewmember
opening the helmet purge valve on the helmet.
Suit pressure is controlled from 3.33 to 3.9 psid
and a flow of 2.5 ib/hr is delivered through the
helmet. Flow in this mode is into the helmet
through the vent pad, over and around the
crewmember's head, and then out through the helmet
purge valve; no cooling is provided.
DCM - The Displays and Controls Module (Figure 7)
contains the visual displays and electrical and
mechanical controls required for operation of the
EMU by the EVA crewmember. Contained in the DCM
are the cooling control valve, the suite pressure
gauge, a purge valve, the SCU interface connector,
a significant portion of the EMU electrical
control electronics and switches, and the remote
actuator for oxygen regulators. The DCM mounts
directly to the front of the HUT.
SCU - The Service and Cooling Umbilical is a 12-ft
umbilical that consists of three water hoses, a
high-pressure oxygen hose, electrical wiring and
bacteria filters. The SCU supplies the PLSS with
electrical power, communications, oxygen, waste
water drainage, and water cooling from the Orbiter
during pre- and post-EVA operations. It also
supplies the EMU with recharge of the oxygen
tanks, water tanks, and battery.
ii
The vehicle end of the SCU consists of four ECLSS
connections and one electrical connector that
connects the SCU to the Orbiter service panel. The
connections are permanent and do not require
crewmember operation.
The common connector on the EMU end of the SCU
combines the four fluid and one electrical circuit
connector into a single connector operated by the
crewmember.
O EVCS - The EMU radio is a UHF/AM transceiver
installed within the PLSS (reference Figure 4).
It provides the followoing basic functions.
O Duplex voice communications with another EVA
crewmember and the Orbiter
O Biomedical (ECG) Telemetry via a subcarrier
o A backup communications mode that provides
simplex voice-only communications between the
Orbiter and EVA crewmembers
Additionally, the radio provides audible caution
and warning tones when cued by the CWS to alert
the crewmember in the event of abnormal or unsafe
conditions.
The low profile, omnidirectional UHF antenna is
mounted in a pocket of the thermal cover on top of
the PLSS. It consists of three resonating cavity
antennas, one for each of the frequencies used.
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• Space Suit Assembly (SSA) - The SSA, reference Figure
8, provides crewmember enclosure for all EVA
operations. Containment of the pressurized
environment, ventilation and cooling loop support,
crewmember mobility and crewmember visibility are the
primary frunctions provided by the SSA. The assemblies
and components comprising the SSA are discussed in the
following paragraphs•
o HUT and Arms: The hard upper torso includes
provisions for the attachment of the helmet/vlsor,
arms, lower torso, PLSS, and DCM. The upper torso
consists of a hard torso section, the upper half
of the waist ring, the lower half of the helmet
neck ring, and the TMG. Intergral to the upper
torso structure is the channeling for both cooling
water circulation and ventilation oxygen
circulation. Each arm consists of an upper arm
and a lower arm connected by the arm bearing.
The upper arm includes the upper torso interfacing
scye bearing, a shouider joint, a conformal
bladder, and a TMG. The lower arm includes the
glove interfacing wrist disconnect, an elbow
Joint, a conformal bladder, and a TMG.
o LTA: The lower torso assembly provides coverage
for the crewmember from the waist down. It
includes a waist bearing, waist section; legs,
boots, boot soles, fabric restraint, bladder, and
TMG. The top of the lower torso is the lower half
of the waist ring, which provides space suit
assembly separation for donning, doffing and
support for the waist section and hip joints• The
redundant axial restraint system transmits loads
through all Joints from the boots to the lower
half of the waist ring.
o Gloves: The EV glove provides protection from
both vacuum and temperature extremes for the
crewmember's hand. A conformal urethane bladder
provides pressure integrity while a polyester
cloth restraint system keeps the bladder from
deforming when pressurized. A multi-layer
insulation (MLI) thermal blanket covers the
bladder/restraint system with an Ortho fabric
outer layer over the MLI. An adjustable plam
restraint bar enables the crewmember to tighten
the glove palm area as required for hand mobility•
o Helmet/Visor Assembly: The helmet/visor consists
of the helmet bubble and the visor assembly, which
are permanently attached• The bubble is a clear
rigid pressure-retaining vessel made from UV-
stabilized polycarbonate material. Integral to
16
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•the helmet bubble are the helmet neck ring, which
attaches to the upper torso neck ring, and the
vent pad, which directs the oxygen flow to the
helmet over the crewmember's face for effective
carbon dioxide removal. The helmet purge valve is
located on the left side of the helmet•
The visor assembly protects the crewmember and
helmet from thermal and solar radiation. It
consists of visors, pivot and latch mechanisms,
center and side eyeshades, and supporting
structures for the visors and the shades. The
visors are fabricated from UV-stabilized
polycarbonate and polysulfane material with
thermal/optical coatings applied to the inner
surface.
O LCVG: The cooling garmet is a form-fitting
elastic garment worn against the crewmember's
body. The garment supports a network of tubing
that circulates cooling water over the body. It
also supports a network of ducting that draws
ventilating gas from suit extremities to complete
the suit ventilation loop. Connections to the
ducting in the HUT for both cooling water and vent
flows are made at the multiple connector.
O
O
CCA: The comm cap is a fabric skull cap
encapsulating microphone and earphone electronic
modules.
!
UCD: The male UCD is a rubberized fabric bladder
worn inside the cooling garmet around the waist
with a roll-on cuff for interfacing with the
crewmember. Urine contained in the UCD may be
dumped into the urine tube of the Waste Collection
System (WCS). The UCD can contain a maximum of 32
fluid ounces of urine.
Caution and Warning System (CWS) - The EMU caution and
warning system monitors system configuration,
environmental parameters, and consumables status, when
detected, faults are displayed to the crewmember
automatically. The crewmember can display suit
parameters and consumables status at any time. The
Shuttle EMU is independent of ground monitoring and
control.
The CWS microprocessor is the heart of the EMU CWS and
is located on the top side of the PLSS. This box
contains the central processing unit, the memory, the
analog to digital converters, and the latching relays
necessary to processing incoming sensor information and
providing it to the crewmember.
18
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3.2 Interfaces and Locations
The EMU interfaces with the Shuttle Orbiter airlock, its mission
equipment provisions, and the MMU.
The Orbiter airlock provides stowage for the EMU during launch,
orbit, and reentry by means of the EMU mount. The EMU mount
serves as the EMU donning and doffing station during EVA
preparation and post-EVA operations in the airlock. During EVA
prep and post activities, the EMU is connected to the Orbiter
Environmental Control and Life Support Subsystem (ECLSS) in the
airlock by the SCU for airlock-supplied oxygen, cooling water,
communications, and power. Before a second EVA, the EMU is
connected to the Orbiter ECLSS by the SCU for EMU recharge.
During recharge, the EMU is stowed in the airlock on the EMU
mount which serves as a recharge station to permit simultaneous
water and oxygen charging, LiOH cartridge replacement, and
battery charging or replacement.
The EMU interfaces with crewmember restraint and translation
provisions in the airlock and cargo bay. These provisions
include handholds, handrails, foot restraints, and tether
attachment points.
The Manned Maneuvering Unit (MMU) provides the EVA crewmember a
free space maneuvering capability outside the Orbiter cargo bay.
The EMU latches to the MMU with the passive half of the latching
device provided by the PLSS. The MMU contains the active half of
the latching mechanism. Additionally, the MMU support station
provides restraints and handrails to aid the EVA crewmember in
donning and doffing the MMU.
i
w
3.3 Hierarchy
Due to the approach employed by the IOA, the EMU system was
analyzed in a hierarchal manner to ensure consistency in fault
path definition and in the identification of failure effects.
The top level hierarchy employed for EMU analysis considerations
is presented in Figure 9.
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w 4.0 ANALYSIS RESULTS
The IOA analysis of the EMU resulted in the identification of 497
failure modes (reference Appendix C) from which 390 PCIs
(reference Appendix D) were derived. The summary distributions
of failure criticalities and their corresponding PCIs are
provided in Tables I and II, respectively.
-+
TABLE I Summary of IOA Failure Modes and Criticalities
Criticality:
LSS (Total)
PLSS
SOP
SCU
DCM
EVCS
C & W
SSA (Total)
HUT
Helmet
Arms
Gloves
LTA
LCVG
IDB
UCD
CCA
TOTAL
I/i
7
2
4
1
4
3
1
Ii
2/IR
187
135
16
2
34
32
8
2
5
3
i0
4
219
2/2
82
28
2
5
47
34
7
3
4
6
3
1
4
5
1
123
3/IR
14
9
5
14
3/2R
93
12
5
27
4O
9
2
1
1
95
3/3
23
12
1
1
9
i0
2
1
2
3
2
35
TOTAL
406
198
28
35
136
9
82
2O
7
i0
9
15
8
6
5
2
497
21
ITABLE II Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items
Criticality:
LSS (Total)
PLSS
SOP
SCU
DCM
EVCS
C & W
SSA (Total)
HUT
Helmet
Arms
Gloves
LTA
LCVG
IDB
UCD
CCA
TOTAL
i/i
7
2
4
I
1
i
4
3
w
i
w
i
i
I
i
I
ii
2/IR
187
135
16
2
34
I
32
8
2
5
3
i0
4
i
219
2/2
82
28
2
5
47
i
34
7
3
4
6
3
1
4
5
1
123
3/2R TOTAL
313
180
24
15
94
i
7
70
18
5
i0
9
13
5
4
5
1
24 390
3/IR
13 24
9 6
- 2
- 8
4 8
--
i i
i i
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As is evident, the failure mode and PCI distributions were
generally dependent upon hardware complexity and the number of
primary functions supported or impacted. These distributions are
discussed in detail in the following paragraphs.
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u4.1 Analysis Results - PLSS
The PLSS analysis identified one hundred and ninety-eight (198)
failure modes applicable to its various components and
assemblies. Of this number, 90.9% were determined to be PCIs.
The two most critical failure modes can result in immediate loss
of the crewperson due to an oxygen fire or shrapnel. Because the
SOP (discussed in paragraph 4.2) provides redundancy for many of
the PLSS functions, one hundred and thirty-five (135) of the 163
mission impact PCI failure modes could be elevated to a posible
loss of life if the SOP functions were also failed.
No simple breakdown of failure modes per function was identified;
however, during the analysis, the dependency placed upon the SOP
by the system design became quite evident. With the exception of
the two aforementioned life critical PCI failure modes and twelve
failure modes which do not impact PLSS operation in any critical
manner, the large majority of the remaining 184 failure modes
require unimparied SOP operation to ensure crewperson survival.
4.2 Analysis Results - S0P
Four single point failures within the SOP can result in loss of
crewperson due to an oxygen fire or shrapnel release. Eighteen
failure modes can result in mission impact and sixteen of these,
given a failure of a non-SOP primary function, can also result in
loss of crewperson. The majority of the aforementioned mission
impact failure modes typically result in the loss or degradation
of the SOP function. When an additional five failure modes (each
resulting in mission impact only after an earlier failure) are
accounted for and redundancy screens assessed, the total number
of PCIs determined within the SOP is twenty-four (24).
4.3 Analysis Results - SCU
within the analysis the SCU was considered an integral element to
several EMU functions (e.g. oxygen delivery, cooling, and
environmental maintenance). As such, seven failure modes were
identified which, if detected, would result in mission
termination; additionally, two of these could result in loss of
crewperson during an EVA if a redundant function is also lost.
Another twenty-seven failure modes identified were determined
capable of impact to the mission with a corresponding loss of
redundancy and, of these, only eight failed one or more
redundancy screens.
4.4 Analysis Results - DCM
The failure of the DCM pressure gage bourdon tube in a violent
manner (ruptures causing an oxygen fire) is the sole DCM PCI
which can result in immediate loss of the crewperson. The
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remaining DCM PCI failure modes (a total of 93) typically either
result in mission impacts or, when combined with loss of
redundancy, loss of crewperson or mission. Eighty-one PCIs exist
which, if any one occurs, could result in mission termination;
however, if combined with corresponding loss of redundant
function(s), thirty-four of these could cause the loss of a
crewperson. Additionally, a large number of these 81 PCIs result
in the inability of the DCM to support either EMU recharge or EMU
systems management operations. An additional forty-five (45)
failure modes exist which have no impact unless accompanied by
loss of redundancy. Of these, five can result in loss of crew-
person and forty can result in loss of mission - these often
split between loss of EMU recharge or systems management.
Application of redundancy screens to these forty-five failure
modes result in only 12 being considered PCIs.
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4.5 Analysis Results - EVCS
Being the Evcs design provides redundant transmission and
reception capabilities no life threatening or mission critical
failure modes were identified. However, of the nine failure
modes identified, all were considered capable of causing mission
terminatiion when loss of redundant EVCS functions were
considered. Because all nine of these passed their redundancy
screens, none were considered as a PCI.
4.6 Analysis Results - Caution and Warning
Nine failure modes, seven of which are PCIs, can exist in the EMU
caution and warning subsystem. The seven PCI failure modes all
would result in mission termination either due to erroneous
information being provided the crewperson or due to loss of
insight into EMU systems operation,.
4.7 Analysis Results - HUT
Twenty failure modes were identified applicable to the HUT;
eighteen of which are PCIs. The three most critical PCI failure
modes result in loss of crewperson due to a gross failure of a
HUT interface thereby causing loss of EMU pressure integrity
beyond the capability of the SOP. The remaining fifteen PCI
faiiure modes result in mission impact. When eight of these are
combined with a corresponding loss of a redundant function -
quite often one supported by the SOP, loss of crewperson could
result. The other seven PCI failure modes all result in the
inability of the HUT to support mission donning/configuration
requirements (e.g. unable to mate the helmet to HUT).
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m 4.8 Analysis Results - Helmet
Seven failure modes applicable to the helmet resulted in five
PCIs being identified. Each PCI failure mode results in a
mission impact. Two of these, if accompanied by a corresponding
loss of redundant functions, can also result in loss of
crewperson due to loss of pressurization.
i
w
4.9 Analysis Results - Arms
Every failure mode (i0) applicable to the arms resulted in a PCI.
One failure mode could cause loss of a crewperson (by gross
depressurization) while the remaining nine would be an immediate
mission impact - typically either by loss of mobility, pressure
integrity, or don/doff capability. Additionally, the five
failure modes which cause degradation or loss of pressure
integrity can cause loss of a crewperson if the redundant
pressure integrity functions are correspondingly lost.
i
w
4.10 Analysis Results - Gloves
The gloves contain nine failure modes and PCIs - all mission
impacts. As with the arms, three failure modes, involving loss
of degradation of pressure integrity, can result in crewperson
loss with loss of redundancies. The remaining PCI failure modes
impact the mission by degradation of glove mobility or function
during don/doff.
m
4.11 Analysis Results - LTA
The failure modes applicable to the LTS are similar to those
applicable to the HUT and arms. Fifteen failure modes were
identified as applicable to the LTS and, upon analysis, thirteen
were considered PCIs. None could result in immediate loss of
crewperson without corresponding loss of redundant elements; ten
of these exist.
4.12 Analysis Results - LCVG
Analysis of the LCVG identified five PCIs. All five result in
mission impact and, except for one, can result in loss of crew-
person with corresponding loss of redundancy. Those four which
can cause loss of crewperson typically cause degradation or loss
of the LCVG ventilation or cooling functions.
25
4.13 Analysis Results - IDB, UCD, and CCA
None of the failures identified as applicable to the IDB, UCD,
and CCA are capable of causing loss of life; however, ten (all of
which are pcIs) are capable of causing mission termination. Nine
IDB and UCD PCI failure modes impact the mission by reducing
crewperson comfort and impairment of performance - typically by
reduced mobility or vision. The CCA PCI failure mode causes loss
of communications and, therefore, the mission.
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i0. SVSK93600, Schematic, Systems Shuttle EMU; HSD, Rev. U,
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12. SV778872, Connector, Multiple; HSD, Rev. Y, 6-17-85
13. SV778596, Switch, Power Mode; HSD, Rev. D, 1-13-84
14. SVSK94600, Schematic, Electrical, DCM; HSD, Rev. AA, 8-10-83
15. SV769939, Valve, Temperature Control; HSD, Rev. K, 11-19-82
16. SV771887, Switch, Fan/CLIV; HSD, Rev. E. 11-19-84
17. SVSK 94002, EMU Wiring Block Diagram; HSD, Rev. N. 12-9-85
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19. SV767794, Switch, Push to Talk; HSD, Rev. D, 1-24-84
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21. SV767792, Switch, Caution and warning; HSD, Rev. F, 9-7-85
22. SV767786, Switch, Mode Selector; HSD, Rev. F, 1-24-84
23. SV767789-02, Battery; HSD, Rev. E, 2-11-86
24. SV767789-03, Battery; HSD, Rev. B, 9-26-84 ........
25. SV778528, Sensor, Pressure, Primary Oxygen; HSD, Rev. C,
9-29-83 ....... i
SV767788, Sensor, Differential Pressure; HSD, Rev. J,
4-1-85
0101-10001, Communications Carrier Assembly; ILC, Rev. N,
4-29-85
28. SV778873, Pressure Control Module - Primary; HSD, Rev. V,
11-17-84
29. SV789111, Swich, Sensitive, Hermetic; HSD, Rev. B, 5-27-86
30. SV785844, Relief Valve, Dual Mode - Oxygen Feedwater; HSD,
Rev. T, 12-20-84 ....
31. SV7q1836, Check Valve and vent Flow Sensor; HSD, Rev. AV,
11-19-84
32. SV787993, Motor, Brushless; HSD, Rev. M. 2-7-86
33. SV772277, Pump, Water; HSD, Rev. R, 8-6-85
34. SV787994, Fan/Separator/Pump Assembly; HSD, Rev. J, 2-7-86
35. SV769480, Valve, Pilot Actuated; HSD, Rev. N, 5-30-85
36. SV784996, Valve, Check; HSD, Rev. B, 4-27-83
37. SV778543, Filter, Pump Inlet; HSD, Rev. H, 7-17-85
38. SV767699, Valve, Check, Assembly; HSD, 9-6-77
39. SV769403, Valve, Relief Condensate Water; HSD, Rev. N,
5-16-85
SV784943, Trap, Gas; HSD, Rev. E, 10-30-84
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SV769405, Valve, Relief, Water; HSD, Rev. J, 10-4-82
SV785860, Valve, Relief; HSD, Rev. H. 11-20-84
SV787036, Valve, Positive Relief; HSD, Rev. G, 12-14-84
SV85927, Valve, Negative Relief; HSD, Rev. A, 11-19-84
SV85970, Box Assy., Caution and Warning; HSD, Rev. N. 12-20-
85
46. SV784982, Valve, Isolation; HSD, Rev. F, 6-20-85
47. SV784998, Valve Assy., Coolant Isolation; HSD, Rev. E, 4-15-
85
48. SV784985, Valve, Coolant Relief; HSD, Rev. D, 12-4-82
49. ICD-HSD-4-0001-OD-0, EMU-MMU Interface (Section II); HSD,
Rev. L, 2-8-85
50. ICD-HSD-4-0008-OC, Figure 6, EVC Envelope Requirement; HSD,
Rev. G, 12-13-83
51. SV789152, Harness, Electrical Signal; HSD, Rev. R, 6-24-86
52. SV789151, Harness, Electrical Power, HSD, Rev. AD, 6-30-86
53. SV767710-07, Secondasry Oxygen Pack; HSD; Rev. V, 7-13-85
54. SV778475, Pressure Control Module, Secondary; HSD, Rev. T,
7-2-85
55. SV792294-01, Module, Display and Control; HSD, 6-27-86
56. SV767690-02, Harness, EMU, Electrical; HSD, Rev. F, 12-10-85
57. SV772910, Regulator, Pressure, Water Supply; HSD, Rev. L,
8-20-84
SV771717, Regulator, Condensate Water; HSD, Rev. M, 11-8-82
SV778865, Hose Assy., SCU; HSD, Rev. F, 8-15-84
SV767730-09, Umbilical, Service and Cooling; HSD, 8-8-85
SV767785, Potentiometer, Display Intensity; HSD, Rev. F,
2-22-84
62. SV767784, Potentiometers, Volume Control; HSD, Rev. F,
2-23-84
63. SV771763, Harness Assy., Electrical; HSD, Rev. ABH, 6-30-86
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69.
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71.
74.
75.
76.
77.
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79.
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83.
SV771749, Sheath Assy.; HSD, Rev. H. 2-8-84
SV778872, Connector, Multiple; HSD, Rev. Y, 6-17-86
SV787027, Purge Valve - DCM;p HSD, Rev. C, 10-9-85
SV792291, Electronic Assy., DCM; HSD, Rev. H, 6-21-86
SV785003, Connector, Electrical, SCU; HSD, 7-21-82
SV764255, Connector, Electrical, Circular; HSD, Rev. J,
8-30-78
SV789153, Harness, Electrical, Caution and Warning; HSD,
Rev. V, 6-30-85
SV779301, Manifold Assy., Oxygen, Water; HSD, Rev. F,
12-9-85
SV778540, Shear Plate Assy.; HSD, Rev. BU, 5-27-86
0102-82437-18, ILCDover, Table of Operations,
Waterline/Vent Tube Assembly, 5-14-86
9693, Assembly Multiple Connector LCVS Side, Air-Lock, Inc.,
Rev. D, 3-17-83
9697, Assembly Three HOse Clamp, Air-Lock, Inc., Rev. D,
3-17-83
9357, Helmet-to-Suit Disconnect Assembly Suit Side, Air-
Lock, Inc., Rev. Q, 3-17-83
9715, Helmet ventseal Assembly, Air-Lock, Inc., Rev. D,
3-17-83
0107-82568-09, Table of Operations, Vent Plenum
Assembly, ILC Dover, Rev. A, October 1985
0107-81057-19/20, Table of Operations, Boot/Leg
Vent Duct, ILC Dover, July 1986
0107-81060-08, Table of Operations, LCVG Hand
Vent/Arm Duct, ILC Dover, Rev. A, September 1985
0104-82403-29/30, Table of Operations, Pressure Boot
Assembly, ILC Dover, Rev. B, September 1985
9752, Boot Disconnect Assembly, Air-Lock, Inc., Rev. B,
5-16-83
9787, Assembly Body Seal Closure LTA Half (16" Inside), Air-
Lock, Inc., Rev. F, 5-16-83
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0106-86059-01, Table of Operations, Palm Restraint Assembly,
Glove Modified, ILC Dover, Rev. IR, March 1986
0106-23421, Bar, Palm Restraint, ILC Dover, Rev. E, 6-27-83
9924, Wrist Disconnect Assembly Glove Side-Right Hand, Large
(3.680 ID), Air-Lock, Inc., Rev. C, 7-26-84
9814, Wrist Disconnect Assembly Suit SIDE-RH, Air-Lock,
Inc., Rev. F, 6-12-86
9782, Assembly SCYE Bearing, 8.710 Ball Circles Dia.,
Air-Lock, Inc., Rev. E
9813, Wrist Disconnect Assembly Suite Side-LH, Air-Lock,
Inc., Rev. F, 6-12-86
9819, Combination Purge Vent Assembly, Air-Lock, Inc.,
Rev. R, 5-17-83
9672, Helmet Assembly, Air-Lock, Inc., Rev. K, 9-23-82
9786, Body Seal Closure Hut Half, 16" Inside, Air-Lock,
Inc., Rev. D, 5-12-83
SV772302, Retainer and Inserts, Bearing Shoulder, HSD,
Rev. M, 1-10-80
SV772303, Support, Pivot-Shoulder Bearing, HSD, Rev. E,
7-9-82
0102-82438-15/16 Rev. A, ILC Dover, Rev. A, July 1985
9694, Assembly Multiple Connector, Hut Side, Air-Lock, Inc.,
Rev. J, 5-2-86
SV772375, Shell and Inserts, Large-Hard Torso, HSD, 10-9-78
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APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS
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AAP
BITE
CCA
CCC
COMM
CPU
CWS
C&W
DCM
EVCS
ECLSS
EMU
EVA
EVC
EVVA
EVCS
FM
GFE
HSD
HUT
IOA
IDB
IVA
LCVG
LiOH
LSS
LTA
MMU
OPS
PLSS
SCU
SOP
SSA
STS
UCD
Airlock Adapter Plate
Built-in Test Equipment
Communications Carrier Assembly
Contaminant Control Cartridge
Communication
Central Processing Unit
Caution and Warning System
Caution and Warning
Display and Control Module
Extravehicular Communications System
Environmental Control and Life Support System
Extravehicular Activity
Extravehicular Activity
Extravehicular Communicator
Extravehicular Visor Assembly
Extravehicular Communications System
Failure Mode
Government Furnished Equipment
Hamilton Standard
Hard Upper Torso
Independent Orbiter-Assessment
Insult Drink Bag
Intravehicular Activity
Liquid Cooling and vent Garmet
Lithium Hydroxide
Life Support System
Lower Torso Assembly
Manned Maneuvering Unit
Operations
Primary Life Support Subsystem
Service and Cooling Umbilical
Secondary Oxygen Pack
Space Suite Assembly
Space Transportation System
Urine Collection Device
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I
B.2
B.3
Definitions
Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
Subsystem-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
m
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, i0 October 1986, were used with the _Y6_lowing
_plifications "and additi--_.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
_-60PS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
_-_nsition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
_-_nsition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
_-_nsition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard m--_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
p-_ed end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(ops)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
B-2
MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or _ of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard m--_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards - ____ _= - _
OP__SS- software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives areequal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at r_nsition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and en--_at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main_gear _
touchdown and ens--d-{-_ith the completion of post-landing
safing operations
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CIL, I0 October 1986, was employe--_-with the
following amp-[ifications and additions•
--=
m
w
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i •
•
•
•
•
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown•
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance•
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
B-4
• All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prlme Contractor
Orbiter FMEATCILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser•
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail•
• Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of thls task.
8. The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
9. Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed•
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection•
i0. Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
ll. Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
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DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.3 EMU Ground Rules and Assumptions
i • The overall EMU mission will encompass both planned EVA
operations (typically two 2-man EVAs are available each
Orbiter mission) and unscheduled EVA operations
(typically reserved for Orbiter safety-critical EVA
tasks).
RATIONALE: Ensures analysis provides worst-case
mission impact•
• The inability of an EMU to perform an EVA or to satisfy
a six-hour EVA duration will be considered a mission
impact•
RATIONALE: A worst case scenario in which the EMU is
employed for prebreathe, or in which the
EVA is time critical (e.g. rescue of
stranded EVA crewmember), or in which the
EVA objectives require full EVA duration is
thus obtained for the IOA analysis.
i
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APPENDIX C
DETAILED ANALYSIS
u
This section contains the IOA analysis worksheets generated
during the analysis of this subsystem. The information on these
worksheets is intentionally similar to the NASA FMEAs. Each of
these sheets identifies the hardware item being analyzed, and
parent assembly, as well as the function. For each failure mode,
the possible causes are outlined, and the assessed hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase is listed, as
described in the NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation of FMEA
and CIL, i0 October 1986. Finally, effects are entered at-The
_-6-_t_ of--each sheet?-_d the worst case criticality is entered
at the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 - Loss of life or vehicle
2 - Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 - All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR - Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R - Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
i - Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 - Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 - Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA - Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P - Passed Screen
F - Failed Screen
NA - Not Applicable
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
i00
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRIMARY H20 TANK 1 (ITEM 131)
BLADDER FAILURE (02/H20)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
A[2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV769592-24
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT, EXCESSIVE WEAR, BLADDER SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
02 AND H20 MIX IN FDW TANK DURING EVA WITH PROBABLE
DEGREDATION/LOSS OF COOLING DUE TO INEFFICIENT H20 FLOW TO
SUBLIMATOR; THEREFORE, LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
UNABLE TO OBTAIN HYRAULIC LOCK-UP DURING FILL/RECHARGE-WOULD LEAK
INTO THE GAS SIDE. EXCESS H20 USAGE DURING CHARGE WOULD INDICATE
LEAK. UNDETECTED, H20 ON THE GAS SIDE COULD MIGRATE (VIA THE
120A ORIFICE) TO THE SUIT WHERE IT WOULD THREATEN USE OF THE
PURGE VALVE BY H20 FREEZING AND BLOCKING IT DURING EVA WHEN LOSS
OF COOLING WOULD REQUIRE EMERGENCY SOP USE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-2
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
lO1
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/_C
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRIMARY H20 TANK 1 (ITEM 131)
LEAK-02 SIDE EXTERNAL
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV769592-24
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONAl:
DURING PRE- AND POST-EVA, 02 SIDE IS NOT PRESSURIZED EXCEPT
DURING PORTIONS OF DONNING I)_-D DOFFING SEQUENCES. _EVA AND
PRE- AND POST-EVA TIMEFRAMES WHEN 02 PRESSURIZATION EXISTS,
LEAKAGE WOULD RESULT IN MISSION IMPACTAND LOSS OF PRIMARY 02
SUPPLY REQUIRING, IF EVA, SOP USAGE. LOSS OF SOP CAN RESULT IN
LOSS OF CREWPERSON.
REFERENCES:
I
I
l
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g
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g
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-3
I
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
102
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRIMARY H20 TANK 1 (ITEM 131)
LEAK-H20 SIDE, EXTERNAL (OR VIA TPJ)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
T)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV769592-24
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF H20 RESULTS IN THE INABILITY TO OBTAIN ACCEPTABLE
FILL/RECHARGE AND THEREFORE LOSS OF MISSION. H20 LOSS DURING EVA
RESULTS IN LOSS/DEGRADATION OF COOLING VIA SUBLIMATOR WITH
POSSIBLE USAGE OF SOP REQUIRED TO RETURN CREWPERSON TO VEHICLE.
WITH LOSS OF SOP, POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-4
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
103
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRIMARY H20 TANK 1 (ITEM 162)
BLADDER FAILURE (02/H20)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI ;
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV769592-24
B[F] C [ P]
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT, EXCESSIVE WEAR, BLADDER SEAL FAILURE_
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
02 AND H20 MIX _NFDW T_, UNAB_ TO OBTAIN HYDRAULIC LOCK-UP
DURING FILL/RECHARGE. H20 WOULD LEAK INTO GAS SIDE AND EXCESS H20
USE WOULD INDICATE LEAK. UNDETECTED, THIS H20 ON THE GAS SIDE
COULD MIGRATE (VIA THE 120A ORIFICE) TO THE SUIT WHERE IT
WOULD THREATEN USE OF THE PURGE VALVE BY H20 FREEZING AND ....
BLOCKING IT DURING EVA WHEN LOSS OF COOLING REQUIRES SOP USAGE.
REFERENCES:
g
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m
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
104
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRIMARY H20 TANK 1 (ITEM 162)
LEAK-02 SIDE, EXTERNAL
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLsS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV769592-24
B [P] C [P]
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DURING PRE- AND POST-EVA, 02 SIDE IS NOT PRESSURIZED EXCEPT
DURING PORTIONS OF DONNINGAND DOFFING SEQUENCES. DURING EVA,
AND THESE PRE- AND POST-EVA TIMEFRAMES WHEN 02 PRESSURIZATION
EXIST, LEAKAGE WOULD RESULT IN MISSION IMPACTAND LOSS OF PRIMARY
02 SUPPLY REQUIRING, IF EVA, SOP USAGE. POSSIBLE CREWPERSON LOSS
IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-6
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 105
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRIMARY H20 TANK i (ITEM 162)
LEAK-H20 SIDE, EXTERNAL (AND/OR VIA TPK)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLsS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV769592-24
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF H20 RESULTS IN INABILITY TO PERFORM ACCEPTABLE
FILL/RECHARGE AND THEREFORE LOSS OF_iON. H20 LOSS DURING EVA
RESULTS IN LOSS/DEGRADATION OF COOLING VIA SUBLIMATOR WITH
POSSIBLE REQUIRED USAGE OF SOP TO RETURN CREW PERSON TO VEHICLE.
IF THE SOP FAILS THE CREWPERSON COULD BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 106
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM: RESERVE H20 TANK (ITEM 148)
FAILURE MODE: BLADDER FAILURE (02/H20 MIX)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV769592-24
B [P] C [ P]
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT, EXCESSIVE WEAR, BLADDER SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
02 AND H20 MIX IN FDW TANK. UNABLE TO OBTAIN HYDRAULIC LOCK-UP
DURING FILL/RECHARGE-H20 THEN LEAK INTO THE GAS SIDE. EXCESS H20
FOR FILL WOULD INDICATE LEAK. UNDETECTED, THIS H20 ON THE GAS
SIDE COULD MIGRATE (VIA THE 120A ORIFICE) TO THE SUIT WHERE IT
WOULD THREATEN USE OF THE PURGE VALVE BY H20 FREEZING AND
BLOCKING IT DURING EVA WHEN LOSS OF COOLING WOULD REQUIRE SOP
USEAGE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-8
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
107
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
_SERVE H20 T_K (ITEM 148)
_-02 SIDE, EXTE_AL
T._AD _ALYST: G. _FFAELLI SUBSYS _AD: G. _FFAELLI
B___ HIE_CHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITI_LITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C
P_-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
_CATION:
P_T _MBER: SV769592-24
B [P] C [P]
CAUSES: SEAL FAIL_
EFFECTS/_TIONAT._:
D_ING P_- _D POST-EVA, 02 SIDE IS NOT P_SS_IZED EXCEPT
D_ING PORTIONS OF _ING _D _FFING _EQUENCES. D_ING _A,
_D THOSE P_- _D POST-EVA TIME_MES _N 02 P_SS_IZATION
EXISTS, T._GE WOULD _SULT IN MISSION IMPACT DUE TO _SS OF
PRIMLY 02 _QUIRING USE OF=SOP i? EV_. IF _P_ FAI_D THE
C_WPE_ON COULD BE _ST.
_FE_NCES:
1
1
1
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
108
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESERVE H20 TANK (ITEM 148)
LEAK-H20 SIDE, EXTERNAL (AND/OR VIA TPC OR TPL)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV769592-24
CAUSES: CORROSION, SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF H20 RESULTS IN FLOW FROM ALL TANKS UNTIL COOLING IS
DEGRADED/LOST REQUIRING MISSION TERMINATION. IF EVA, MISSION
TERMINATION MAY REQUIRE SOP USAGE TO RETURN TO VEHICLE.
LOSS OF CREWPERSON COULD RESULT WITH SOP FAILURE.
REFERENCES:
w
L_
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-10
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
109
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FDW SUPPLY PRESSURE SENSOR (ITEM 132B)
BIASED HIGH (OR FAILED HIGH)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F J
LOCATION:
PARTNUMBER: SV767793-5/SV767793-7
CAUSES: INTERNAL LINKAGE/WIPER FAILURE-BINDING
c[P]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRE- OR POST-EVA WILL NOT BE ABLE TO ENSURE APPROPRIATE H20 FILL
AVAILABLE AND WILL IMPACT c&W'MISSION IMPACT; ALSO, THE AIRLOCK
HAS AN H20 GAGE TO COMPARE TO. IF EVA, CREWMEMBER WILL NOT BE
FOREWARNED OF "PREMATURE" H20 DEPLETION, BUT CAN USE
SUBLIMATER PRESSURE (ITEM 138) TO INDICATE SOP REQUIRED.
ADDITIONALLY THE H20 SUPPLY IS ADEQUATE FOR A NORMAL MISSION
LENGTH WHICH IS TIMED AND PROVIDED TO THE CREWPERSON. FAILURE OF
THESE REDUNDANCIES WOULD RESULT IN MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-ll
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uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
ii0
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FDW SUPPLY PRESSURE SENSOR (ITEM 132B)
BIASED LOW (OR FAILED LOW)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767793-5/SV767793-7
CAUSES: INTERNAL LINKAGE/WIPER FAILURE-BINDING, LOSS OF
REFERENCE PRESSURE INTEGRITY-BELLOWS LKG, LOSS OF POWER (SEE
BATTERY FAILURE)-OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRE- AND POST-EVA WILL NOT BE ABLE TO ENSURE APPROPRIATE H20 FILL
AVAILABLE AND WILL IMPACT C&W-MISSION IMPACT. (THE AIRLOCKHAS
AN H20 GAGE TO COMPARE TO). IF EVA, CREWMEMBER WILL NOT BEFULLY
AWARE OF H20 USAGE. POSSIBLE SOP USAGE REQUIRED IF H20
USE RATE GREATER THAN NORMAL AND/OR LEAK EXISTS.
REFERENCES:
m
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-12
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
111
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FDW SUPPLY PRESSURE SENSOR (ITEM 132B)
EXTERNAL H20 LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI_ __
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767793-5/SV767793-7
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GRADUAL H20 LOSS UNTIL IMPACT TO CREWMEMBER COOLING. POSSIBLE
SOP USAGE, IF EVA. LOSS OF CREWPERSON POSSIBLE IF SOP IS FAILED.
m
Eli
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REFERENCES: ......
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iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
112
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FDW SUPPLY PRESSURE SENSOR (ITEM 132B)
INTERNAL SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLsS
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
•POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ F]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767793-5/SV767793-7
CAUSES: VIBRATION, FAILURE OF INSULATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROBABLE ERRONEOUS READING OF PRESSURE. CURRENT LIMITED IN THE
DCM. DECREASES BATTERY RESERVE AVAILABLE. IF EVA, CREWMEMBER
MAY GET ERRONEOUS C&W MESSAGES OR BE DEPRIVED OF ACCURATE C&W.
EARLY POWER LOSS OR ERRONEOUS C&W CAN RESULT IN SOP BEING USED IF
MISSION NOT TERMINATED. CREWPERSON LOSS CAN RESULT IF SOP IS
ALSO FAILS WHEN USED.
REFERENCES:
m
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-14
INDEPENDENTORBITER_SESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM_ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE: 9/26/86 HIG_ST CRITICALITY HDW/_C
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 113 FLIGHT: 3/IR
ITEM: WATER_LIEF VALVE (ITEM 142) _
FAILU_ MODE: INTE_AL _G/FAIL OPEN (PRIVY T_KS TO _SERVE
_D VICE VERSA)
_D _ALYST: G. _FF_LLI SUBSYS _D:_G. _FFAELLI
B_O_ HIE_CHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES ....
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C
P_-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/IR
_ST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
_CATION:
P_T_MBER: SV769405-3
CAUSES: SEAL FAIL_, MEC_ICAL FAIL_ _ABT._. TO _SEAT-SPRING
F_C_, C_CK P_SS_ _W
EFFECTS/_O__! _ .....
THIS WILL _USE _ T_KS TO DEPUTE AS O_. _EMBER WILL BE
_AW_ OF _SERVE T_K USAGE. HOOVER, _IS WI_ NOT IMPACT THE
USE _TE OF FEEDWATER; _THER, IT MAY A_W FOR C_EMBER,
D_ING HIGH H_T-_AD MISSIONS, TO OVEr'END BEYOND AVAILBT._.
FEEDWATER SUPPLY _D COOLING WI_O_ W_ING; THE_BY _QUIRING
SOP USEAGE IN _ _P_D M_ER. ADDITIONA_Y, A MISSION C_CK
IS AVAI_BT._. FOR THE EVA C_WMEMBER' FAIL--OF _D_D_ SOP
E_ME_ C_ _SULT IN _SS OF C_ERSON.
_FE_NCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
ll4
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WATER RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 142)
FAILURE TO OPEN/FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV769405-3
CAUSES: MECHANICAL FAILURE-UNABLE TO OPEN DUE BEING TO STUCK IN
SEAT OR SPRING FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TOTAL FEEDWATER QUANTITY NOW REDUCED BY .9 LBS. THIS CAN RESULT
IN EARLY MISSION TERMINATION AND LOSS OF FULL COOLING CAPABILITY
VIA SUBLIMATOR. SOP USAGE MAY BE REQUIRED. UNABLE TO DRAIN
RESERVE TANK. POSSIBLELOSS OF CREWPERSON WITH LOSS OF SOP.
REFERENCES:
i..
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-16
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT __
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 115
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WATER RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 142)
E_E_AL _G
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
A[2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV769405-3
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF FEEDWATER WILL DEGRADE CAPABILITY TO COOL CREWMEMBERAND
MAY RESULT IN USE OF SOP IN ADDITION TO MISSION TERMINATION.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON WITH SOP FAILURE.
REFERENCES:
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I
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9126186
EMU
116
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WATER CHECK VALVE (ITEM 143)
INTERNAL LKG (FROM RESERVE TO PRI)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
_)
8)
9)
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/IR
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV769406-2
CAUSES: INTERNAL SEAT/SEAL FAILURE-WEAR OR CONTAMINATION, SPRING
FAILURE/FRACTURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS WILL CAUSE ALL TANKS TO DEPLETE AS ONE. THE CREWMEMBER WILL
BE UNAWARE OF RESERVE TANK USAGE UNTIL ALL FDW DEPLETED. THIS
WILL NOT IMPACT FEEDWATER USE RATE. A MISSION CLOCK IS AVAILABLE
TO CREWMEMBER TO INDICATE TYPICAL MISSION DURATION. FOR
HIGH HEAT LOAD OR NONTYPICAL MISSIONS, THE CREWMEMBER CAN
POSSIBLY BE SUBJECTED TO LOSS OF COOLING THEREBY REQUIRING
POSSIBLE SOP USEAGE. POSSIBLE CREWPERSON LOSS WITH SOP FAILURE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-18
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 117 FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WATER CHECK VALVE (ITEM 143)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1). EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
A[ 2 ] B[F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV769406-2
CAUSES: MECHANICAL FAILURE MAINTAINS SEAL, SPRING
FAILURE/FRAC_
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO CHARGE/RECHARGE RESERVE H20 TANK THEREBY IMPACTING
MISSION. (DETECTION OF PROBLEM BY H20 QUANTITY USED FOR FILL.)
IFUNDETECTED BY WATER MANAGEMENT, EVA CREWMEMBER MAY BE
SUBJECTED TO PREMATURE LOSS OF COOLING AND REQUIRE THESOP TO
RETURN TO THE VEHICLE. LOSS OF CREWPERSON WITH SOP FAILURE.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
ll8
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TANK SIDE)
WATER CHECK VALVE (ITEM 143)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (RESERVE TANK SIDE OR PRIMARY
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
?)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV769406-2
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE AND CONNECTOR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF FEEDWATER RESULTS IN MISSION TERMINATIONAND POSSIBLE USE
OF SOP FOR COOLING IF EVA. POSSIBLE CREWPERSON LOSS WITH SOP
FAILURE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-20
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 119
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM: FEEDWATER PRESSURE REGULATOR (ITEM 136)
FAILURE MODE: REGULATES HIGH (BIASED OR FULL OPEN)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLS S
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE
PRE-EVA:
EVA:
POST-EVA:
A[ 2 ]
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/IR
2/2
B [ P]
SV792528-3
c[p]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL FAILURE-RESISTANT SPRING FAILURES,
PISTON/PLUNGER STICKS OPEN, CONTAMINATION ON SEAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROBABLE SUBLIMATOR FEEDWATER BREAKTHROUGH AND LOSS OF COOLING
WHEN EVA. DETECTABLE VIA PRESSURE SENSOR ITEM 138. SOP WILL
PROVIDE REDUNDANT COOLING.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP FAILS DURING EVA.
REFERENCES:
g
I
I
m
I
J
U
m
i
m
i
i
m
=_
m
u
mm
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-21
i
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
120
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FEEDWATER PRESSURE REGULATOR (ITEM 136)
REGULATES LOW (BIASED OR FULL CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792528-3
CAUSES: PRESSURE REF. FAILURE, CONTAMINATION IS BLOCKING
INTERNAL FLOW PATH, FILTER BLOCKED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOW PRESSURE REGULATION RESULTS IN DEGRADED COOLING, MISSION
TERMINATION, AND POSSIBLE SOP USAGE IF EVA. POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREWPERSON IF SOP IS FAILED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-22
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
121
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FEEDWATER PRESSURE REGULATOR (ITEM 136)
INTERNAL LKG.
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLsS
4)
s)
6)
_)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792528-3
CAUSES: SEAT FAILURE/SEAL FAILURE
B[P] c[P]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ASSUMING EVA WITH THE ISOLATION VALVE OPEN, PROBABLE SUBLIMATOR
FEEDWATER BREAKTHROUGH AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF COOLING. SOP USAGE
POSSIBLE. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP IS FAILED. IF IN
AIRLOCK PRE- OR POST-EVA, MISSION IS TERMINATED IF
SUBLIMATOR SHUTOFF VALVE FAILS OPEN.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-23
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
122
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FEEDWATER PRESSURE REGULATOR (ITEM 136)
EXTERNAL LKG.
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
A[2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV792528-3
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF FEEDWATER SUPPLY WITH DEGRADATION/LOSS OF COOLING VIA
SUBLIMATOR. SOP USAGE POSSIBLE IF EVA. POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREWPERSON IF SOP IS FAILED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-24
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 123 FLIGHT:
ITEM: FEEDWATERRELIEF VALVE (ITEM 135)
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL LKG. - FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV769404-6
CAUSES: INTERNAL PLUNGER/DIAPHRAM FAILS MECHANICALLY OPEN,
CONT_iNATION B_CKS SEAT OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .....................................
LOSS OF H20 FDW SUPPLY FOR SUBLIMATOR. DEGRADATION-COOLING LOSS
TO CREWMEMBER. POSSIBLE SOP USAGE IF EVA. POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREWPERSON IF SOP IS FAILED.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-25
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
124
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FEEDWATERRELIEF VALVE (ITEM 135)
EXTERNAL LKG _- FDW. SIDE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PiSS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV769404-6
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF H20 FDW SUPPLY FOR SUBLIMATOR.
CREWMEMBER. POSSIBLE SOP USAGE IF EVA.
CREWPERSON IF SOP IS FAILED.
DEGRATION COOLING LOSS TO
POSSIBLE LOSS OF
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-26
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 125
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FEEDWATERRELIEF VALVE (ITEM 135)
FAILS TO OPEN
HDW/FUNC
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV769404-6
A[2 ] B [F] C[P]
CAUSES: PLUNGER MECHANICAL FAILURE; BLOCKED DUE TO
CONTAMINATION, DIAPHRAM FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FOR A FAILURE TO OPEN SCENARIO, ONE MUST ASSUME OVER ....
PRESSURIZATION IN THE FWD TANKS EXISTS DUE TO THERMAL EXPANSION.
THIS CAN NOT OCCUR DURING EVA DUE TO EVA USAGE OF H20 VIA
SUBLIMATOR. PRE- AND POST-EVA, THIS FAILURE CAN RESULT IN DAMAGE
TO SEALS, BLADDERS, _D OTHER SYSTEM COMPONENTS; THEREBY
REQUIRING MISSION TERMINATION IF DETECTED.
REFERENCES :
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-27
D
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
126
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FEEDWATER SHUTOFF VALVE (ITEM 137)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 2/2
A[2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767660-5
CAUSES: INTERNAL SEAL FAILURES, VALVE POPPET UNABLE TO FULLY
SEAT DUE TO CONTAMINATION AND/OR SEAT WEAR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRESSURE READOUT AT ITEM 138 WILL DETECT INTERNAL LEAKAGE WHEN
VALVE IS CLOSED. LEAKAGE PRE- OR POST-EVA WILL DEPLETE THE
RESERVOIR OF H20 VIA THE SUBLIMATOR. MISSION TERMINATION
REQUIRED DUE TO FLOODED SUBLIMATOR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-28
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 127
HIGHEST_ITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FEEDWATER SHUTOFF VALVE (ITEM 137)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (EITHER SIDE)
HDW/FU-NC
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767660-5
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE - INLET, OUTLET, OR HOUSING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE DURING EVA WILL DEPLETE H20 RESERVOIRS AND CAUSE LOSS OF
COOLING VIA SUBLIMATOR. MISSION TERMINATI6N REQUIRED _WITH
POSSIBLE SOP USAGE IF EVA. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP IS
FAILED.
REFERENCES :
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-29
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
128
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FEEDWATER SHUTOFF VALVE (ITEM 137)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767660-5
CAUSES: SOLENOID MOTOR FAILURE (ELECTRONICS); OPEN/SHORT;
MECHANICAL FAILURE OF MOTOR/VALVE PREVENTS OPENING OR CAUSES
VALVE TO BE STUCK IN CLOSED POSITION, SWITCH FAILURE (SEE DCM),
POWER FAILURE (SEE ELECTRICAL), VIBRATION/CONTAMINATION, BLOCKED
FILTER
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ISOLATES H20 FROM SUBLIMATOR RESULTING IN MISSION TERMINATION AND
POSSIBLE USAGE OF SOP, IF EVAI THIS SHOULD BE RAPIDLY DETECTABLE
BY CREWPERSON. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP IS FAILED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-30
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
129
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FEEDWATER SHUTOFF VALVE (ITEM 137)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLS S
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767660-5
CAUSES: SOLENOID MOTOR FAILURE (ELECTRONICS OPEN OR SHORT),
MECHANICAL FAILURE OF MOTOR OR VALVE PREVENTS CLOSING, SWITCH
FAILURE (SEE DCM), POWER FAILURE (SEE ELECTRICAL)
EFFECTS/RATIONA_ :
VALVE IS NORMALLY OPEN DURING EVA. PRE- AND POST-EVA FAILURE
WILL RESULT IN H20 DUMPING TO AIRLOCK VIA SUBLIMATOR AND MISSION
TERMINATION?. _ ..........._ .... ......................
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-31
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 130
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FEEDWATER SHUTOFF VALVE (ITEM 137)
ELECTRONICS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
_)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767660-5
CAUSES: VIBRATION/CONTAMINATION IN SOLENOID ELECTRONICS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DCM CIRCUITRY PROVIDES CURRENT LIMITING. VALVE MAY POSSIBLY
REMAIN IN POSITION AT TIME OF FAILURE. USE OF AVAILABLE POWER
FROM BATTERY AT HIGHER RATE CAUSES MISSION TERMINATION AND, IF
EMU POWER LOST, POSSIBLE SOP USAGE. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON
IF SOP FAILS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-32
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EMU
131 FLIGHT: 2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OFF)
FEEDWATER SHUTOFF VALVE (ITEM 137)
EXCESSIVE/CONTINUOUS CURRENT DRAW - (WILL NOT SHUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PiSS
4)
5)
6)
"7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES _
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767660-5
CAUSES: ELECTRONICS FAILURE OR SHORT, DCM SWITCH FAILURE
EFFECTSZRATIONALE:_ ........ .....................
DCM CIRCUITRY PROVIDES CURRENT LIMITING. BATTERY POWER USED AT
HIGHER RATE CAN RESULT IN MISSION TERMINATION AND, IF EMU POWER
LOST, POSSIBLE SOP USAGE.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP FAILS.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-33
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
132
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FEEDWATER PRESSURE SENSOR (ITEM 138)
BIASED HIGH OR FAILED HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767793-8
CAUSES: INTERNAL LINKAGE/WIPER FAILURE-BINDING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF PRE- OR POST-EVA WOULD BE DETECTABLE BY COMPARISON TO AIRLOCK
SENSOR. HOWEVER, IF EVA, IT WILL REQUIRE CREWMEMBER MONITORING
OF COOLING CAPABILITY TO VERIFY IF SENSOR FAILURE OR REGULATOR
FAILURE.
NO IMPACT TO MISSION, EMU, OR CREWPERSON.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-34
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
133
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FEEDWATER PRESSURE SENSOR {ITEM 138)
BIASED LOW OR FAILED LOW
HDW/FUNC
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767793-8
CAUSES: INTERNAL LINKAGE/WIPER FAILURE-BINDING, LOSS OF PRESS
REF. INTEGRITY-BELLOWS LKG., LOSS OF POWER-OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
_PRE-OR__BE DETECTABLE BY COMP_ISON TO AIRLOCK
SENSOR. IF EVA, CREWMEMBER MUST MONITOR COOLING TEMPERATURE TO
VERIFY SENSOR FAILURE VERSUS REGULATOR FAILURE.
NO IMPACT.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-35
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 134
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM: FEEDWATER PRESSURE SENSOR (ITEM 138)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
s) PLsS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767793-8
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF FDW H20 SUPPLY CAUSING DEGRADATION/LOSS OF COOLING.
MISSION TERMINATION AND, IF EVA, POSSIBLE SOP USAGE REQUIRED.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP FAILS.
REFERENCES:
l
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-36
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WORKS_ET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
135
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/_NC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
FEEDWATER PRESSU_ SENSOR (ITEM 138)
INTE_AL SHORT
7_AD _ALYST: G. _FF_LLI SUBSYS T_AD: G. _FFAELLI
B_DO_ HIE_CHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C
P_-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
_CATION:
P_T _MBER: SV767793-8
CAUSES: VIB_TION, FAIL_ OF INSU_TION, CONT_INATION
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
INSTRUMENT FAIL_; EXCESSIVE USE OF BATTERY PO_R_SULTING IN
E_LY MISSION TERMINATION. IF ALL E_ _R _ST, MAY _QUI_
SOP USAGE IF EVA.
POSSIBT._ _SS OF C_WPE_ON IF SOP FAI_.
_FE_NCES:
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_PORT DATE 12/02/86 C-37
I
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
136
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SUBLIMATOR (ITEM 140)
EXTERNAL H20 FDW LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: /NA
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV783850-14
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF H20 QUANTITY RESULTS IN EARLY MISSION TERMINATION DUE TO
COOLING DEGRADATION/LOSS. POSSIBLE USE OF SOP MAY OCCUR.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP FAILS.
REFERENCES:
B
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-38
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 137
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM: SUBLIMATOR (ITEM 140)
FAILURE MODE: SUBLIMATOR BLOCKED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: /
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV783850-14
CAUSES:
BLOCKAGE)
CORROSION/DEPOSITION (HISTORY OF DEPOSITION CAUSING ....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUCED COOLING CAPABILITY RESULTS IN EARLY MISSION TERMINATION
AND POSSIBLE SOP USAGE.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP FAILS.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
138
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SUBLIMATOR (ITEM 140)
EXTERNAL LCG H20 LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] C [P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV783850-14
CAUSES: SUBLIMATOR INLET/OUTLET SEAL(S)FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF LCG H20 DRAINS THE FDW TANKS THEREBY REDUCING MISSION
COOLING CAPABILITY. SOP WILL BE REQUIRED IF ALL H20 USED.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP FAILS.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-40
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _LYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
139
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SUBLIMATOR (ITEM 140)
INTERNAL LCG-TO-FDW LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
s) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV783850-14
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE .......
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HIGH PRESSURE IN FDW GAP WILL LIKELY CAUSE BREAKTHROUGH AND FAIL
EMU COOLING CAPABILITY THEREBY CAUSING CREW PERSON DISCOMFORT,
AND REQUIRING SOP USAGE. TERMINATION OF MISSION IF EVA.
IF SOP IS FAILED, POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW PERSON. IF THIS OCCURS
IN AIRLOCK PRE-EVA, THE AFFECTED EMU CANNOT PERFORM AN EVA
MISSION.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-41
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M
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
140
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SUBLIMATOR (ITEM 140)
INTERNAL LCG-VENT LOOP LEAKAGE (H20 AND 02)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C C F]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV783850-14
CAUSES: VIBRATIONCAUSES JOINT FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DURING EVA, WATER IN VENT LOOP CANBE CARRIED OVER INTO HELMET
AND SSA, WITH THE RESULTANT LOSS OF COOLING AND POSSIBLY THE VENT
LOOP. THE PURGE VALVE MUST BE OPENED TO ACTIVATE THE SOP. IF
THIS OCCURS, WATER CAN ENTER THE VALVE, FREEZE, AND PREVENT
SOP USAGE. (ASSUMES SLURPER CANNOT HANDLE THE AMOUNT OF H20
LEAKAGE.) CREWPERSON CAN BE LOST IF SOP IS FAILED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-42
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE: 9/26/86 HIGHEST CRITI_LITY
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 141 FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
SUBLIMATOR (ITEM 140) ......
EXTE_AL VE_ _OP T._GE
T,_AD _ALYST: G. _FFAELLI SUBSYS T._AD: G. _FFAELLI
B_DO_ HIE_CHY:
l) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C
P_-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
_CATION:
P_T _MBER: SV783850-14
CAUSES: SEAL FAIL_ AT IN_T OR OUT'T, SLOPER OUTER SEAL
FA_L_
EFFECTS/_TIONAT_:
_SS OF PRIMLY O_GEN A_OSP_ WILL___Y END OF
MISSION _D POSSIBT_ USAGE OF SOP TO PROVIDE _ EMERGEN_ __
TO ORBITER.
_SSIB_ _SS OF C_E_ON IF SOP IS FAIT._D EVA.
_FE_NCES:
1
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_PORT DATE 12/02/86 C-43
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
142
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SUBLIMATOR (ITEM 140)
SLURPER BLOCKED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: /NA
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV783850-14
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BLOCKAGE RESULTS IN DEGRADATION OF HUMIDITY REMOVAL CAPABILITY
THEREBY INCREASING THE AMOUNT OF H20 IN VENT LOOP OVER THE
MISSION. AS THIS CONTINUES, WATER WILL BE CARRIED OVER INTO THE
HELMET, SSA, AND WILL DEGRADE THE VENT LOOPS.
MISSION TERMINATION WILL RESULT. THE SOP CAN BE USED IF VENT
LOOP FAILS.
REFERENCES:
_ I
line
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-44
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 143 FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TEMPERATURE SENSOR & HARNESS (ITEM 139)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF H20
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792503-I
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF H20 IMPACTS.....MISSION COOLING CApABIL!TY REQUIRING MISSION
TERMINATION. POSSIBLE SOP USAGE IF EVA.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP IS FAILED.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-45
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
144
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TEMPERATURE SENSOR & HARNESS (ITEM 139)
FAILS/BIASED HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
A[ 2 ] B [F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792503-I
CAUSES: ELECTRONICS FAILURE-SHORT DUE TO CONTAMiNATION/VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS C&W INDICATION.
USING SENSORY PERCEPTION.
CREW PERSON CAN MANUALLY CONTROL SUIT
REFERENCES:
w
w
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-46
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
145
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TEMPERATURE SENSOR & HARNESS (ITEM 139)
ELECTRICAL SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRTTICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792503-I
CAUSES: VIBRATION/CONTAMINATION IN CONNECTOR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXCESSIVE USAGE OF BATTERY POWER DURING EVA (CURRENT LIMITED)
WILL RESULT IN MISSION TERMINATION. POSSIBLE SOP USAGE IF EVA.
SENSOR WILL LIKELY BE LOST.
IF POWER AND SOP FAILED, POSSIBLE CREWPERSON LOSS.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-47
::;c
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 146
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM: TEMPERATURE SENSOR & HARNESS (ITEM 139)
FAILURE MODE: BIASED LOW OR FAILS LOW (FULL SCALE)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) pLSs
4)
5)
6)
_)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792503-I
CAUSES: OPEN IN ELECTRONICS DUE TO VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS C&W INDICATION.
PERCEPTION. NO IMPACT.
CREW PERSON MUST EMPLOY SENSORY
HDW/FUNC
3/3
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-48
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 147 FLIGHT: 2/2
ITEM: PITOT ACTUATED VALVE (ITEM 125)
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL LEAKAGE VIA NORMAL FLOW PATHS (GAS TRAP
INLET TO VALVE OUTLET TO WATER SEPARATOR)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
a) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITIES _
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV769480-3
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE INTERNAL, PLUNGER STICKS, SPRING BREAKS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _ _ _ : :::_:_: =_
INTERNAL LEAKAGE WITH H20 SEPARATOR OFF CAN RESULTINVENTLOOP
FLOODING AT THE FAN WHEN WATER LOOPS ARE PRESSURIZED. SINCE H20
SEP IS NORMALLY-ON DURING EVA, THE PRIMARY IMPACTS WOULD BE PRE-
AND POST-EVA AND NO IMPA_Ti? DURING EVA.
EMUUNAVAILABLE TO PERFORM MISSION.
REFERENCES:
i
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EMU
148 FLIGHT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PITOT ACTUATED VALVE (ITEM 125)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE FROM GAS TRAP INLET TO SENSE PORT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV769480-3
CAUSES: HOUSING SEAL FAILURE, DIAPHRAM FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE ACROSS DIAPHRAM CAUSING PITOT TO
CLOSE. THIS IN TURN CAUSES GAS-WATER TO BYPASS THE FAN-SEPARATOR
WHICH WILL THEREBY CREATE A POSSIBLE OCCURRENCE OF A BUBBLE
ENTERING THE H20 PUMP AND FAILING H20 FLOW. IF THIS OCCURS THE
SOP WILL BE REQUIRED TO BE USED. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF
SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
L
m
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-50
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 149 FLIGHT: 2/1R
ITEM: PITOT ACTUATED VALVE (ITEM 125)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (INLET FROM GAS TRAP, OUTLET TO
H20 SEPARATOR, AND VIA SHAFT SEAL)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV769480-3
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ..................................................
H20 LEAKAGE WOULD CAUSE DEPLETION OF H20 TANKS OVER TIME, THEREBY
REMOVING COOLING CAPABILITY AND POSSIBLY EXPOSING IN-SUIT LCG
LINES TO VACUUM. CREWMEMBER SHOULD RETURN TO VEHICLE UPON
INDICATION OF RESERVE H20 TANK USAGE ANDCAN USE THE SOP IF
NECESSARY.
REFERENCES :
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-51 n
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
150
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PITOT ACTUATED VALVE (ITEM 125)
INLET FILTER BLOCKED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) Lss
3) PLsS
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV769480-3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION/DEPOSITION (E.G. ALUMINUM-OXIDE),
CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO MAINTAIN FLOW FROM GAS TRAP. THIS WILL INCREASE GAS
CONCENTRATION IN FLUID LOOPS UNTIL SUFFICIENT AMOUNT IS
ACCUMULATED TO IMPACT COOLANT FLOW AND THEREFORE COOLING
CAPABILITY.
IF EVA, CREWMEMBER COULD USE THE SOP AS A REDUNDANT COOLING PATH
VIA PURGE VALVE DURING RETURN TO VEHICLE. POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-52
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
151
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PITOT ACTUATED VALVE (ITEM 125)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSs
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV769480-3
CAUSES: SPRING BREAKS, SHAFT STICKS, DIAPHRAM FAILURE CAUSES
LOSS OF REFERENCE PRESSURE
UNAB_ TO MAINTAIN FLOW FROM GAS TRAP/THIS _ iNe_SE GAS
CONCENTRATION IN FLUID LOOPS UNTIL SUFFICIENT AMOUNT IS
ACCUMULATED TO IMPACT COOLANT FLOW AND THEREFORE COOLING
CAPABILITY.
IF EVA, C_WMEMBER COULD USE THE SOP AS A REDUNDANT COOLING PATH
VIA PURGE VALVE DURING RETURN TO VEHICLE. POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS. _.......
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-53
J
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 152
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM: CHECK VALVE AND HOUSING (ITEM 128)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF H20
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767699-I
CAUSES: HOUSING SEAL FAILURE, INLET/OUTLET SEAL FAILURE, TEST
PORT-H CAP SEAL FAILURE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF H20 AND DECREASED COOLING CAPABILITY. MISSION IMPACTED
DUE TO LOSS OF COOLING H20. POSSIBLE/PROBABLE USE OF SOP TO
RETURN TO AIRLOCK.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
i
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-54
u
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
153
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECK VALVE AND HOUSING (ITEM 128)
INTERNAL H20 LEAKAGE/FAILED OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV767699-I
B [ P ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: HOUSING SEAL FAILURE, FLAPPER STUCK DUE TO CONTAMINATION
OR CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CHECK VALVE IS NORMALLY OPEN WHENON EVA; THEREFORE NO EVA
IMPACT. FAILURE PRE- OR POST-EVA CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF IMMEDIATE
OR NEXT MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO CHARGE (PRIME) H20 PUMP WITH
H20 RESULTING IN LOSS OR SEVERE DEGRADATION OF H20 FLOW.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
154
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECK VALVE AND HOUSING (ITEM 128)
FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
21 LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767699-I
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: FLAPPER STUCK CLOSED DUE TO CONTAMINATION OR CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL COOLING FLOW REQUIRING IMMEDIATE TERMINATION OF EVA
MISSION. LOSS OF CREWMEMBER COOLING DURING EVA REQUIRES USE OF
SOP TO RETURN TO VEHICLE.
POSSIBLE CREWPERSON LOSS IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES :
,u--
u
i
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-56
INDEPENDE_ ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM_ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
155
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/_C
2/IR
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
PUMP INLET FILTER (ITEM 127)
EXTE_AL _GE
_AD _ALYST: G. _FFAELLI SUBSYS _AD: G. _FFAELLI
B_DO_ HIE_CHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C
P_-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
A[ 2 ] B[ P] C [ P]
_CATION:
P_T _MBER: SV778543-3
CAUSES: HOUSING SEAL FAIL_
EFFECTS/_TIONAT_:
_SS OF H20 WI_ CONTI_E _TIL DEPUTED. TE_INATION OF
MISSION. POSSIB_ USE OF SOP BY C_EMBER TO __ TO VEHIC_.
POSSIBT_ C_WPERSON _SS IF SOP A_O FAI_'
_FE_NCES:
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_PORT DATE 12/02/86 C-57
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
156
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PUMP INLET FILTER (ITEM 127)
BLOC_D
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3 ) PLS S
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778543-3
CAUSES: CORROSION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONDENSATE NOT RECIRCULATED, GOES INTO H20 TANKS AND SUBLIMATOR
VIA 171 AND 172 VALVES. UNABLE TO CHARGE THE LCVG PRE- AND POST-
EVA. LOSS OF MAKEUP FDW DURING EVA CAN CAUSE REDUCTION OF
COOLING TO CREWMEMBER THEREBY IMPACTING MISSION. IF COOLING IS
SIGNIFICANTLY DEGRADED SOP USAGE MAY BE REQUIRED. POSSIBLE
CREWPERSON LOSS IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-58
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
157
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PUMP INLET FILTER (ITEM 127)
PASSAGE OF CONTAMINANTS
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLsS
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778543-3
CAUSES: FILTER ELEMENT RUPTURE, ELEMENT SEAL TO HOUSING FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PUMP_EX_S_ TO CONTAMINANT S, PROBABLE REDUCTION OR _LOSS OF
COOLING PUMP FLOW RESULTING IN CORRESPONDING DEGRADATION/LOSS OF
i
u
U
i
mm
m
ms
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COOLING. LOSS OF COOLING FLOW DURING EVA RESULTS IN MISSION
TERMINATION AND POSSIBLE USE OF SOP FOR COOLING.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CPEWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS, _ .....
REFERENCES:
I
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 158
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM: GAS TRAP (ITEM 141)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
"1)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV78493-3
CAUSES: HOUSING SEAL FAILURE, H20 INLET/OUTLET SEAL FAILURE,
H20/GAS OUTLET SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF H20 WILL DRAIN SUPPLY RESULTING IN NO COOLING FOR
CREWMEMBER DURING EVA. SOP WILL BE REQUIRED FOR EVA CASE; SCU
FOR PRE- AND POST-EVA CASES.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS EVA.
REFERENCES:
w
L
u
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-60
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
159
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GAS TRAP (ITEM 141)
GAS BREAKTHROUGH
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) pLss
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES _
FLIGHT P_ m_w/nmc
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV78493-3
CAUSES{ _ HYDROPHYLI_ SCREEN DETACHES FRbM HOUSING, HOUSING SEAL
FAILS, GAS ORIFICE BLOCKED DUE TO CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RAT!ONALE_
FAILURE CAN RESULT IN INABILITY TO PUMP H20 DUE TO GAS IN WATER
PUMP. THIS CAN CAUSE MISSION FAI_ DUE TO _SS OF COOLING
CAPABILITY, AND, IF EVA, MAY REQUIRE SOP USAGE TO RETURN TO
ORBITER.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
160
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GAS TRAP (ITEM 141)
SCREEN BLOCKED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV78493-3
CAUSES: GROSS CONTAMINATION ON SCREEN, GROSS CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SEVERELY RESTRICTS H20 FLOW AND THEREFORE DEGRADES COOLING TO THE
CREWMEMBER. IF EVA, MISSION WILLTERMINATEAND POSSIBLESOP .....
USAGE MAY RESULT.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-62
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
161
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GAS TRAP (ITEM 141)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE (H20 INLET TO GAS OUTLET)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ F ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV78493-3
CAUSES: HOUSING SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXCESSIVE FLOW TO FAN SEPARATOR CAN RESULT IN H20 CARRY-OVER TO
VENT LOOP. H20 CAN THEN MIGRATE TO HELMET AND SSAWHERE PURGE
VALVES ARE. IF VALVES ARE USED AND H20 FREEZES IN VALVES, SOP
AND COOLING 02 SUPPLY CAPABILITY WOULD BE LOST.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
162
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONDENSATE H20 RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 134)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF H20
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
A ['2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV769403-6
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE, HOUSING SEAL FAILURE (INTERNAL LEAKAGE TO
AMBIENT)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF COOLING FDW REQUIRES CREWMEMBER TO TERMINATE MISSION.
POSSIBLE SOP USAGE IF EVA. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP
ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
m
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-64
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 163
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/_NC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONDENSATE H20 RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 134)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV769403-6
CAUSES: SPRING FRACTURE, DIAPHRAM FAILURE, PLUNGER STICKS DUE TO
CORROSION/CONTAMINATION, INTERNAL LEAKAGE DUE TO HOUSING SEAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRIMARY IMPACT IS DURING PRE-EVAAND POST-EVA SCENARIOS WHEN FAN
SEPARATOR IS OFF. VENT LOOP FLOODING, WHEN CHARGING OR
RECHARGING H20 LOOPS WITH A FAILED OPEN FDW ISOLATION VALVE (171)
OR CLOSE VALVE (177) WILL RESULT IN MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES :
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
164
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONDENSATE H20 RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 134)
BLOCKED INLET FILTER (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [ F]
LOCATION
PART NUMBER: SV769403-6
CAUSES: EXCESSIVE CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO FLOW PATH FOR CONDENSATE RESULTS IN VENT LOOP FLOODINGAND
LOSS OF FAN/SEPARATOR/H20 PUMP. CAN IMPACT USE OF SOP DUE TO
POSSIBLE FREEZING AND BLOCKAGE OF PURGE VALVE (NECESSARY FOR USE
OF SOP) BY FREE WATER.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-66
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
E_
165
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONDENSATE H20RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 134)
VALVE FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] C [ F]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV769403-6
CAUSES: SPRING FRACTURE, PLUNGER STICKS (DUE TO
CORROSION/CONTAMINATION)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO FLOW PATH FOR CONDENSATE RESULTS IN VENT LOOP FLOODING AND
LOSS OF FAN/SEPARATOR/H20 PUMP. CAN IMPACT USE OF SOP DUE TO
POSSIBLE FREEZING OF WATER IN THE PURGE VALVES.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON.
REFERENCES:
m
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m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
166
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDWIFUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONDENSATE H20RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 134)
FILTER PASSES CONTAMINANTS
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV769403-6
CAUSES: FILTER ELEMENT FILTER, HOUSING-TO-FILTER SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE IMPACT TO VALVE OPERATION. DOWNSTREAM ELEMENTS ARE
PROTECTED BY FILTERS. NO IMMEDIATE IMPACT TO ANY INTERFACES OR
ITEMS.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-68
INDEPENbENTORBITER AS_ESSM-Ei'_=T
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/26/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 167 FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H20 SHUTOFF VALVE (ITEM 191)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV784982-I (MOTOR VALVE SV784998)
CAUSES:
FAILURE
SEAL FAILURE AT ANY INLET OR OUTLET, HOUSING SEAL(S)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF COOLING FDWREQUI_S CREWMEMBER TO TERMINATE MISSION AND,
IF EVA, POSSIBLY USE SOP FOR COOLING.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
168
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LOOPS)
H20 SHUTOFF VALVE (ITEM 171)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE - FAILS OPEN (FDW TANKS TO LCG
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV784982-I (MOTOR VALVE SV784998)
c[P]
CAUSES: HOUSING SEAL FAILURE, LINKAGE FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
PRE- AND POST-EVA FAILED OPEN (WHICH IS NORMAL EVA MODE) CAN
RESULT IN VENT LOOP FLOODING WHEN FAN SEPARATOR IS OFF AND EITHER
THE 125 OR 134 VALVE FAILS OPEN; THIS IN TURN CAUSES MISSION
TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-70
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
169
HIG_ST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/_C
2/IR
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
LOOPS)
H20 S_TOFF VALVE (ITEM 171)
FAI_ C_SED (NO FDW F_W PATH TO LCG COOLING
_AD _ALYST: G. _FF_LLI SUBSYS T._AD: G. _FFAELLI
B_DO_ HIE_CHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
_ITI_LITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C
P_-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [ F]
_CATION :
P_T _MBER: SV784982-I (MOTOR VALVE SV784998)
_USES: POPPET S_CK, OPEN E_C_I_L CO_CTION, SHORT FROM
OP_ TO C_SED
EFFECTS/_TIONA7._:
P_- _D _ST-EVA WOULD BE _AB_ TO C_GE/_C_GE EMU. D_ING
EVA, FOR SCEN_IO _ _GE AMO_ OF _MIDITY EXISTS _D THE
_D_D_ I_ERFACE TO _E FDW T_KS (VIA _E 172 VALVE) IS _ST,
IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO CAUSE CONDENSATE BACK FLOW INTO THE
F_ _D VENT _OP _D _SS OF F_ _IT. IF SOP _ USED, IT TOO
COULD FAIL DUE TO THE P_GE VALVE BEING B_C_D BY FROZEN WATER.
_SS OF C_PERSON.
_FE_NCES:
1
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
170
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H20 SHUTOFF VALVE (ITEM 171)
CONTINUOUS MOTOR DRAW OF CURRENT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/iR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV784982-1 (MOTOR VALVE SV784998)
CAUSES: SHORT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AVAILABLE BATTERY POWER WILL BE DRAINED CAUSING MISSION
TERMINATION. POSSIBLE SOP USAGE IF EVA.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP FAILS.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-72
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
171
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H20 SHUTOFF VALVE (ITEM 171)
FILTER ELEMENT BLOCKED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 3/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] C [ P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV784982-1 (MOTOR VALVE SV784998)
CAUSES: GROSS CONTAMINATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CHARGE/RECHARGE_PABILITYPRE- _D POST-EVARESULTS IN
MISSION IMPACT. IF EVA, H20 MAKEUP CAPABILITY WILL BEIMPACTED
AS LCVG COMPLETES DEGASSING.
IF THE 172 VALVE WERE FAILED CLOSED IN A HIGHHUMIDITY SCENARIO
WI_ THE LCVG "_D _GED"; IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO F_OD THE
VENT LOOP AND CAUSE THE SOP TO BE REQUIRED. CREWPERSON COULD BE
LOST IF SOP FAILED.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
172
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H20 SHUTOFF VALVE (ITEM 171)
ELECTRICAL SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
A[ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV784982-1 (MOTOR VALVE SV784998)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION IN ELECTRONICS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORT IS CURRENT LIMITED _ DCM. VALVE COULD FAIL CLOSED AND
BATTERY RESERVE COULD BE IMPACTED. IF LOW POWER DURING EVA,
MISSION TERMINATION RESULTS WITH POSSIBLE SOP USAGE.
POSSIBLE CREWPERSON LOSS WITH SOP FAILURE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-74
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
173
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUN9
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COOLANT RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 172)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
S)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV784982-I (MOTOR VALVE SV784998)
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE, HOUSING SEAL FAILURE ...... . _.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF H20 REQUIRES MISSION TERMINATION AND POSSIBLE SOP USAGE.
POSSIBLE CREWPERSON LOSS WITH SOP FAILURE.
REFERENCES :
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9126186
EMU
174
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COOLANT RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 172)
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV784982-1 (MOTOR VALVE SV784998)
CAUSES: SPRING FRACTURE, DIAPHRAM FAILURE, PLUNGER STICKS,
INTERNAL LEAKAGE DUE TO HOUSING SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DURING CHARGE OR RECHARGE, H20 IS SHORT CIRCUITED AND AN
INEFFECTIVE CHARGE RESULTS. ALSO, IF 134 VALVE FAILS OPEN DURING
PRE- OR POST-EVA, THE VENT LOOP COULD BE FLOODED RESULTING IN
MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-76
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
175
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COOLANT RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 172)
BLOCKED INLET FILTER
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV784982-I (MOTOR VALVE SV784998)
C [ F]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ASSUMING A HARD CHARGE OF H20 THROUGHOUT EMU SYSTEM AND A 171
VALVE FAILED CLOSED, CONDENSATE WOULD NOT FLOW OUT OF SYSTEM INTO
TANKS, THEREBY CAUSING FLOODING OF VENT LOOPAND MISSION
TERMINATION. IF THE LOOP IS FLOODED FREE WATER COULD MIGRATE TO
THE SSA WHERE IT COULD BLOCK THE PURGE VALVES BY FREEZING WHEN
THEY ARE OPENED TO ACTIVATE THE SOP. THIS WILL RESULT IN
POSSIBLE CREWPERSON LOSS IF SOP UNABLE TO OPERATE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-77
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EZ_.?
176
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COOLANT RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 172)
VALVE FAILS CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G, RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV784982-I (MOTOR VALVE SV784998)
CAUSES: SPRING FRACTURE, PLUNGER STICKS
c[P]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ASSUMING A HARD CHARGE OF H20 THROUGHOUT EMU SYSTEM AND A 171
VALVE FAILED CLOSED, CONDENSATE WOULD NOT FLOW OUT OF SYSTEM INTO
TANKS, THEREBY CAUSING FLOODING OF VENT LOOPAND MISSION
TERMINATION. IF THE LOOP IS FLOODED FREE WATER COULD MIGRATE TO
THE SSA WHERE IT COULD BLOCK THE PURGE VALVES BY FREEZING WHEN
THEY ARE OPENED TO ACTIVATE THE SOP. THIS WILL RESULT IN
POSSIBLE CREWPERSON LOSS IF SOP UNABLE TO OPERATE.
REFERENCES:
w
u
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-78
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/26/86
EMU
177
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COOLANT RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 172)
FILTER PASSES CONTAMINANTS
HDW/FUNC
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV784982-1 (MOTOR VALVE SV784998)
CAUSES: FILTER ELEMENT FAILURE, HOUSING-TO-FILTER SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE IMPACT TO VALVE OPERATION. DOWNSTREAM ELEMENTS ARE
PROTECTED BY FILTERS. NO DEFINEABLE IMMEDIATE IMPACT TO ANY
INTERFACES OR ITEMS.
REFERENCES:
l
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i
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-79
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/06/86
EMU
178
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ROTARY H20 SEPARATOR (ITEM 123 B)
PITOT TUBE (H20 OUTLET) BLOCKED
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV787994-8
C[F]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION (E.G. KOROPON)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BLOC_G=ERESULT$ IN H20 CARRYOVER INTO VENT LOOP PERMITTING WATER
TO MIGRATE TO HELMET AND SSA. PURGE VALVES NECESSARY FOR SOP
USAGE COULD POSSIBLY BE BLOCKED BY ICE. SOP USAGE REQUIRED DUE
TO VENT LOOP FAILURE.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP FUNCTION FAILED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-80
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
10/06/86
EMU
179
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/_C
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ROTARY H20 SEPARATOR (ITEM 123 B)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (H20 OUTLET OR H20/GAS INLET)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
A[2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV787994-8
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DEG_RADAT!_NOF COOLING FUNCTION RESULTING IN MISSION TERMINATION
AND POSSIBLE SOP USAGE IF EVA.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP FUNCTION FAILED.
REFERENCES:
i
i
w
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u
c
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C-81REPORT DATE 12/02/86
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/06/86
EMU
180
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ROTARY H20 SEPARATOR (ITEM 123 B)
BEARINGS BIND
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
A[ 2 ] B [P] C [ F]
SV787994-8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION IN BEARINGS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUCED RPM, POSSIBLE H20 CARRYOVER INTO VENT LOOP, REDUCED VENT
LOOP FLOW DUE TO COMMON SHAFT. H20 CARRYOVER CAN RESULT IN WATER
MIGRATING INTO HELMET AND SSA WHERE, IF PURGE VALVE WERE USED,
THE WATER COULD FREEZE IN THE VALVE AND BLOCK IT.
THE PURGE VALVE IS REQUIRED FOR SOP USAGE WHICH MAY BE REQUIRED
DUE TO THIS FAILURE. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF EVA.
REFERENCES:
w
u
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-82
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/06/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 181
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM: WATER PUMP (ITEM 123C)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (H20 INLET OR OUTLET)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV772277
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
DEPLETION OF H20 RESERVES, LOSS OF COOLING, MISSION TERMINATION,
P_ SOP USAGE, ............. .......... _
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILED.
REFERENCES : _
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O6/86
EMU
182
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WATER PUMP (ITEM 123C)
REDUCED FLOW
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLS S
4)
s)
6)
"I)
s)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV772277
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
A[ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
CAUSES: BEARINGS BIND DUE TO CORROSION/CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOADS MOTOR, EXCESSIVE POWER DRAW, REDUCED VENT FLOW; MISSION
TERMINATION AND, IF EVA, POSSIBLE SOP USAGE.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-84
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/06/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 183
ITEM: WATER PUMP (ITEM 123C)
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
_)
V)
8)
9)
CRiTICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV772277
A[ 2 ] B [F] C [ P]
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE, CRACK/SPLIT IN CLOSURE PLUG
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WATER CAN MIGRATE INTO AND FAIL MOTOR. LOSS OF COOLING AND
VENTILATION. MISSION TERMINATION' POSSIBLE SOP USAGE I? EVA.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILED.
REFERENCES:
I
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/06/86
EMU
184
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FAN (ITEM 123A)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE-02
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV787994-8
c[p]
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRIMARY 02. MISSION TERMINATION.
LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILED.
POSSIBLE SOP USAGE.
REFERENCES:
w
w
u
m
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-86
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSME_
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_HEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lo/o6/86
EMU
185
HIG_ST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/_C
2/IR
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
F_ (ITEM 123A)
_WF_W
_AD _ALYST: G. _FF_LLI SUBSYS T._AD: G. _FF_LLI
B_DO_ HIE_C_:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PUSS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C
P_-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
A[ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
_TION:
P_T _MBER: SV787994-8
CAUSES: BE_INGS BIND, B_DES OFF-_CE DUE TO CO_AMIN_T
BUILD-UP
EFFECTS/_TIONAT,_:
_DUCED SPEED/F_W. _ADS MOTOR EXCESSIVELY. MISSION
TE_INATION. POSSIB_ SOP USAGE _QUI_D IF EVA.
_SSIBT,_ _SS OF C_WPERSON IF SOP _O FAI_D.
_FE_NCES :
I
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
zo/o6/86
EMU
186
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BRUSHLESS MOTOR (ITEM 123B)
BEARINGS BIND OR SEIZE
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV787993-7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OVERLOAD MOTOR, EXCESSIVE CURRENT DRAW WHICH CANRESULT IN LOSS
OF COOLING AND VENT LOOPS. MISSION TERMINATION. POSSIBI_ SOP
USAGE IF EVA.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILED.
REFERENCES:
W
h_
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-88
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10106/86
EMU
187
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BRUSHLESS MOTOR (ITEM 123B)
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV787993-7
CAUSES: OPEN IN ELECTRICAL POWER LEADS OR CONNECTOR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF COOLING AND VENT LOOPS. MISSION TERMINATION.
sop USAGE IF EVA. .......
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILED.
±
REFERENCES:
POSSIBLE
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10106/86
EMU
188
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BRUSHLESS MOTOR (ITEM 123B)
LOW SPEED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA" 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV787993-7
CAUSES: WINDING OPEN OR SHORTED, SPEED CONTROL ELECTRONICS
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOW COOLING AND VENT FLOW. MISSION TERMINATION.
USAGE IF EVA.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILED.
POSSIBLE SOP
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-90
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: I0/06/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 189
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BRUSHLESS MOTOR (ITEM 123B)
HIGH SPEED (EXCESSIVE)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
_)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE _ HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV787993-7
B[P] C [ P]
CAUSES: SPEED CONTROL ELECTRONICS FAILURE, SHORT TO WINDINGS
PROVIDES CONTINUOUS CURRENT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INCREASED POWER CONSUMPTION DRAINS BATTERY. MISSION TERMINATION.
POSSIBLE SOP USAGE IF EVA.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILED.
REFERENCES:
I
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
zo/o6/B6
EMU
190
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BRUSHLESS MOTOR (ITEM 123B)
SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
A [ 2 ] B[P] C[ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV787993-7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION ACROSS LEADS, CONNECTORS, WINDINGS,
INSULATION FAILS DUE TO CHAFFING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF STILL OPERATING, INCREASED POWER CONSUMPTION DRAWS BATTERY
DOWN AND REDUCES COOLING AND VENT FLOW. IF SHORT CAUSES MOTOR TO
NOT OPERATE, COOLING AND VENT LOOPS ARE LOST. MISSION
TERMINATION. POSSIBLE SOP USAGE IF EVA.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-92
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1o1o6186
EMU
191
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MUFFLER (ITEM 170)
EXTERNAL LEDGE (INLET OR OUTLET)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV785890
A[2 ] B[P] C [P]
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DEPLETION OF PRIMARY 02 AND MISSION TERMINATION.
USAGE MAY BE REQUIRED.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILED.
IF EVA, SOP
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-93
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O6/86
EMU
192
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTAMINANT CONTROL CARTRIDGE (ITEM 480)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) pLss
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792600-00
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE AT INLET OR OUTLET
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE RESULTS IN DEPLETION OF PRIMARY 02, DEGRADATION
OF C02 REMOVAL CAPABILITY. MISSION TERMINATION, AND POSSIBLE USE
OF SOP TO RETURN TO VEHICLE.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-94
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10106186
EMU
193
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTAMINANT CONTROL CARTRIDGE (ITEM 480)
PARTICULATE FILTER PARTIALLY BLOCKED
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLsS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792600-00
CAUSES: EXCESSIVE CONTAMINANTS IN SYSTEM AT START-UP
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUCED VENT FLOW. H20 RETENTION IN LiOH BED CAUSING GRADUAL
LOSS OF C02 REMOVAL CAPABILITY. MISSION TERMINATION. POSSIBLE
SOP USAGE IF EVA.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILED.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
io/o6/86
EMU
194
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTAMINANT CONTROL CARTRIDGE (ITEM 480)
TEFLON SCREEN PARTIALLY BLOCKED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792600-00
B [P] C [P]
CAUSES: EXCESSIVE CONTAMINANTS IN SYSTEM AT STARTUP
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUCED VENT FLOW. MISSION TERMINATION. POSSIBLE SOP USAGE IF
EVA.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILED.
REFERENCES:
w
w
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-96
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/06/86
EMU
195
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
CO_IN_T CONTROL _TRIDGE (ITEM 480)
INTE_AL T._._GE
_D _ALYST: G. _FF_LLI
B__ HIE_CHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
_)
8)
9)
SUBSYS T._AD: G. _FFAELLI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C
P_-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] C [ P]
_TION:
P_T _MBER: SV792600-00
CAUSES: HOUSING SEAL FAIL_
EFFECTS/_TIONAT._:
_DETE_INAB7._ BYPASS OF LIOH. _DUCED/DEG_DED CO2 _MOVAL.
C02 B_LDUP. MISSION TERMINATION. POSSIB_ SOP USAGE IF EVA.
_SSIBT._ _SS OF C_PERSON IF SOP A_O FAIT,_.D.
_FE_NCES:
m
m
g
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I
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/06/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 196
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM: CONTAMINANT CONTROL CARTRIDGE (ITEM 480)
FAILURE MODE: LiOH RELEASED TO VENT LOOP
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792600-00
B[F] C [P]
CAUSES: RUPTURE OF PARTICULATOR FILTER, FILTER SEAL SEPARATION
FROM HOUSING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE CONTAMINANT CONTRIBUTING TO FAN FAILURE, REDUCED COOLING
EFFICIENCY, BLOCKAGE OF SLURPER, AND/OR MIGRATION TO AND FAILURE
OF FAN SEPARATOR DUE TO CONTAMINANT BLOCKAGE OF PITOT TUBE.
ALSO, LiOH IS AN IRRITANT TO CREW PERSON IF IT GETS IN EYES
ORAL/NASAL PASSAGES. MISSION TERMINATION. POSSIBLE SOP USAGE IF
EVA. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-98
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lo/o6/86
EMU
197
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECK VALVE AND VENT FLOW SENSOR (ITEM 121)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLsS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV771836-28
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE, DPN SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRIMARY 02 AND PRESSURE INTEGRITY. MISSION TERMINATION.
POSSIBLE SOP USAGE IF EVA.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES: ...........
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-99
z
i
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lo/o6/86
EMU
198
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECK VALVE AND VENT FLOW SENSOR (ITEM 121)
VALVE FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLS S
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV771836-28
CAUSES: CORROSION/CONTAMINATION JAMS VALVE CLOSED, CORROSION ON
BEARINGS/LINKAGE, SPRING FRACTURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF VENT LOOP. MISSION TERMINATION AND, IF EVA, POSSIBLE SOP
USAGE.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-100
INDEPENDE_ ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lo/o6/86
EMU
199
HIG_ST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
C_CK VALVE_D VENT FLOW SENSOR (ITEM 121)
SENSOR FAILS LOW
T,_.AD _ALYST: G. _FFAELLI SUBSYS 7,_.AD: G. _FFAELLI
B_DO_ HIE_CHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITI_LITIES
....FLIGHT P_SE _W/_C
P_-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
PoST-EVA: ......... 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
P_T_MBER: SV771836-28
CAUSES: OPEN IN ET,_.CTRICAL CO_ECTOR OR SWITCH, CO_OSION ON
SWITCH CONTACTS
EFFECTS/RATIONA_ ." ..................................
FAIL LOW WOULDIMPACT MfS_ION_f_N_DIC_A_IN_G INAEQ_-UAT_-_?_W D_ING
CHECKO_ _D MISSION; THE_BY _QUIRING MISSION TE_INATION.
_FE_NCES:
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_PORT DATE 12/02/86 C-101
mm
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1o/o6/86
EMU
200
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECK VALVEAND VENT FLOW SENSOR (ITEM 121)
VALVE FAILS OPEN-INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [F]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV771836-28
CAUSES: DISC WARPED/BENT, SPRING FRACTURE JAMS VALVE OPEN,
CORROSION ON BEARINGS, OR LINKAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMPACT UNLESS A SECOND FAILURE (E.G. LOSS OF VENT LOOP) OCCURS
REQUIRING SOP USAGE WHILE EVA. THE SOP FLOW WOULD THEN BE SPLIT
AND NOT FULLY AVAILABLE TO THE ORAL-NASALAREA OF THE CREWMEMBER,
THEREBY INCREASING C02 AND HUMIDITY LEVELS TO THE
CREWMEMBER. MISSION TERMINATION WOULD THEN BE REQUIRED.
ADDITIONALLY, THE PRE-EVA SOP CHECK COULD NOT BE PERFORMED
WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT SOP 02 LOSS. MISSION TERMINATION WOULD
RESULT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-i02
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
Io/o6/s6
EMU
201
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECK VALVE AND VENT FLOW SENSOR (ITEM 121)
SENSOR FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV771836-28
B[F] C [P]
CAUSES: SHORT IN ELECTRICAL SWITCH, BELLOWS FAILS LEAKING_ .........
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FAILING HIGH WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF "VENT LOOP FLOW LOW" CAUTION
AND WARNING TO THE CREWMEMBER. FOR PRE- AND POST-EVA OPERATIONS,
THIS WOULD RESULT IN MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-I03
mm
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10106186
EMU
202
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECK VALVE AND VENT FLOW SENSOR (ITEM 121)
SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV771836-28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION ACROSS ELECTRICAL CONTACTS, WIRE CHAFFING.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INCREASES USAGE OF AVAILABLE BATTERY POWER REDUCING MISSION
LENGTH. POSSIBLE SOP USAGE MAY BE REQUIRED IF EVA.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-I04
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 203 FLIGHT:
ITEM: C02 T_SDUCER (ITEM 122)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV767798-I
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS 0FPRI_YO2_QUIRIN q MISSION TERMINATION, MY ALSQ ___
REQUIRE SOP USAGE IF EVA. I_IIIITIi .... _
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
I
I
mm
g
a
mm
B
I
g
U
mm
E
l
m
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-I05
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/06/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 204
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM: C02 TRANSDUCER (ITEM 122)
FAILURE MODE: SENSOR FAILS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767798-I
CAUSES: OPEN IN REFERENCE ELECTRICAL LEAD, ELECTRONICS FAILURE
IN COMPARISON CIRCUITRY
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
PREMATURE MISSION TERMINATION DUE TO FALSE HIGH READING.
_I
i
REFERENCES:
_ r
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-I06
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O6/86
EMU
205
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
C02 TRANSDUCER (ITEM 122)
SENSOR FAILS LOW
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/1R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767798-I
CAUSES: LOSS OF REFERENCE, FILM DEPOSITION ON GLASS ELECTRODE,
MEMBRANE BLOCKAGE, OPEN IN ELECTRONICS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MULTIPLE FAILURES ARE REQUIRED FOR SIGNIFICANT IMPACT. HOWEVER,
IF EVA AND THE LiOH CARTRIDGE WERE TO ALSO FAIL, HIGH UNDETECTED
C02 LEVELS WOULD RESULTREQUIRING MISSION TERMINATION AND
POSSIBLE SOP USAGE.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILED.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-I07
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O6/86
EMU
206
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
C02 TRANSDUCER (ITEM 122)
ELECTRICAL SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_E HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] BCP] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767798-I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION ACROSS LEADS, VIBRATION CAUSES CONTACT OF
POWER LEADS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROBABLE LOSS OF SENSOR OUTPUT, EXCESSIVE POWER CONSUMPTION.
MISSION TERMINATION. POSSIBLE SOP USAGE IF EVA.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-I08
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/06/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 207
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM: FILTER AND ORIFICE (ITEM 126)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV772158-3
B [P] C [P]
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GRADUAL LOSS OF PRIMARY 02 CAUSING MISSION TERMINATION. POSSIBLE
SOP USAGE _QUIRED IF EVA.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO ?AILED. _
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-I09
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O6/86
EMU
208
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FILTER AND ORIFICE (ITEM 126)
ORIFICE BLOCKED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2). LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 3/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV772158-3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, FILTER ELEMENT RUPTURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CO2 MONITORING CAPABILITY. WITH A FAILURE OF CCC CO2
REMOVAL, THE CREWMEMBER MUST RELY ON SENSORY DETECTION. IF EVA,
WITH REDUNDANT CCC FAILURE POSSIBLE USE OF SOP.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-ll0
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10106186
EMU
209
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE SUIT SENSOR (ITEM 114)
BIASED HIGH (OR FAILED HIGH)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) Lss
_) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
A[2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767788-2
CAUSES: INTERNAL LINKAGE FAILURE, WIPER FAILURE/BINDING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
C&W WARNING OF HIGH PRESSURE. CREWMEMBERWILL USE GAGE ON DCM
FOR VERIFICATION. MISSI--ONIMPACT IF GAGE FAILS.
I
B
z
m
m
w,
I
i
g
u
i
g
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/06/86
EMU
210
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDWIFUNC
312R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE SUIT SENSOR (ITEM 114)
BIASED LOW (OR FAILED LOW)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) pLss
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
A[ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767788-2
CAUSES: INTERNAL LINKAGE FAILURE, WIPER FAILURE-BINDING, LOSS OF
REFERENCE PRESSURE INTEGRITY-BELLOWS LEAKS, LOSS OF POWER/OPEN IN
ELECTRICAL LINES.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
C&W WARNING OF LOW PRESSURE. CREWMEMBER CAN VERIFY BY PRESSURE
GAGE ON DCM. MISSION IMPACT IF GAGE FAILS.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-I12
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
10/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EMU
211 FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE SUIT SENSOR (ITEM 114)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
_) pLss
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/ 1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767788-2
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE
LOSS OF PRIMARY 02 RESULTS IN EARLY MISSION TERMINATION WITH
POSSIBLE USE OF SOP IF EVA.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/06/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 212
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM: PRESSURE SUIT SENSOR (ITEM 114)
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLsS
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [ P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV767788-2
CAUSES : CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SENSOR FAILURE AND INCREASE IN DEMAND UPON BATTERY. MISSION
TERMINATION. IF EVA, CREWMEMBER MAY REQUIRE SOP IF BATTERY POWER
INSUFFICIENT.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
w
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-i14
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/06/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 213
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM: RELIEF VALVE AND ORIFICE (ITEM 145)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
S)
7)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV785860-3
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GRADUAL LOSS OF PRIMARY 02 RESULTING IN MISSION TERMINATION.
EVA, SOP MAY BE REQUIRE_ ........................
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
IF
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O6/86
EMU
214
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELIEF VALVE AND ORIFICE (ITEM 145)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE/FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLS S
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV785860-3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION ON SEAT, RELAXATION OF SPRING/SPRING
FRACTURE, POPPET/PLUNGER STUCK DUE TO CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES ADDITIONAL VENT FLOW PATH TO SUIT, THEREBY REDUCING FLOW
TO HELMET _D ORAL'NASAL AREA. DURING SOP CHECKOUT, A FAILED
OPEN VALVE WOULD RESULT IN HIGH SOP USAGE COULD RESULT IN MISSION
TERMINATION DUE TO LOSS OF A LARGE QUANTITY OF SECONDARY
OXYGEN SUPPLY. ON EVA, A SECOND FAILURE REQUIRED SOP USEAGE
COULD RESULT IN INEFFICIENT FLUSHING OF THE ORAL-NASAL AREA.
REFERENCES:
i
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-I16
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1o/o6/86
EMU
215
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELIEF VALVE AND ORIFICE (ITEM 145)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) pLSs
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/1R
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV785860-3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION ACTS AS AN ADHESIVE ON BALL, SPRING
FRACTURE, POPPET STICKS IN CLOSED POSITION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILED CLOSED IS TYPICALLY OF NO IMPACT EXCEPT FOR CASE OF A
FAILED OPEN SOP SECOND STAGE REGULATOR DURING SOP CHECKOUT WHICH
IF IT OCCURRED WOULD RESULT IN THE SYSTEM BEING EXPOSED TO
APPROXIMATELY 200 PSI OXYGEN AND POSSIBLE FAILURE OF S_I_RUCTURAL
INTEGRITY. IF THIS FAILURE WERE VIOLENT ENOUGH, A FIRE COULD
START AND RESULT IN LOSS OF CREWPERSON AND/OR VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-117
mw
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/06/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 216
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM: POSITIVE PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 146)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
2/iR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV787036-3
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE, DRAIN PORT P SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRIMARY 02. MISSION TERMINATION. IF EVA, SOP USAGE MAY
BE REQUIRED.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-I18
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
io/o6/s6
EMU
217
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POSITIVE PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 146)
FAILS OPEN/INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV787036-3
CAUSES: SPRING RELAXES, SPRING FRACTURE, POPPET/PLUNGER STICKS
DUE TO CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ...........................
LOSS OF PRIMARY 02 AT HIGH RATE. MISSION TERMINATION. IF EVA
AND FAILURE RESULTS IN MAXIMUM FLOW THROUGH VALVE, THE SOP WOULD
BE REQUIRED TO BE USED.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
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J
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-I19
I
uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O6/86
EMU
218
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POSITIVE PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 146)
FAILS CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV787036-3
CAUSES: SPRING FRACTURE, POPPET/PLUNGER STUCK, FILTER BLOCKED BY
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FOR PRE-EVA, SUIT WOULD OVERPRESSURE DURING AIRLOCK DEPRESS
RESULTING IN MISSION TERMINATION. DURING EVA, IF THE PRIMARY OR
SECONDARY REGULATOR FAILS OPEN, THE PURGE VALVE MUST BE USED BY
CREWMEMBER TO REDUCE SUIT PRESSURE.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SUIT PRESSURE CANNOT BE REDUCED
RAPIDLY ENOUGH.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-120
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
iOlO6186
EMU
219
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
NEGATIVE PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 147)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLss
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV785927-2
B[P] C [ P]
CAUSES:: SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRIMARY OXYGEN. • MISSION TERMINATION. POSSIBLE SOP USAGE
IF EVA.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFE_NCES: ............................. _ ....
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-121
m
"i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O6/86
EMU
220
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NEGATIVE PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 147)
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV785927-2
c[P]
CAUSES: POPPET STUCK OPEN, SPRING FRACTURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRIMARY OXYGEN. MISSION TERMINATION.
IF EVA.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
POSSIBLE SOP USAGE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-122
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 221 FLIGHT:
HDW_C
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NEGATIVE PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 147)
FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE H_DW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] C [ F]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV785927-2
CAUSES: POPPET STUCK DUE TO CONTAMINATION, SPRING FRACTURE,
FILTER BLOCKED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :_ _=-_-=__,;_, _-_ _ __= -_ "........... ....
FAILED C_SED WOU-k--LDIMPACT REPRESSURIZATION OF THE AIRLOCK ........
(ESPECIALLY AN EMERGENCY REPRESS_-RIZATION) IN THAT THE CAPABILITY
TO EQUALIZE PRESSURE BETWEEN THE SUIT AND AIRLOCK IS LOST VIA
ITEM 147._ _ ill
SUIT DAMAGE COULD OCCUR RESULTING IN LOSS OF FUTURE MISSIONS.
POSSIBLE INJURY CAN ALSO RESULT.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-123
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/06/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 222
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM: CHECK VALVE AND FILTER (ITEM II3A)
FAILURE MODEz EXTERNAL LEAKAGE AT INLET
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778873-12
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE AT 02 FILL PORT INLET INTERFACE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE AT THIS INTERFACE SHOULD ONLY IMPACT PRE- AND
POST-EVA FILL/RECHARGE OPERATIONS UNLESS ACCOMPANIED BY INTERNAL
LEAKAGE SUCH THAT THE PRIMARY 02 SUPPLY WOULD BE DEPLETED.
AN ACCEPTABLE FILL SHOULD STILL BE OBTAINED UNLESS LEAKAGE IS
GROSS. THIS LEAK, IF UNDETECTED, COULD ALSO DEPLETE VEHICLE 02
SUPPLY. LOSS OF PRIMARY 02 DURING EVA WOULD REQUIRE SOP USAGE.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-124
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O6/86
EMU
223
HIG_ST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
CHECK VALVE_D FILTER (ITEM 113A)
EXTE_AL _A_GE AT OUTT._.T
_AD _ALYST: G. _FF_LLI SUBSYS T._.AD: G. _FFAELLI
BRE_O_ HIE_CHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) P_S
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C
P_-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
_CATION:
P_T_MBER: SV778873-12
CAUSES:
_IFOLD
SEAL FAIL_ AT INTERFACE TO 02 T_K _D ORIFICE
EFFECTS/_TIONA_! ....................................................................
DEP_TION OF PRIMLY 02. MISSION TERMINATION. POSSIB_ SOP
USAGE IF EVA.
POSSIBLE _SS OF C_WPERSON IF SOP A_O FAI_.
_FE_CES:
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_PORT DATE 12/02/86 C-125
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u
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O6/86
EMU
224
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECK VALVE AND FILTER (ITEM 113A)
INLET OR OUTLET FILTER BLOCKED
HDW/FUNC
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778873-12
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO FILL OR RECHARGE EMU 02 TANKS.
NOT USED).
(DURING EVA FILTERS ARE
REFERENCES:
w
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-126
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1o/o6186
EMU
225
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECK VALVE AND FILTER (ITEM 113A)
INLET FILTER FAILS-PASSES CONTAMINANTS
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/1R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778873-12
CAUSES: FILTER ELEMENT RUPTURE, FILTER SEAL TO HOUSING FAILS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONTAMINATION-COULD CAUSE CHECK VALVE FAILURE TO SEAL-AND, IF
UPSTREAM EXTERNAL LEAKOCCURRED, POSSIBLE MISSION T_INATION.
FAILURE OF THE DOWNSTREAM FILTER COULD RESULT IN BLOCKAGE OF THE
I13C SHUTOFF VALVE INLET FILTER OR THE FLOW ORIFICE
AND CAUSE A REDUCED FLOW OF PRIMARY 02 TO BE PROVIDED THE
CREWPERSON. LOSS OF 02 OR IMPAIRED FLOW COULD RESULT IN SOP
USAGE IF EVA. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-127
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1o106186
EMU
226
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECK VALVE AND FILTER (ITEM 113A)
OUTLET FILTER FAILS-PASSES CONTAMINANTS
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778873-12
CAUSES: FILTER ELEMENTS RUPTURE, FILTER SEAL TO HOUSING FAILS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WORST CASE IS FOR THE ELEMENT TO RUPTURE (OTHERWISE INLET FILTER
PROVIDES REDUNDANCY) PASSING CONTAMINANTS INTO TANKS AND ORIFICE.
POSSIBLE BLOCKAGE OR FLOW CONSTRICTION IN ORIFICE. CONTAMINANTS
WOULD BE FILTERED AGAIN AT SHUTOFF VALVE (I13C) INLET.
IF SIGNIFICANT BLOCKAGE OCCURS, INSUFFICIENT 02 FLOW MAY RESULT
FOR SUIT PRESSURIZATION DURING PRE-EVA. IF EVA, INSUFFICIENT 02
FLOW COULD RESULT IN SOP USAGE AND POSSIBLE CREWPERSON LOSS IF
SOP ALSO FAILED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-128
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1o1o6186
EMU
227
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECK VALVE AND FILTER (ITEM 113A)
VALVE FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
_)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778873-12
CAUSES: BALL STUCK DUE TO CORROSION/CONTAI_INATiON
HDW/FUNC
2/2
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO FILL OR RECHARGE.
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REFERENCES:. _
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C-129REPORT DATE 12/02/86
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/06/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 228
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM: CHECK VALVE AND FILTER (ITEM 113A)
FAILURE MODE| VALVE FAILS OPEN-INTERNALLEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) pLSs
4)
s)
6)
_)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/1R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV778873-12
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION ON SEAT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE FAILED OPEN WOULD REQUIRE A SECOND FAILURE OF EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE UPSTREAM FOR LOSS OF PRIMARY O2WHICHWOULDREQUIRE
POSSIBLE SOP USAGE, IF EVA, AND MISSION TERMINATION. POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREWMEMBER IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
u
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-130
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/06/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 229
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM: ADJUSTABLE ORIFICE (ITEM II3B)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778873-12
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS_RAT_QNA_: ........
LOSS OF OXYGEN. MISSION TERMINATION. POSSIBLE SOP USAGE_IF EVA.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IS SOP ALSO FAILS. FOR PRE- AND
POST-EVA CHARGE/RECHARGE, IF UNDETECTED, THE LEAKAGE WILL ALSO
CAUSE LOSS OF A "LEAK-RATE DEPENDENT" QUANTITY OF VEHICLE 02.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-131
wm
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/06/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 230
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM: ADJUSTABLE ORIFICE (ITEM II3B)
FAILURE MODE: NO FLOW-BLOCKED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFA_ELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
_)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778873-12
CAUSES : CONTAMINATION, ADJUSTMENT SCREW ROTATES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OR DEGRADATION OF 02 FLOW TO VENT LOOP AND H20 TANK
BACKPRESSURE REGULATOR. M_SSIONTERMINATION. POSSIBLE SOP USAGE
REQUIRED IF EVA. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-132
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 231 FLIGHT: 2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ADJUSTABLE ORIFICE (ITEM II3B)
HIGH FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: _ RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI _ _
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778873-12
B[F] C [ P]
CAUSES: ADJUSTMENT SCREW ROTATES, EROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HIGH FLOW WOULD REQUIRE A PRIMARY REGULATOR OR WATER REGULATOR
FAILED OPEN TO OVER PRESSURIZE THE SUIT. THE 146 RELIEF VALVE
WILL NOT PROVIDE EMU PRESSURE PROTECTION AT THESE HIGH FLOW
RATES. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON CAN THEREFORE RESULT.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-133
_w
I
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O6/S6
EMU
232
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ON/OFF VALVE (ITEM I13C)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778873-12
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE, HOUSING SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRIMARY OXYGEN. MISSION TERMINATION. POSSIBLE USE OF
SOP IF EVA. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
= =
U
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-134
JINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/06/86
EMU
233
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ON/OFF VALVE (ITEM I13C)
FAILED CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778873-12
CAUSES: SPRING FRACTURE, BALL/PLUNGER STUCK DUE TO CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO PERFORM EVA DUE TO NO 02 PATH FROM TANK TO SUIT.
MISSION TERMINATION. FUTURE MISSION TERMINATION.
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REFERENCES:
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C-135REPORT DATE 12/02/86
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O6/86
EMU
234
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ON/OFF VALVE (ITEM I13C)
FAILED OPEN/INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
HDW/FUNC
2/2
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLsS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778873-12
c[P]
CAUSES: SPRING FRACTURE, BALL/PLUNGER STUCK DUE TO
CONTAMINATION, CONTAMINATION ON SEAT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE IS NORMALLY OPEN DURING EVA. DURING PRE- OR POST-EVA
TIMEFRAMES AND FOR LOW H20 TANKS, NO H20 CHARGE WOULD BE CAPABLE
DUE TO BACKPRESSURE. ALSO, WOULD HAVE A CONSTANT 02 LEAK TO SUIT
AND AIRLOCK. LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-136
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 235 FLIGHT:
ITEM: PRIMARY REGULATOR (ITEM II3D)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778873-12
B[F] C [P]
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE, HOUSING SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
_SSOF P_!MARY OXYGEN WHEN 02 SHUTOFF VALVE IS OPEN. MISSION
TERMINATION. POSSIBLE S6PU_AGE _FEVA._-_SS_B_LOSg_ .........
CREWPERSON IS SOP ALSO FAILS.
-i
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-137
mmm
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/06/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 236
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM: PRIMARY REGULATOR (ITEM 113D)
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL LEAKAGE/FAILED OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA" 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778873-12
CAUSES:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXCESSIVE 02 FLOW TO SUIT. POSSIBLE OVERPRESSURIZATION REQUIRING
THE 146 RELIEF VALVE TO OPERATE. LOSS OF PRIMARY OXYGEN.
MISSION TERMINATION. POSSIBLE SOP USAGE IF EVA. POSSIBLE LOSS
OF CREWPERSON IS SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
i
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-138
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT O_ITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_SHEET
10/06/86
EMU
237
HIG_ST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/_C
2/IR
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
PRIMLY _GU_TOR (ITEM 113D)
FAI_ C_SED
;._AD _ALYST: G. _FFAE_I SUBSYS T._AD: G. _FF_LLI
B_DO_ HIE_CHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITI_LITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C
P_-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
_TION :
P_T _MBER: SV778873-12
B [P] C [P]
_USES: CO_INATION FAI_ STEM C_SED, SPRING F_C_, IN_T
FILTER B_C_D
EFFECTS/__A_: ........................ _ =_
_SS OF PRIMLY OXYGEN TO VENT _OP. MISSION TENON. ..........
POSSIBT._ SOP USAGE IF EVA. POSSIBT._. _SS OF _W PE_ON IF SOP
_O FAI_.
_FE_NCES:
i
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m
_PORT DATE 12/02/86 C-139
I
i
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/06/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 238
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM: PRIMARY REGULATOR (ITEM II3D)
FAILURE MODE: REGULATES LOW/DRIFTS LOW
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778873-12
B[P] C [ P]
CAUSES: BALANCE STEM STICKS, SPRING RELAXES/FRACaS, ORIFICE
TO SENSE PORT BLOCKED, CONTAMINATION/DEPOSITS SKEW PARTS
ALIGNMENT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOW PRESSURE CAN RESULT IN SOP USAGE TO ENSURE CREWMEMBER
ENVIRONMENT MAINTAINED ABOVE 3.3 PSIA. MISSION TERMINATION.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPE_SON IF SOP ALSOFAILS.
REFERENCES :
m
u
m
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-140
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O6/86
EMU
239
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRIMARY REGULATOR (ITEM 113D) _
REGULATES HIGH/DRIFTS HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLS S
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778873-12
CAUSES: ....BA_CE STEM STICKS, SPRING RELAXES/FRACTURES,
CONTAMINATION DEPOSITS SKEW PARTS ALIGNMENT
EFFECTS/RATIbN;_IIE:!_
HIGH PRESSURE CAN RESULT IN OVERPRESSURIZATION 0F SUIT THEREBY _
CAUSING 146 RELIEF VALVE TO OPEN. FINAL RESULT WILL BE LOSS OF
PRIMARY OXYGEN. MISSION TERMINATION, POSSIBLESOP USAGE IF EVA,
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
l
I
[]
m
D
I
E
m
m
z
I
m
m
m
REFERENCES:
l
l
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-141
M
m
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10106186
EMU
240
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRIMARY REGULATOR (ITEM 113D)
IV-EV LINKAGE FAILURE
HDW/FUNC
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2). LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778873-12
CAUSES: JAMS DUE TO CONTAMINATION ACTING AS AN ADHESIVE, SPRING
FRACTURE, SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY FAILURE (SEE SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BECAUSE THE FAILURE IS A MECHANICAL FAILURE, IT IS NOT APPLICABLE
TO EVA IN THAT NO IV TO EV OR EV TO IV OPERATION OCCURS AT THAT
TIME. FAILURE PRE- OR POST-EVA RESULTS IN MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
w
w
w
n
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-142
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10106186
EMU
241
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H20 REGULATOR (ITEM 113E)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2 ) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CRITI_ALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] CEP]
LO_TION:
PART NUMBER: SV778873-12
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE, BELLOWS FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRIMARY OXYGEN AND/OR WATER TANKS BACKPRESSUREAND
THEREFORE COOLING. IF EVA, POSSIBLE SOP USAGE REQUIRED.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-143
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1o/o6/86
EMU
242
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H20 REGULATOR (ITEM II3E)
FAILS OPEN-INTERNAL LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778873-12
CAUSES: SPRING FRACTURE, CONTAMINATION CAUSES PLUNGER TO STICK,
BELLOWS FAILURE, SEAT FAILURE DUE TO CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HIGH OXYGEN FLOW/PRESSURE RESULTS IN HIGHER THAN NOMINAL FLOW TO
SUIT VIA 120B RELIEF VALVE. SUIT OVERPRESSURE PROTECTED BY 146
RELIEF VALVE. LOSS OF 02 RESULTS AND MISSION IS TERMINATED. SOP
USAGE MAY BE REQUIRED IF EVA.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-144
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O6/86
EMU
243
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H20 REGULATOR (ITEM II3E)
REGULATES HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778873-12
CAUSES: REFERENCE VOLUME CONTAMINATION BLOCKS REFERENCE
RESULTING IN HIGH PRESSURE REF., SPRING RELAXES
EF?ECTS/RATIONALE:
DOWNSTREAM 120B RELIEF VALVE WILL OPERATE RESULTING IN EXCESS 02
FLOW TO SUIT. SUIT OVERPRESSURE PROTECTED BY 146 RELIEF VALVE.
LOSS OF 02 RESULTS AND MISSION IS TERMINATED. SOP USAGE MAY BE
REQUIRED IF EVA.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
I
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-145
m
mm
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
io/o6/86
EMU
244
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H20 REGULATOR (ITEM 113E)
REGULATES LOW
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
_)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778873-12
CAUSES_ SPRING RELAXES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOW PRESSURE TO SUIT LCG PUMP LOOP RESULTING IN DEGRADED COOLING.
MISSION TERMINATION AND, IF EVA, POSSIBLE SOP USAGE AND CHANGING.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
w
w
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-146
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10106186
EMU
245
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
H20 REGULATOR (ITEM II3E)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
A[ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
SV778873-12
CAUSES: SPRING FRACTURE/FAILURE, CONTAMINATION/CORROSION CAUSES
PLUNGER TO STICK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:____ __c _ _ _ _i _ _ _ _--_
LOSS OF H20 RESERVOIR PRESSURE. COOLING LOSS. MISSION
TERMINATES. IF EVA, POSSIBLE SOP USAGE REQUIRED. POSSIBLE LOSS
OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-147
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10106/86
EMU
246
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRIMARY OXYGEN BOTTLES (ITEM 111)-QTY-2
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (NON-VIOLENT)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLsS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV778895/SV784099-1
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRIMARY OXYGEN. MISSION TERMINATION. IF EVA, POSSIBLE
SOP USAGE REQUIRED. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO
FAILS.
w
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-148
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM_ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lo/o6/86
EMU
247
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIG_:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
ITEM:
FAILU_ MODE:
PRIMLY OXYGEN BOTT_S (ITEM 111)-QTY-2
RU_-VIO_NT OXYGEN _ASE
T._.AD _ALYST: G. _FF_LLI SUBSYS T._.AD: G. _FFAELLI
B_DO_ HIE_CHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
......9R_T_I_LITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C
P_-EVA: i/I
EVA: 1/1
POST-EVA: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
_TION:
P_T_MBER: SV778895/SV784099-1
B [P] cOP]
CAUSES: _LD/SEAM FAIL_,MATERIAL FATIGUE
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
VIO_NT _T._.ASE OF O_GEN WQU_ BE ACCOMP_IED BY S_PNEL_D/OR
P_TI_TE _I_ COULD IMPINGE U_N_BY METAL COMPO_S _D
T_ EVA/IVA C_PERSON. IN ADDITION TO S__L IN_Y, A _AL
FI_ _Z_D WOU_ EXIST.
_FE_NCES:
U
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_PORT DATE 12/02/86 C-149
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O6/86
EMU
248
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRIMARY 02 PRESSURE SENSOR (ITEM 112)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[ P]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER: SV778528-2
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRIMARY OXYGEN. MISSION TERMINATION. IF EVA, POSSIBLE
SOP USAGE. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
L
w
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-150
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSME_ _
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O6/86
EMU
249
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRIMARY 02 PRESSURE SENSOR (ITEM 112)
DRIFTS LOW (NOT FULL SCALE)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
HDW/FUNC
2/2
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2 •
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778528-2
CAUSES: BINDING IN BEARING OR LINKAGE, LOSS OF REFERENCE CAVITY
PRESSURE INTEGRITY
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
(LOW READING COULD BE VERIFIED IN AIRLOCK VERSUS AIRLOCK 02
PRESSURE GAGE). CAUTION AND WARNING SYSTEM AND CREWPERSON UNABLE
TO OBSERVE TOTAL PRESSURE OF 02 REMAINING. POSSIBLE MISSION
TERMINATION •
±
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REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-151
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lo/o6/86
EMU
250
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRIMARY 02 PRESSURE SENSOR (ITEM 112)
FAILS FULL LOW
HDW/FUNC
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) pLSs
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778528-2
CAUSES:
LINKAGE
OPEN IN ELECTRICAL LEAD/CONNECTOR, BINDING IN BEARING OR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CAUTION AND WARNING SYSTEM AND THE CREW PERSON WOULD BE UNABLE TO
OBSERVE THE TIME TOTAL PRESSURE OF 02 REMAINING. MISSION
TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-152
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 251 FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRIMARY 02 PRESSURE SENSOR (ITEM 112)
DRIFTS HIGH (NOT FULL SCALE)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778528-2
CAUSES: BOURDON TUBE RELAXES OVER TIME, LINKAGE FAILURE, SHIFT
IN WIPER TO RESISTIVE ELEMENT
EFFECTS/RATIOnAl: ......
(VALVE CAN BE VERIFIED IN AIRLOCK vERsus AIRLOCK02P_SS_
GAGE.) CAUTION AND WARNING SYSTEM IS DEFEATED IN PREDICTING
MISSION PARAMETERS AND 02 REMAINING. 02 CAN BE DEPLETED DURING
EVA REQUIRING SOP USAGE.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IS SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O6/86
EMU
252
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRIMARY 02 PRESSURE SENSOR (ITEM 112)
FAILS HIGH-FULL SCALE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778528-2
CAUSES: SHORT IN ELECTRONICS, LINKAGE STICKS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CAUTION AND WARNING SYSTEM IS NOT ABLE TO PREDICT MISSION
PARAMETERS AND PROVIDE TIME 02 REMAINING QUANTITY. MISSION
TERMINATION. IF 02 IS DEPLETED IN AN UNPLANNED MANNER DURING
EVA, SOP USAGE MAY BE REQUIRED.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON LOSS IS SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
i
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-154
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
io/o6/s6
EMU
253
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRIMARY 02 PRESSURE SENSOR (ITEM 112)
BOURDON TUBE RUPTURE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 1/1
EVA: 1/1
POST-EVA: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778528-2
B [ P] C [ F]
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HIGH PRESSURE OXYGEN FLOW INTO CAVITY AND SENSOR ELECTRONICS
COULD RESULT IN A FIRE, LOSS OF EMU AND CREWPERSON.
E
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REFERENCES:
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I
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-155
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/06/86
EMU
254
HIG_ST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/_NC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
PRIMLY 02 P_SS_ SENSOR (ITEM 112)
ET,_.CTRICAL SHORT
T_AD _ALYST: G. _FF_LLI SUBSYS _D: G. _FF_LLI
B_DO_ HIE_C_:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
_ITICALITIES
FLIG_ P_E HDW/_C
P_-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
_CATION:
P_T _MBER: SV778528-2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIB_TION
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
WILL LILLY _SE P_SS_ _DING _D CAUSE EXCESS PO_R USAGE.
MISSION COULD TE_INATE. POSSIBTR SOP USAGE IF BATTERY FAILU_
OC_S. POSSIB_ _SS OF C_W PE_ON IF SOP A_O FAI_.
_FE_NCES:
i
_PORT DATE 12/02/86 C-156
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/06/86
EMU
255
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY (ITEM 115)
02 MANIFOLD FILTER BLOCKED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLsS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EV_%: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] C [ P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV778540-26
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION _
EFFECTS/RATiONALE: ......
UNABLE TO CHARGE 02 TANKS. UNABLE TO OBTAIN PRIMARY OXYGEN FROM
TANKS DURING EVA; THEREFORE, MISSION TERMINATION AND POSSIBLE SOP
USAGE. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP FAILS.
REFERENCES:
m
N
mm
Ill
m
i
m
l
m
mm
J
D
I
I
I
B
I
i
C-157REPORT DATE 12/02/86
lINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lo/o6/86
EMU
256
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY (ITEM 115)
02 MANIFOLD FILTER PASSES CONTAMINANTS
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLS S
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778540-26
c[p]
CAUSES: FILTER RUPTURES, FILTER HOUSING SEkL FAILS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONTAMINANTS WOULD BE RELEASED WHICH COULD FAIL THE DOWNSTREAM
SHUT-OFF VALVE OR WATER REGULATOR, IF THE REDUNDANT FILTERS AT
EACH WERE ALSO FAILED. MISSION TERMINATION WOULD RESULT IF
DETECTED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-158
INDEPENDE_ ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O6/86
EMU
257
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILU_ MODE:
SHE_ P_TE ASSEMBLY (ITEM 115)
EXTE_AL T._A_GE OF OXYGEN
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
_AD _ALYST: G. _FF_LLI SUBSYS T_AD: G. _FF_LLI
B_AKDO_ HIE_CHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CRITI_LITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C
P_-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 3/ IR
_ST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
_CATION:
P_T_MBER: SV778540-26
CAUSES: 02 FILL LINE SEAL FAILU_OR FITTING FAIL_ (PRIOR TO
II3A CHECK VALVE)
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
EMU LEAK RESULTS IN LOSS OF VEHICLE 02 AND EXTENSION OF EMU 02
C_GE TIME. MISSION TERMINATION. IF CHECK VALVE (ITEM II3A)
A_OFAI_D OPEN. PRIVY 02 IN T_KS WOU_ BE _ST. MISSION
TE_INATION. _SSIBT_ SOP USAGE _QUI_D IF EVA,
_SSIB_ _SS OF C_WPERSON _SS IF SOP A_O FAI_.
_FE_NCES:
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_PORT DATE 12/02/86
nINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/06/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 258
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM: SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY (ITEM 115)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF OXYGEN
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
A[ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778540-26
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE (02 BOTTLE VERIFIED, TRANSFER TUBE FROM
ITEM 113 TO 120, AND/OR 113 OUTLET TRANSFER TUBE)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRIMARY 02 LOSS. MISSION TERMINATION. POSSIBLE SOP USAGE IF
EVA. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-160
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lo/o6/86
EMU
259
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
SHE_ P_TE ASSEMBLY (ITE-M_ilS) _
FAI_ IN THE "OFF" POSITION
HDW/FUNC
2/2
LEAD _ALYST: G. _FF_LLI SUBSYS T,_AD: G. _FFAELLI
B_DO_ HIE_C_:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C
P_-EVA: 2/2
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 2/2
_D_D_CY SC_ENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [NA ]
_CATION:
PART_MBER: SV778540-26
CAUSES: LINKAGE FAILURE-JAMS DUE TO SPRING FRACTURE, BEARING
BINDING, ACTUATOR CABLE CONNECTION SHEARS OR DISCONNECTS
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
_ABLE TO OPEN S_TOFF VALVE. _ABLE TO PERFORM EVA.
_FE_NCES:
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_PORT DATE 12/02/86 C-161 =
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/06/86
EMU
260
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY (ITEM 115)
FAILS IN THE "IV" POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) pLSs
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778540-26
BI:P] C[NA]
CAUSES: LINKAGE FAILURE-JAMS DUE TO SPRING FRACTURE, BEARING
BINDING, ACTUATOR CABLE CONNECTION SHEARS OR DISCONNECTS, FAILURE
OF LINKAGE AT THE 113 REGULATOR BY BEARINGS JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO PRESSURIZE EMU FOR EVA. UNABLE TO SHUTOFF 02 SUPPLY
FROM EMU; THEREFORE, SINCE EVA CANNOT BE PERFORMED, THE 02 WILL
DUMP INTO THE AIRLOCK CREATINGANOXYGEN-RICH ATMOSPHERE UNLESS
VENTILATED.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-162
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT_
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/06/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 261
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM: SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY (ITEM 115)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS IN THE "PRESS" POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) pLSs
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ F]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778540-26
CAUSES: LINKAGE FAILURE-JAMS _TO SPRING FRA_,BEARING
BINDING, ACTUATOR CABLE CONNECTION SHE_S OR DISCONNECTS, FAILURE
OF LINKAGE AT 113 REGULATOR BY BEARINGS JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO OPEN SOP SHUTOFF VALVE AND UNABLE TO CLOSE PRIMARY 02
SHUTOFF VALVE. MISSION TERMINATION. 02 WILL BE DUMPED INTO THE
AIRLOCK CREATING AN OXYGEN-RICH ATMOSPHERE UNLESS VENTILATED.
u
i
I
I
[]
mm
I
m[]
[]
i
m
I
J
REFERENCES:
[]
=z
i
m
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-163
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/06/86
EMU
262
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY (ITEM i15)
FAILS IN THE "EVA" POSITION
HDW/FUNC
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ F]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778540-26
CAUSES: LINKAGE FAILURE-JAMS DUE TO SPRING FRACTURE, BEARING
BINDING, ACTUATOR CABLE CONNECTION SHEARS OR DISCONNECTS, FAILURE
OF LINKAGE AT THE 113 REGULATOR BY BEARINGS JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMPACT TO IMMEDIATE EVA; HOWEVER SUBSEQUENT EVA MISSIONS
CANNOT BE PERFORMED. REMAINING OXYGEN AND SOP OXYGEN WILL BE
DUMPED TO THE AIRLOCK CREATING AN OXYGEN-RICH ENVIRONMENT UNLESS
VENTILATED.
IF A SPARK WERE TO OCCUR DUE TO A SECOND FAILURE DURING THETIME
OF OXYGEN ENRICHMENT, A FIRE COULDRESULT.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-164
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
10/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EMU
263 FLIGHT: 2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY (ITEM 115)
FAILURE TO OPEN THE PRIMARY I13C SHUTOFF VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778540-26
CAUSES: SPRING FRACTURE OR RELAXATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO PERFORM EVA MISSION OR PRESSURIZE EMU DUE TO NO 02 PATH
FROM TANKS TO SSA. .........
REFE_NCES: _i__
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-165
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
Io/o6/s6
EMU
264
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY (ITEM 115)
FAILURE TO CLOSE THE PRIMARY I13C SHUTOFF VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
_)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: /NA
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778540-26
C [NA ]
CAUSES: SPRING FRACTURE OR RELAXATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .
PRIMARY OXYGEN WILL BE DUMPED INTO AIRLOCK CAUSING AN OXYGEN-RICH
ENVIRONMENT UNLESS VENTILATED. ALSO UNABLE TO CHARGE OR RECHARGE
EMU VIA SCU DUE TO OPEN PATH TO EMU.
E =
w
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-166
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lo/o6/86
EMU
265
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
FAILURE TO OPEN SOP SHUTOFF VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] C [ P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV778540-26
CAUSES: LINKAGE/CAM FAILURE LOOSE OR STRIPPED, ACTUATOR CABLE _
STRETCHED
EFFECTS/RATIONAl: -
SOP UNAVAILABLE FOR EVA; HOWEVER IT WOULD PERFORM THE MANUAL PRE-
EVA CHECKOUT. IF OTHER FAILURE, REQUIRING TO SOP OCCURS DURING
EVA, CREWMEMBER/EMUWOULDBE LOST.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O6/86
EMU
266
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
FAILURE TO CLOSE SOP SHUTOFF VALVE
HDW/FUNC
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 2/2
A[ 2 ] B [F] C [P]
SV778540-26
CAUSES: LINKAGE/CAM FAILURE-LOOSE OR STRIPPED, ACTUATOR CABLE
STRETCHED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SOP WOULD ACTIVATE DURING POST EVA OPERATIONS. SOP OXYGEN WOULD
DUMP INTO AIRLOCK CREATING ANOXYGEN-RICH ENVIRONMENT UNLESS
VENTILATED. MISSION TERMINATION RESULTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-168
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/06/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 267
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM: SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: FAILURE TO PLACE PRIMARY REGULATOR IN .5 PSI
POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778540-26
CAUSES: CHANGE LINKAGE SPRING FRACTURED OR RELAXED, BEARINGS
BIND
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO PERFORM LOW-PRESSURE IV OPERATIONS; EVA MAY STILL BE
PERFORMED.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/06/86
EMU
268
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POSITION
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
FAILURE TO PLACE PRIMARY REGULATOR IN 4.3 PSI
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ F]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778540-26
CAUSES:
BIND
CHANGE LINKAGE SPRING FRACTURED OR RELAXED, BEARINGS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO OBTAIN OR MAINTAIN EVA PRESSURE. POSSIBLE SOP USEAGE
(DUE TO SOP BEING ENABLED) IF IN EVA POSITION AND PRESSURE DROPS
TO SOP RANGE. UNABLE TO PERFORM MISSION.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-170
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 269 FLIGHT:
ITEM: SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY (ITEM 115)
FAILURE MODE: SLIDE ACTUATOR DETENT FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
HDW/FUNC
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778540-26
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: SPRING FRACTURES OR RELAXES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF "OFF, IVA, AND PRESS" POSITIONS DISPLAY CAPABILITY. EVA
CAN PROCEED WITHOUT IMPACT. "EVA" POSITION EMPLOYS AN ADDITIONAL
LOCK MECHANISM AND DISPLAY CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES :
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O6/86
EMU
270
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY (ITEM 115)
EVA POSITION LOCK FAILURE
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST" G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778540-26
C[F]
CAUSES: SPRING FRACTURES OR RELAXES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EVA POSITION SLIPPAGE MAY OCCUR REQUIRING MANUAL PLACEMENT UPON
C&W WARNING. BACKUP NORMAL SLIDE ACTUATOR DETENTE PROVIDES
REDUNDANCY.
IF OUT OF EVA POSITION, SOP IS SHUT OFF AND UNAVAILABLE TO
SUPPORT CREWPERSON IN THE EVENT OF A PLSS FAILURE REQUIRING BACK-
UP. IF THIS OCCURS POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON CAN RESULT.
REFERENCES:
L _
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-172
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/06/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 271
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM: EVA POSITION SWITCH (ITEM 116)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN-NO SIGNAL
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
HDW/FUNC
2/2
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV789111
CAUSES: OPEN IN LEADS OR CONNECTOR, SWITCH F__
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
CANNOT VERIFY 02 ACTUATOR AND SOP S_TOFF VALVE STATUS' MISSION
TERMINATION. IF IT OCCURS EVA, IT WILL REQUIRE A JUDGEMENT CALL
REGARDING ITS VERACITY. LOSS OF LOW SUIT PRESSURE LIMIT CHECK IN
C&W WHICH IS ENABLED BY THIS SIGNAL. ......
REFERENCES :
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10106186
EMU
272
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVA POSITION SWITCH (ITEM 116)
FAILS CLOSED-CONTINUOUS SIGNAL
HDW/FUNC
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV789111
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 2/2
A[2 ] B[F] C[P]
CAUSES: SHORT ACROSS LOADS OR CONNECTOR, FAILURE OF HERMETIC
SEAL, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT VERIFY 02 ACTUATOR AND SOP SHUTOFF VALVE STATUS. MISSION
TERMINATION. IF IT OCCURS EVA, IT WILL NOT BE DETECTABLE.
u
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w
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-174
uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EMU
273 FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BLEED ORIFICE (ITEM 120A)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV785844-6
CAUSES: HOUSING SEAL FAILURE, SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRIM AR_Y 0XYGEN ....._ISSI_N TERMINATION. .........COOLING
DEGRADATION. POSSIBLE USE OF SOP IF EVA. POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O6/86
EMU
274
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BLEED ORIFICE (ITEM 120A)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLsS
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV785844-6
CAUSES: HOUSING SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXCESSIVE 02 FLOW TO SUIT. POSSIBLE SUIT OVERPRESSURIZATION
OPENING RELIEF VALVE ITEM 146, RESULTING IN 02 LOSS. MISSION
TERMINATION. POSSIBLE SOP USAGE IF EVA. POSSIBLE CREWPERSON
LOSS IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O6/86
EMU
275
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BLEED ORIFICE (ITEM 120A)
BLOCKED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLsS
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV785844-6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION OR CORROSION IN ORIFICE, SC_EN/FILTERS
BLOCKED BY CONTAMINATION OR CORROSION, UPSTREAM FILTER FAILS BY
RUPTURING CAUSING ORIFICE OR DOWNSTREAM FILTER TO BLOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE z
POSSIBLE II3E H20 REGULATOR CHATTER. RELIEF VALVES 120B PROVIDE
REDUNDANT PATH FOR CHARGING. IF THE 120B VALVES FAIL CLOSED
UNABLE TO CHARGE OR RECHARGE H20 TANKS AND MISSION TERMINATION
RESULTS.
REFERENCES :
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-177
m
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/06/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 276
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM: DUAL MODE RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 120B)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/ 2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV785844-6
CAUSES:
SCREW
SEAL FAILURE, HOUSING SEAL FAILURE ALONG STEM AND SET
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRIMARY OXYGEN. MISSION TERMINATION. POSSIBLE SOP USAGE
REQUIRED IF EVA. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-178
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/06/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 277
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM: DUAL MODE RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 120B)
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL LEAKAGE/(HI OR LOW FLOW) FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
CRITI_LITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
A[2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV785844-6
CAUSES: SPRING FRACTURES OR RELAXES, CONTAMINATION ON SEAT,
PLUNGER STICKS DUE TO CONTAMINATION, HOUSING SEAL BYPASSED,
FILTER RUPTURES JAMMING VALVE OPEN.
EFFE CT S/RATIONaLE:
PROBABLE HIGH FLOW OF 02 TO SUIT AND POSSIBLE OVERPRESSURIZATION.
RELIEF VALVE 146 PREVENTS OVERPRESSURIZATION BUT LOSS OF 02
OCCURS AT THIS TIME. MISSION TERMINATION. POSSIBLE SOP USAGE
REQUIRED IF EVA. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-179
D
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
:to/o6/86
EMU
278
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DUAL MODE RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 120B)
FAIL CLOSED ("LO" MODE)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV785844-6
CAUSES: SPRING FRACTURE, PLUNGER STICKS, CONTAMINATION, FILTER
BLOCKED DUE TO CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROBABLE LOSS OF H20 RECHARGE CAPABILITY IF BLEED ORIFICE AND
"HI" MODE VALVE ALSO FAIL CLOSED. MISSION TERMINATION RESULTS
WITH THIS SCENARIO.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-180
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/06/86
EMU
279
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DUAL MODE RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 120B)
FAILS CLOSED ("HI" MODE)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV785844-6
CAUSES: SPRING FRACTURE, PLUNGER STICKS, CONTAMINATION, FILTER
BLOCKED DUE TO CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT EFFECTIVELY PROTECT AGAINST A FAILED OPEN II3E REGULATOR.
LOSS OF COOLING COULD RESULT DUE TO H20 TANKS BEING
OVERPRESSURIZED AND FAILING. POSSIBLE SOP USAGE IF EVA.
POSSIBLE CREWPERSON LOSS IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
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REFERENCES:
l
m
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-181
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/06/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 280
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM: FEEDWATER CHECK VALVE (ITEM 120C)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) PiSS
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV785844
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE, TEST PORT "F" SEAL FAILURE, HOUSING SEAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRIMARY OXYGEN RESULTS IN LOSS OF COOLING AND MISSION.
POSSIBLE SOP USAGE IF EVA. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP
ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
m
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-182
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O6/86
EMU
281
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FEEDWATER CHECK VALVE (ITEM 120C)
FAILED OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFF_LLI
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2
EVA: 3/1R
POST-EVA: 3/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV785844
CAUSES: FLAPPER DISC WARPED, CONTAMINATION CAUSES FLAPPER TO
STICK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MOISTURE CAPABLE OF MIGRATING TO PRIMARY 113 REGULATORS AND
CAUSING CORROSION. THIS CORROSION CAN CAUSE MULTIPLE TYPES OF
FAILURE INCLUDING FAILED CLOSED_ OR OPEN THEREBY REQUIRING MISSION
TERMINATION AND, IF EVA, SOP USAGE.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-183
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
zo/o6/86
EMU
282
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FEEDWATER CHECK VALVE (ITEM 120C)
FAILED CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA; 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV785844
CAUSES: FLAPPER STICKS SHUT DUE TO CONTAMINATION OR WARPING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF FEEDWATER PRESSURE CONTROL TO TANKS RESULTING IN OVERALL
LOSS OF COOLING. MISSION TERMINATION. POSSIBLE SOP USAGE IF
EVA. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-184
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 283 FLIGHT:
HDW/_a_C
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FDW SUPPLY PRESSURE SENSOR-02 SIDE (ITEM 132A)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLsS
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
•POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767793-5,-7
c[P]
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE ............
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOS SQFPRIM_ARY QXYGEN. MISSION TERMINATION. POSSIBLE SOP USAGE
IF EVA. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
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REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-185
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O6/86
EMU
284
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FDW SUPPLY PRESSURE SENSOR-02 SIDE (ITEM 132A)
FAILED HIGH (OR BIASED HIGH)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLS S
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767793-5, -7
CAUSES: INTERNAL LINKAGE BINDS, WIPER BINDS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ASSUMING LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY, THE MISSION WILL TERMINATE WITH
THIS FAILURE TO PROTECT AGAINST POSSIBLE II3E REGULATOR FAILURE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-186
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1o/o6/86
EMU
285
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/_C
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FDW SUPPLY PRESSURE SENSOR-02 SIDE (ITEM 132A)
FAILED LOW (OR BIASED LOW)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: Svv6vv93-5,-v
CAUSES: INTERNAL LINKAGE/WIPER FIALURE-BINDING, LOSS OF
REFERENCE PRESSURE INTEGRITY-BELLOWS LEAKAGE, LOSS OF POWER/OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:._
ASSUMING LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY THE MISSiONWILL TERMINATE WITH
ms
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THIS FAILURE TO PROTECT AGAINST POSSIBLE LOSS OF FEEDWATER
PRESSURE AND COOLING LOSS.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-187
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lo/o6/86
EMU
286
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FDW SUPPLY PRESSURE SENSOR-02 SIDE (ITEM 132A)
INTERNAL SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) pLss
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767793-5,-7
A[ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, FAILURE OF INSULATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HIGH USE OF BATTERY POWER IS CURRENT LIMITED BUT CAN RESULT IN
LESS OVERALL MISSION POWER' POSSIBLE LOSS OF EMU POWER. MISSION
TERMINATION. POSSIBLE SOP USAGE. POSSIBLE CREWPERSON LOSS IF
SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-188
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBS YS TEM:
MDAC ID:
io/o6/86
EMU
287
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BATTERY (ITEM 490)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) pLss
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767789-02
CAUSES: CELL BOND FAILS, RELIEF VALVE SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE;
LEAKAGE C_RESULT IN SUBLIMATION OF ELECTROLYTE, ESCAPE OF
HYDROGEN GAS _--WH_H_ENTS__IC_ FIRE HAZARD IF
IGNITION SOURCE EXISTS). LIKELY BATTERY FAILURE. MISSION
TERMINATION. POSSIBLE SOP USAGE IF EVA.
POSSIBLE CREWPERSON LOSS IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-189
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O6/86
EMU
288
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BATTERY (ITEM 490)
RELIEF VALVE FAILS OPEN (INTERNAL LEAKAGE)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767789-02
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION ON SEAT, SPRING FRACTURES OR RELAXES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE CAN RESULT IN SUBLIMINATION OF ELECTROLYTE, ESCAPE OF
HYDROGEN GAS (WHICH PRESENTS A SIGNIFICANT FIRE HAZARD). LIKELY
BATTERY FAILURE. MISSION TERMINATION. POSSIBLE SOP USAGE IF
EVA.
POSSIBLE CREWPERSON LOSS IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-190
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10106186
EMU
289
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BATTERY (ITEM 490)
RELIEF VALVE FAILS CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE - HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/IR
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV767789-02
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION ACTS AS AN ADHESIVE/ CORROSION, SPRING
FRACTURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE!_ _i
POSSIBLE CELL RUPTURE DUE TO OVERPRESS%TRIZATION FROM OVERLOAD OR
SHORT. POWER LOSS. POSSIBLE RELEASE OF HYDROGEN GAS (FIRE
HAZARD). MISSION TERMINATES. POSSIBLE SOP USAGE IF EVA.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS OR IF CELL RUPTURE
IS VIOLENT.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O6/86
EMU
290
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BATTERY (ITEM 490)
GENERATION OF HYDROGEN GAS
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/IR
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/1R
A[2 ] B[P] C [P]
SV767789-02
CAUSES: BATTERY OVERLOADED, SHORT, EXCESSIVE DISCHARGE OF
BATTERY
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CELL PRESS_IZATION OC_S _DRELIEVES VIA RELIEF VALVE,
HYDROGEN GAS WOULD THEN BE DUMPED ABOUT THE PLSS AREA PRESENTING
A POSSIBLE FIRE HAZARD. BATTERY VOLTAGE WOULD BE LOW AND THE
MISSION TERMINATED. IF EVA, POSSIBLE SOP USAGE MAY BE REQUIRED.
POSSIBLE CREWPERSON LOSS IF SOP ALSO FAILS OR IF CELL RUPTURES
VIOLENTLY DUE TO RELIEF VALVE ALSO FAILING CLOSED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-192
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM_ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lo/o6/86
EMU
291
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
BATTERY (ITEM 490)
HIGH _SIST_CE OR OPEN
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
T._.AD _ALYST: G. _FF_LLI SUBSYS T._.AD: G. _FF_LLI
B_A_O_ HIE_CHY:
l) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
_ITICALITIES
FLIG_ P_SE HDW/_C
P_-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
_ST-EVA: 2/2
A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
_TION:
P_T _MBER: SV767789-02
_USES: CONT_INATION ON TE_INA_/CO_ECTORS
EFFECTS/_TIONAT._.: ...........
DROP IN _TTERY VOLTAGE. MISSION TE_INATION D_TQ_PO_____R _SS
_OM_W VOLTAGE. _ _SSIB_ SOP USAGE IF EVA. POSSIB_
C_PE_ON _SS IF SOP A_O FAI_.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/06/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 292
ITEM: BATTERY (ITEM 490)
FAILURE MODE: SHORT
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
s) pLss
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
SV767789-02
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION/LEAKAGE PATH ACROSS CONNECTORS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BATTERY LOSS. MISSION TERMINATION. POSSIBLE SOP USAGE IF EVA.
GENERATION OF HYDROGEN GAS IN THE BATTERY DUE TO OVERLOAD.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IS SOP ALSO FAILS OR IF HYROGEN GAS,
UNABLE TO VENT VIA RELIEF VALVE, CAUSES A VIOLENT RUPTURE OF
THE BATTERY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-194
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
iOlO_186
EMU
295
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SECONARY OXYGEN BOTTLE (ITEM 210)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (NON-VIOLENT)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI _
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) SOP
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778880-I
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE AT BOTTLE TO ASSY INTERFACE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SECONDARYrOXYG_ SUPPLY. MISSION TERMINATION. POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF EVA WITH FAILURE OF PLSS 02, COOLING, OR
POWER. IF PRE- OR POST-EVA, HIGH AIRLOCK 02 CONCENTRATION MAY
REQUIRE VENTILATION TO REDUCE FIRE HAZARD.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O7/86
EMU
296
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SECONARY OXYGEN BOTTLE (ITEM 210)
BOTTLE RUPTURE (VIOLENT)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
HDW/FUNC
1/1
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) . LSS
3) SOP
4)
s)
6)
'7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 1/1
EVA: 1/1
POST-EVA: i/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ F]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778880-I
CAUSES: SEAM FAILURE-FROM FATIGUE (OR DEFECT) OR THERMAL CYCLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VIOLENT RUPTURE OF SOP BOTTLE CAN RESULT IN INJURY OR DEATH DUE
TO SHRAPNEL AND/OR SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN PROBABILITY OF FIRE.
ADDITIONALLY, SHRAPNEL COULD PUNCTURE AND DEPRESSURIZE THE SUIT
IF EVA.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-196
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O"//86
EMU
297
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER (ITEM 215)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI _
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) sop
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778473-4
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SECONDARY OXYGEN SUPPLY. MISSION TERMINATION. POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREWMEMBER IF PLSS FAILS 02 DELIVERY. IF SOP IN USE, LEAK
LOWERS EXPECTED DURATION OF USAGE DEPENDENT UPON LEAK SIZE.
REFERENCES:
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I
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-197
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O7/86
Ei_J
298
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER (ITEM 215)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
i/i
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
s) sop
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 1/1
EVA: 1/1
POST-EVA: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[ P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV778473-4
CAUSES: MATERIAL FATIGUE/FRACTURE BETWEEN PRESSURE SENSE AN_
PORT TO 02 LINE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HIGH-PRESSURE OXYGEN ENTERS ELECTRONICS HOUSING WHERE SOURCES OF
IGNITION CAN EXIST. IF INTERNAL LEAK IS VIOLENT, FRICTION OF
PARTICULATE CAN RESULT IN IGNITION SOURCE. IF IGNITION OCCURS,
LOSS OF LIFE, EMU, AND POSSIBLY VEHICLE CAN RESULT.
REFERENCES:
L ,
J
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-198
.am
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM_ALYSIS WO_HEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lo/o7/86
EMU
299
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
P_SS_ T_SDUCER (ITEM 215)
E_C_ONICS SHORT
_AD _ALYST: G. _FFAELLI SUBSYS _D: G. _FFAELLI
B__ HIE_CHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) soP
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITI_LITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C
P_-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
_TION:
P_T _MBER: SV778473-4
CAUSES: VIB_TION, CONT_INATION ACROSS 7,_ADS/CONTACTS
EFFECTS/_TIONAT._:
HIGHER T_ NOMINAL _TE OF CONSUM_ION OF _R_DUCES OVE_LL
MISSION POWER AVAI_Bt_. POSSIB;,_/PROBAB_ _SS OF SENSOR
OUTPUT. POSSIBT,_ _SS OF __D SYSTEMS _QUIRING SOP USAGE.
POSSIB_ _SS OF _ PERSON IF SOP A_O FAI_.
_FE_NCES:
I
m
J
i
m
m
i
z
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g
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m
_PORT DATE 12/02/86 C-199
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O7/86
EMU
300
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER (ITEM 215)
READS HIGH
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) sop
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778473-4
CAUSES: SHORT OR OPEN IN CIRCUITRY, STRAIN GAGE FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF SOP PRESSURE READOUT TO DCM. NO IMMEDIATE MISSION
IMPACT OR IMPACT TO CREW. PRE-EVA SOP PRESSURE CAN BE VERIFIED
BY THE PRESSURE GAGE ON THE 213 REGULATOR. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO
VERIFY SOP 02 PRESSURE DURING EVA.
IF IN USE, NO IMPACT OTHER THAN INABILITY TO DETERMINE AMOUNT OF
02 LEFT IN SOP. LOSS OF GAGE ALSO WOULD RESULT IN MISSION
TERMINATION PRE-EVA DUE TO NO SOP MONITORING AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-200
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
iOlO_186
EMU
301
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER (ITEM 215)
READS LOW
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) SOP
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778473-4
A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
CAUSES: SHORT OR OPEN IN CIRCUITRY, STRAIN GAGE FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOW SOP PRESSURE REQUI_S MISSION TERMINATION. IT WOULD BE A
JUDGEMENT CALL AS TO THE ACCURACY OF THE TRANSDUCER VERSUS THE
GAGE. FAILURE OF GAGE WOULD ONLY RESULT IN SAME EFFECT OF
MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1o/o7/86
EMU
302
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
IST STAGE REGULATOR (ITEM 213B)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) sop
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
A[2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778473-13
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE, HOUSING SEAL FAILURE, VIA TPD SEAL/CHECK
VALVE FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SOP OXYGEN. MISSION TERMINATION.
OF CREWPERSON WITH PLSS FAILURE
IF EVA, POSSIBLE LOSS
REFERENCES:
i
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-202
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/07/86
EMU
303
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
IST STAGE _GU_TOR (ITEM 213B)
I_E_AL T._A_GE/FAIL OPEN
T_AD _ALYST: G. _FF_LLI SUBSYS T_AD: G. _FFAELLI
B_DO_ HIE_CHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) sop
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRI_CALITIES
FLIG_ P_SE HDW/_C
P_-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] C [P]
_CATION:
P_T _MBER: SV778473-13
CAUSES:
SEAT
SPRING F_C_, PL_GER STICKS/JAMS, FAIL_ OF BALL TO
EFFECTS/_TIONAT._:
POSSIB_ HIGH 02 F_W _D HIGH P_SS_ TO SECOND STAGE
_GU_TOR. POSSIBT._ HIGH F_W _D SUIT OVE_SS_ _ RESULT
IF A 213D _GU_TOR FAI_ OPEN _N SOP IS ENABT._D. USE OF EMU
_LIEF VALVES _D/OR _GE VALVES WOULD _EN BE _CESS_Y.
MISSION TE_INATION. POSSIBT_ C_WPERSON _SS IF P_S 02 ALSO
FAI_.
_FE_NCES:
I
m
m
l
m
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i
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D
_PORT DATE 12/02/86 C-203
B
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/07/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 304
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1_
ITEM: IST STAGE REGULATOR (ITEM 213B)
FAILURE MODE: REGULATES HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) SOP
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778473-13
CAUSES: SPRING FRACTURES/RELAXES, PLUNGER JAMS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HIGH PRESSURE TO 213D REGULATOR CAN RESULT IN HIGH FLOW TO EMU
WITH A 213D REGULATOR FAILED OPEN. POSSIBLE SUIT OVER
PRESSURIZATION CAN RESULT IF EMU RELIEF VALVES AND/OR PURGE
VALVES FAILED.
POSSIBLE CREWPERSON LOSS IF PLSS 02 ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-204
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/07/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 305
ITEM: IST STAGE REGULATOR (ITEM 213B)
FAILURE MODE: REGULATES LOW
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) sop
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV778473-13
CAUSES: SPRING FRACTURES, PLUNGER J_S_:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ASSUMING SOP IN USE, LOW PRESSURE TO THE 213D REGULATOR CAN
RESULT IN REDUCED FLOW TO CREWPERSON AND EMU. POSSIBLE
CREWPERSON LOSS IF PLSS FAILS ALSO.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
2/ZR
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-205
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/07/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 306
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM: IST STAGE REGULATOR (ITEM 213B)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) sop
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
A[ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778473-13
CAUSES: INLET FILTER BLOCKED, SPRING FRACTURES, PLUNGER JAMS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
ASSUMING SOP IN USE DUE TO A PLSS FAILURE, NO 02 FLOW TO
CREWPERSON OR EMU CAN RESULT IN BOTH LOSS OF CREWPERSON AND EMU.
m
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-206
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10107186
EMU
307
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
IST STAGE REGULATOR (ITEM 2!3B)
DIAPHRAM RUPTURE
HDW/nmC
1/1
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) SOP
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 1/1
EVA: 1/1
POST-EVA: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778475-13
AC 2 ] B [ F] C [ F]
CAUSES: FATIGUE DUE TO CYCLING
EFFECTS/_TIQNA_: ....................
A DIAP__ RUp'_ _ C_ULDBE VIOLENT OR COULD RESULT I_ _ _
PARTICULATES BEING RELEASED TO 02 ENVIRONMENT. _?OR'_T_ .......
EFFECT, POSSIBLE FIRE CAN RESULT DUE TO FRICTION.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-207
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O7186
EMU
308
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLI GHT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
2ND STAGE REGULATOR (ITEM 213D)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) soP
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
A[2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778475-13
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SOP OXYGEN. MISSION TERMINATION. IF EVA, POSSIBLE LOSS
OF CREWPERSON WITH FAILURE OF PLSS. IF PLSS SIDE, POSSIBLE LOSS
OF CREWPERSON WITH LOSS OF SOP.
m REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-208
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
io/ov/86
EMU
309
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
2ND STAGE REGULATOR (ITEM 213D)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE/FAIL OPEN
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) sop
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
..............CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778475-13
CAUSES: PLUNGER JAMS, SPRING FRACTURE, BALANCE STEM SEAL FAILURE
(PATH VIA RV), SPRING RELAXES, BALL FAILS TO FULLY SEAT, BELLOWS
(PRESSURE REFERENCE) FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
UNCONTROLLED OXYGEN FLOW TO EMU. POSSIBLE EMU OVERPRESSURIZATION
CONTROLLED BY ITEM 146 RELIEF VALVE. TOT_AL FLOW CONTROLLED BY
INTERNAL ORIFICE. POSSIBLE HIGH 02 CONCENTRATION IN AIRLOCK
REQUIRES VENTILATION.
IF EVA, HIGH PRESSURE RESULTS IN PLSS REGULATOR CLOSURE UNTIL ALL
SOP OXYGEN VENTED. MISSION TERMINATION. POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREWPERSON WITH LOSS OF PLSS.
REFERENCES :
i
m
I
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J
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-209
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/07/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 310
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM: 2ND STAGE REGULATOR (ITEM 213D)
FAILURE MODE: REGULATES HIGH
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) sop
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778475-13
CAUSES: SPRING RELAXES, SPRING FRACTURE, BALANCE STEM STICKS,
CONTAMINATION ON PLUNGER/BALL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HIGHER PRESSURE REALIZED IN EMU (PRESSURE LIMITED BY 146 RELIEF
VALVE AND PURGE VALVES). HIGHER 02 FLOW TO EMU WHEN OPERATED.
EFFECTIVELY REDUCES THE PREDICTED 30 MINUTE 02 SUPPLY AVAILABLE
WHEN SOP REQUIRED.
SINCE SOP REGULATION DURING EVA ONLY RESULTS AFTER A PLSS
FAILURE, REDUCED 02 SUPPLY CAN RESULT IN CREWPERSON LOSS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-210
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
lOlOVlS6
EMU
311
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
2ND STAGE REGULATOR (ITEM 213D)
REGULATES LOW
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) soP
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: _ 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778475-13
B [ P ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: SPRING FRACTURE, PLUNGER STICKS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOW PRESSURE REGULATION WOULD TERMINATE THE MISSION _RErEVA AND
RULE OUT _ MISSIONS IF POST-E- VA. SINCE SOP REGULATION IS NOT
REQUIRED DURING AN EVA EXCEPT AFTER A PLSS FAILURE, LOW
REGULATOR PRESSURE CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE DUE TO LOW A
PRE_. ..... _ _
REFERENCES:
I
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-211
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lo/o7/86
EMU
312
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
2ND STAGE REGULATOR (ITEM 213D)
FAILS CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) sop
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV778475-13
CAUSES: INLET FILTER BLOCKED, MECHANICAL LINKAGE FAILS TO ENABLE
REGULATOR, BALL/PLUNGER JAMS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILING CLOSED PRE- OR POST-EVA RESULTS IN TERMINATION OF THE
EXISTING OR FUTURE MISSIONS. FAILURE DURING AN EVA WOULD NOT BE
REALIZED UNTIL REQUIRED SUBSEQUENT TO A FAILURE OF A PRIMARY
REDUNDANT FUNCTION. THE CREWPERSON WOULD BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-212
INDEPENDENTORBITER_ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/07/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 313
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
2ND STAGE REGULATOR (ITEM 213D)
MECHANICAL LINKAGE FAILS ENGAGED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
HDW/FUNC
2/2
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
s) sop
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778475-13
CAUSES: FATIGUE, LINKAGE JAMS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE SOP WOULD REMAIN ENGAGED DURING POST-EVA AND, WHEN AIRLOCK TO
SUIT PRESSURE IS LOWER THAN 3.2 PSID, THE SOP WOULD START TO
OPERATE. POSSIBLE HIGH 02 CONCENTRATION IN AIRLOCK COULD REQUIRE
VENTIALTION TO REDUCE FIRE HAZARD.
NO FUTURE MISSIONS WOULD BE POSSIBLE. _
REFERENCES:
g
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-213
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/07/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 314
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM: SOP PRESSURE GAGE (ITEM 213E)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) sop
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778475-13
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GRADUAL LOSS OF SECONDARY OXYGEN SUPPLY. IF EVA, POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREWPERSON WITH LOSS OF PLSS. POSSIBLE HIGH 02 CONCENTRATION IN
AIRLOCK WOULD REQUIRE VENTILATION.
w
REFERENCES:
w
m
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-214
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/07/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 315
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SOP PRESSURE GAGE (ITEM 213E)
BOURDN TUBE RUPTURE
HDW/FUNC
i/I
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) soP
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: i/1
EVA: 1/1
POST-EVA: 1/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778475-13
CAUSES: MATERIAL FATIGUE/DEFECT
B[F] C [F]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A RUPTURE OF THE BOURDON TUBE COULD BE VIOLENT AND RESULT IN AN
OXYGEN FIRE.
REFERENCES:
lib
l
I
l
mm
IB
g
Im
m
MII
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m
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g
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g
l
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-215
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O7/86
EMU
316
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SOP PRESSURE GAGE (ITEM 213E)
FAILS HIGH
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) sop
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778475-13
CAUSES: LINKAGE FAILURE, BOURDON TUBE RELAXES, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF PRESSURE TRANSDUCER ALSO FAILS, THE CREWPERSON CANNOT VERIFY
SOP PRESSURE PRIOR TO THE MISSION. MISSION TERMINATION SHOULD
RESULT.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-216
IDATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
10/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EMU
317 FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SOP PRESSURE GAGE (ITEM 213E)
FAILS LOW
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) sop
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT _P--HAS_ HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778475-13
B [ P] C [P]
CAUSES: LINKAGE FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EFFECTS/RA_QNAL__:
IF PRESSURE TRANSDUCER ALSO FAILS, THE _CRE_WpER_0N .C_OTI VERIFY
SOP_P_SS_PRIORTOTHE MISSION. MISSION TERMINATION SHOULD .......
RESULT.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-217
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O7/86
EMU
318
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SOP FILL PORT QD AND FILTER (ITEM 213F)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE/INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) SOP
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778475-13
B[P] CCP]
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE AT ASSEMBLY INTERFACE, SPRING
FRACTURES/RELAXES IN CHECK VALVE, CONTAMINATION ON SEAT, HOUSING
SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GRADUAL LOSS OF SECONDARY OXYGEN SUPPLY. IF EVA, POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREWPERSON WITH LOSS OF PLSS. POSSIBLE HIGH 02 CONCENTRATION IN
AIRLOCK WOULD REQUIRE VENTILATION.
REFERENCES:
w
i
_ I REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-218
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/07/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 319
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM: SOP FILL PORT QD AND FILTER (ITEM 213F)
FAILURE MODE: FILTER BLOCKED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) SOP
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITI_LITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778475-13
A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: EXCESSIVE CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FILTER IS EMPLOYED DURING FILL OPERATIONS (ONGROUND ONLY),
THEREFORE, NO INPUT FOR FLIGHT.
REFE NCES:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
g
mm
M
i
=
om
i
R
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-219
ww
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O_/86
EMU
320
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SOP FILL PORT QD AND FILTER (ITEM 213F)
FILTER PASSES CONTAMINANTS
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) SOP
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778475-13
CAUSES: FILTER TO HOUSING SEAL FAILS, FILTER RUPTURES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GROSS PASSAGE OF CONTAMINANTS CAN RESULT IN BLOCKAGE OF
DOWNSTREAM FILTERS OR CAN CONTRIBUTE TO FAILURE OF THE IST STAGE
REGULATOR FAILURE.
w
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-220
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 321 FLIGHT: 3/2R
ITEM: SOP ASSEMBLY (ITEM 200)
FAILURE MODE: BOTTLE INLET FILTER BLOCKED (ONE FILTER FOR EACH
BOTTLE)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) sop
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES _
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767710-07-08
CAUSES: EXCESSIVE CONTAMINATION IN SYSTEM
EFFECTS/RATIONA_ __-_ ..............
DUE TO THE DELTA P WHICH THE FILTER WOULD BE EXPOSED, THE FILTER
WOULD LIKELY RUPTURE AND RELEASE CONTAMINANTS DOWNSTREAM TO IST
STAGE REGULATOR FAILURE WHICH CAN THEN FAIL DUE TO THE
CONTAMINATION.
SUCH A FAILURE WOULD THEN RESULT IN MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-221
mmm
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/07/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 322
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
ITEM: SOP ASSEMBLY (ITEM 200)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) SOP
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767710-07-08
CAUSES: DRAIN PORT "M" SEAL FAILURE, PLSS INTERFACE SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GRADUAL LOSS OF PLSS OXYGEN. POSSIBLE CREWPERSON LOSS IF SOP
FAILS DURING EVA. POSSIBLE HIGH 02 CONCENTRATION IS AIRLOCK.
REFERENCESI
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-222
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
S_SYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O8/86
EMU
323
HIG_ST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/_C
3/2R
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
COMMON _LTIPT._ CO_ECTOR (ITEM 410)
EXTE_AL _GE-OXYGEN
_D _ALYST: G. _FFAELLI SUBSYS T._AD: G. _FFAELLI
B_AK_ HIE_CHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) scu
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITI_LITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C
P_-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
_CATION:
P_T_MBER: SV778872-12
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: S_L FAIL_, CO_ECTOR SEAL FAIL_, _MATED: POPPET _
STIC_ OPENS, __ SPRING F_C_S/_ES
EFFECTS/_TIQNA_ _ __
_SS OF OXYGEN TO EMU _Y _SULT IN OFF-NOMINAL C_GE _D
MISSION TE_INATION. AIR_CK 02 CONCEN_TION INC_ASES POSSIBLE
FI_ _Z_D IF NOT _LL VENTI_TED. POSSIBT._ _SS OF VEHIC_ 02.
D_ING EVA, 02 VALVE IN AIR_CK IS C_SED _E_BY _DUCING _
_PABILITY.
_FE_NCES:
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_PORT DATE 12/02/86 C-223
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lo/o8/86
EMU
324
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 410)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE-FEEDWATER SUPPLY/DRAIN LINE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) scu
4)
s)
6)
7)
e)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2R
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778872-12
B [ P] C [P]
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE, CONNECTOR SEAL FAILURE; UNMATED: POPPET
STICKS OPENS, RETURN SPRING FRACTURES/RELAXES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF FEEDWATER PRESSURE FOR CHARGING EMU MAY RESULT IN OFF-
NOMINAL CHARGE AND MISSION TERMINATION. FREE WATER IN AIRLOCK
MAY FREEZE IN AIRLOCK VENT VALVE AND BLOCK AIRLOCK
DEPRESSURIZATION THEREBY TERMINATING THE MISSION.
FEEDWATER SUPPLY VALVE NORMALLY OFF IN AIRLOCK AFTER INITIAL
CHARGE. IF EVA PERFORMED W/O DETECTION OF FAILURE TO OBTAIN FULL
FEEWATER CHARGE, COOLING BE LOST PREMATURELY THEREBY REQUIRING
SOP USAGE. IF THE SOP ALSO FAILED, CREWPERSON COULD BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
i
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-224
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/08/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 325
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM: COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 410)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE- LCG INLET - LCG OUTLET
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) scc
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778872-12
B [ P] C [P]
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE, CONNECTOR SEAL FAILURE; UNMATED: POPPET
STICKS OPENS, RETURN SPRING FRACTURES/RELAXES
EFFECTS/RATIONALEz
POSSIBLE DEGRADED LCG COOLING, INCREASED USAGE OF FEEDWATER
SUPPLY TO CHARGE LCG LINES, THEREBY POSSIBLY DEGRADING FEEWATER
CHARGE. IN EFFICIENT FEEDWATER CHARGE CAN RESULT IN MISSION
TERMINATION.
I
I
I
m
i
mm
I
B
m
w
J
REFERENCES:
g
l
I
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-225
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O8/86
EMU
326
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 410)
CONNECTOR DOES NOT LATCH CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
s) scu
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778872-12
CAUSES: LATCH MECHANISM BINDS, COUPLINGS MISALIGN, CAM FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
USE OF SECOND SCU CONNECTOR REQUIRED TO PERFORM MISSION, RECHARGE
(02, H20, AND POWER) OR INITIAL CHARGE. IF SECOND SCU IS FAILED,
MISSION MUST TERMINATE.
REFERENCES:
m
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-226
INDEPENDENTORBITER_SESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O8/86
EMU
327
HIG_ST CRITI_LITY
FLIG_:
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
COMMON MULTIP_ CO_ECTOR (ITEM 410)
CO_ECTOR DOES NOT _T._ASE OPEN
_AD ANALYST: G. _FF_LLI SUBSYS 7._AD: G. _FFAELLI
HDW/FUNC
2/2
B_A_O_ HIE_Y:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) SCU
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C
P_-EVA: 2/2
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 2/2
_D_DANCY SC_ENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [NA ]
_CATION :
P_T _MBER: SV778872-12
C_USES: _TCH/_CK MEC_ISM BINDS, CAM FAIL_, COUPLINGS BIND
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
EMU IS ES_IALLY TIED INTO THE AIR_CK. MISSION TE_INATION.
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_PORT DATE 12/02/86 C-227
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lo/o8/86
EMU
328
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 410)
ELECTRICAL POWER OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) scu
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] cCP]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778872-12
CAUSES: PIN PUSHED IN, CONTACT BREAKS, PIN MISALIGNED/BENT,
CORROSION/CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EMU UNABLE TO BE POWERED VIA SCU WITH FAILURE. BATTERY MUST BE
EMPLOYED AS MUST SECOND SCU. POSSIBLE MISSION IMPACT DUE TO
EARLY BATTERY USAGE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-228
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O8/86
EMU
329
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 410)
ELECTRICAL POWER SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) scu
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV778872-12
CAUSES: PIN(S) MISALIGNED/BENT, CONTAMINATION IN CONNECTOR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
HIGH POWER USAGE ON ORBITER SYSTEM. UNABLE TO POWER EMU.
MISSION TERMINATION IF SECOND SCU FAILS. POSSIBLE MISSION
IMPACTS DUE TO EARLY BATTERY USAGE.
REFERENCES:
HDW/_C
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-229
R
u
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/08/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 330
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
ITEM: COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 410)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN IN VOLTAGE SENSE LINE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) SCU
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 3/2R
A[ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778872-12
CAUSES: CORROSION, VIBRATION, PIN FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO POWER EMU FOR IV OPERATIONS USING VEHICLE POWER.
BATTERY USE COULD BE A MISSION DURATION IMPACT. SECOND SCU
AVIALABLE.
EARLY
m REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-230
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i0/08/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 331
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 410)
SHORT IN VOLTAGE SENSE LINE
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) LSS
3) scu
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES _
FLIGHT PHASE - HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV778872-12
B[P] C [P]
CAUSES: CORROSION, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION ACROSS CONNECTOR
CONTACTS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ........................................................
UNABLE TO POWER EMU FOR IV OPERATIONS USING VEHICLE POWER. EARLY
BATTERY USE COULD BE A MISSION IMPACT. SECOND SCU AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-231
wm
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
zo/o8/86
EMU
332
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 410)
OPEN IN HARDLINE, AUDIO IN OR OUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) scu
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778872-12
CAUSES: CORROSION, VIBRATION, PIN FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF HARDLINE TWO-WAY COMMUNICATIONS TO VEHICLE. SECOND SCU
AND EVC ARE AVAILABLE FOR COMMUNICATIONS. MISSION TERMINATES IF
ALL REDUNDANCY (IN PARTICULAR TO EVC) ARE FAILED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-232
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/08/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 333 FLIGHT:
ITEM: COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 410)
FAILURE MODE: SHORT IN HARDLINE, AUDIO IN OR OUT
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) scu
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778872-12
B [ P] C [P]
CAUSES: CORROSION, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION ACROSS CONNECTOR
CONTACTS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _ _
LOSS OF HARDLINE--TWO-WAY COM_ICATIONS TO vEHICLE. SECOND SCU
AND EVC ARE AVAILABLE FOR COMMUNICATIONS. MISSION TERMINATES IF
ALL REDUNDANCY (IN PARTICULAR THE EVC) ARE FAILED.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-233
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/OS/86
EMU
334
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMMON MULTIPLECONNECTOR
BATTERY RECHARGE, LINE-OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) SCU
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 3/2R
A[ 2 ] BCP] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778872-12
CAUSES: PIN PUSHED IN, CONTACT BREAKS, PIN MISALIGNED/BENT,
CORROSION/CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO CHARGE/RECHARGE BATTERY-MISSION TERMINATION IF SECOND
SCU IS FAILED.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-234
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/08/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 335 FLIGHT:
ITEM: COMMON MULTIP_CONNECTOR
FAILURE MODE: BATTERY RECHARGE, LINE-SHORT
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) scu
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] c[P]
LOCAT:_ON:
PART NUMBER: SV778872-12
CAUSES: PINS MISALIGNED/BENT, CONTAMINATION ACROSS
LEADS/CONTACTS
EFFECTS/RATIONAl:
FAILS TO CHARGE/RECHARGE BATTERY. CAUSES EXCESSIVE BATTERY
DRAIN. MISSION TERMINATION IF SECOND SCU IS FAILED.
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-235
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O8/86
EMU
336
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HIGH PRESSURE OXYGEN LINE (ITEM 411)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) scu
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: /NA
POST,EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778865-2
CAUSES: FITTING/CONNECTOR, SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 02 DURING CHARGE-RECHARGE. INEFFICIENT CHARGE MAY
REQUIRE USE OF REMAINING SCU TO FINISH 02 CHARGE. POSSIBLE HIGH
02 CONCENTRATION IN AIRLOCK MAY REQUIRE VENTILATION TO MINIMIZE
FIRE HAZARD.
MISSION TERMINATION IF SECOND SCU IS FAILED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-236
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lo/o8/s6
EMU
337
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILLE MODE:
PORTABT,_. H20 LINE (ITEM 412A)
EXTE_AL T._._GE
7,_.AD ANALYST: G. _FF_LLI SUBSYS HAD: G. _FFAELLI
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
B_DO_ HIE_CHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) scu
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)-
..........¢_R_I_TI_CALITIES -
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
_CATION:
P_T _MBER: SV771722-5
mUSES: FITTING/CO_ECTOR SEAL FAIL_
EFFECTS/_TIONAT,_.: ................
_SS OF FEEDWATER SUPPLY FROM AIR_CKAND EMU. WATER_Y BE
VISIBT,_. IN AIR_CK. MISSION IMPACT D_ TO _OBAB_ E_LY USE OF
BATTERY. BATTERY IS USED E_Y BECAUSE S_ SUPPLY H20 C_OT BE
ISO_TED FROM _E EMU WITHO_ S_ DISCO_ECTION FROM THE DCM.
DEG_DED _GE/_C_GE CAPABILITY _QUIRING SECOND S_ TO
COMP_TE C_GE. IF SECOND S_ IS FAI_D, MISSION TE_INATION
CAN _SULT.
_FE_NCES:
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_PORT DATE 12/02/86
i
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/08/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 338
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM: COOLING H20 IN-LINE (ITEM 412B)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) scu
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER: SV771722-6
CAUSES: CONNECTOR/FITTING, SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GRADUAL LOSS OF EMU FEEDWATER SUPPLY. WATER MAY BE VISIBLE IN
AIRLOCK. MISSION IMPACT DUE TO PROBABLE EARLY BATTERY USE
BECAUSE THE H20 LEAK CANNOT BE ISOLATED FROM THE EMUWITHOUT SCU
DISCONNECTION FROM THE DCM.
THE LEAK WILL ADDITIONALLY USE AVAILABLE FEEDWATERWHICH CAN
RESULT IN AN INSUFFICIENT CHARGE. MISSION TERMINATION CAN RESULT
IF SECOND SCU ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-238
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM_ALYSIS WO_HEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O8/86
EMU
339
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
COOLING H20 OR-LINE (ITEM 412C)
EXTE_AL _AKAGE
7._AD _ALYST: G. _FFAELLI SUBSYS _AD: G. _FFAELLI
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
B_AKDO_ HIE_CHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) SCU
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C
P_-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
_CATION:
P_T_MBER: SV771722-7
B[F] cCP]
CAUSES: CO_ECTOR/FITTING SEAL FAIL_
EFFECTS/_TIONATR:
_SS OF EMU FEEDWATER SUPPLY. WATER MAY BE VISIB_ IN AIR_CK.
MISSION IMPACT DUE TO PRO_BT._. E_LY USE OF _TTERY PO_R.
BATTERY IS USED E_LY BECAUSE THE H20 _ _OT BE ISO_TED
FROM THE EMU WITHO_ S_ DISCONNECTION FROM THE DCM.
T_ _ WI_ ADDITIONALLY USE AVAI_BT._ FEEDWATER_ICH C_
_SULT IN _ INSUFFICIE_ C_GE. MISSION TE_INATION C_ _SULT
IF SECOND S_ _O FAI_.
_FE_NCES:
_PORT DATE 12/02/86 C-239
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/08/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 340
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM: BACTERIAL FILTER HOUSING (ITEM 416)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) LSS
3) scu
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 3/2R
A [ 2 ] B[F] C[ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767709-14
CAUSES: CONNECTOR SEAL FAILURE, SEAL FAILURE (TO REGULATORS),
HOUSING SEAL FAILURE, TEST PORT "Q" AND/OR "R" SEAL FAILURES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF FEEDWATER SUPPLY IN EMU. WATER MAY BE VISIBLE IN
AIRLOCK. MISSION IMPACT DUE TO PROBABLE EARLY USE OF BATTERY
POWER. BATTERY IS USED EARLY BECAUSE THE H20 LEAK CANNOT BE
ISOLATED FROM THE EMU WITHOUT SCU DISCONNECTION FROM THE DCM.
MISSION TERMINATION IF SECOND SCU IS FAILED ANDUNABLE TO
RECHARGE WATER SUPPLY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-240
mmm
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
lO/O8/86
EMU
341
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONDENSATE H20 REGULATOR (ITEM 418)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (EMU SIDE)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) scu
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV771717-7
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE, HOUSING SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF FEEDWATER SUPPLY IN EMU. WATER MAY BE VISIBLE IN
AIRLOCK. M_I-S-SI--0NIMPACT DUETO PROBABLE EARLY USE OF BATTERY
POWER. BATTERY IS USED EARLY BECAUSE FAILED SCU MUST BE
DISCONNECTED FROM DCM TO ISOLATE LEAK FROM EMU.
ADDITIONALLY, THE LEAK COULD SUFFICIENTLY LOWER THE PRESSURE TO
CAUSE THE REGULATOR TO OPEN AND EXPEDITE LOSS OF FEEDWATER
SUPPLY. MISSION TERMINATION IF SECOND SCU IS FAILED AND UNABLE
TO RECHARGE WATER SUPPLY.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-241
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O8/86
EMU
342
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONDENSATE H20 REGULATOR (ITEM 418)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (FILTER SIDE)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) SCU
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV771717-7
A[2 ] B[F] C [P]
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE LEAK IS ISOLATED BY THE REGULATOR FROM THE EMU RESULTING IN
NO IMPACTS.
REFERENCES:
u
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-242
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lo/o8/86
EMU
343
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONDENSATE H20_G_U_TOR (ITEM 418)
INTERNAL LEA_GE/FAI_ OPEN
HDW/_NC
3/2R
T._AD ANALYST: G. _FFAELLI SUBSYS 7._AD: G. _FFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) scu
4)
s)
6)
"I)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C
P_-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV771717-7
CAUSES: SPRING F_C_S/_XES, CONTAMINATION SEAT, PLUNGER
STICKS, HOUSING SEAL LEAKAGE, MANUAL OVERIDE STICk/JAMS OPEN
EF_CTS/_TIONAT?_!_' ix_h_-- i_ _ _ _ _ _ -_ - ___i__i.L_i,_i_i
LOSS OF S_ FOR H20 C_GE/_C_GE. DRAINAGE OF EMU FEEDWATER.
MISSION TERMINATION IF OTHER S_ FAILS. POSSIBLE REDUCTION IN
MISSION LENGTH DUE TO EARLY USE OF BATTERY DUE TO SCU
DISCONNECTION TO ISOLATE DRAINAGE.
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_PORT DATE 12/02/86
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lo/o8/86
EMU
344
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONDENSATE H20 REGULATOR (ITEM 418)
FAILS CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) scu
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV771717-7
CAUSES: SPRING FRACTURES, STUCK PLUNGER, DIAPHRAGM STICKS,
CONTAMINATION IN AMBIENT SENSE CHAMBER CAUSES SENSE SHIFT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO RELIEVE CONDENSATE GENERATED DURING IV OPERATIONS
(WHEN EMU IS ALREADY HARD CHARGED) CAN RESULT IN H20 CARRYOVER
INTO THE VENT-LOOP OF PLSS THEREBY CAUSING MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
=
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-244
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10108186
EMU
345
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONDENSATE H20 REGULATOR (ITEM 418)
REGULATES LOW
HDW/FUNC
312R
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) SCU
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV771717-7
CAUSES: SPRING RELAXES, CONTAMINATION ON SEAT, PLUNGER
COMPRESSES SEAT
EFFECTS/RATION_:
(CRACKS AND RESEATS AT A LOWER WATER PRESSURE.) LOSS OF SCU FOR
H20 CHARGE/RECHARGE. DRAINAGE OF EMU FEEDWATER. MISSION
TERMINATION IF OTHER SCU FAILS. POSSIBLE REDUCTION IN MISSION
LENGTH DUE TO EARLY USE OF BATTERY POWER REQUIRED
WHEN SCU IS DISCONNECTED TO ISOLATE FAILURE FROM EMU.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-245
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/08/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 346
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM: CONDENSATE H20 REGULATOR (ITEM 418)
FAILURE MODE: REGUALTES HIGH
HDW/FUNC
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) scu
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] C [P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV771717-7
CAUSES: SPRING FRACTURES, CONTAMINATION IN AMBIENT SENSE CHAMBER
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO RELIEVE CONDENSATE GENERATED DURING IV OPERATIONS CAN
RESULT IN H20 CARRYOVER INTO THE VENT-LOOP OF PLSS THEREBY
CAUSING MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-246
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/08/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EMU
347 FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONDENSATE H20 REGULATOR (ITEM 418)
MANUAL OVERRIDE JAMS (UNABLE TO OPEN VALVE)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMu
2) LSS
s) scu
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: S/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV771717-7
CAUSES: CAM BINDS, PLUN_ER JAMS _ _ .......
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO DRAIN TANKS. CANRESULT IN STRETCHANDREDUCED
LIFETIME OF TANK BLADDERS WITH POSSIBLE FAILURE FOR NEXT MISSION
IF NOT DRAINED BY SECOND SCU.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-247
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O8/86
EMU
348
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WATER SUPPLY PRESSURE REGULATOR (ITEM 419)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI • SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) LSS
3) scu
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV772190-6
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE, HOUSING SEAL FAILURE, DIAPHRAGM
FAILURE/RUPTURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF FEEDWATER AND/OR FEEDWATER PRESSURE IN H20 TANKS.
MISSION TERMINATION RESULTS IF NO FEEDWATER AVAILABLE FROM SECOND
SCU. PROBABLE MISSION IMPACT DUE TO EARLY BATTERY USAGE TO
CHARGE SCUtS.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-248
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10108186
EMU
349
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WATER SUPPLY PRESSURE REGULATOR (ITEM 419)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE/FAILED OPEN OR REGULATES HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) scu
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV772190-6
CAusEs: SPRING FRACTURES/RELAXES, CONTAMINATION VALVE SEAT,
HOUSING SEAL FAILURE, PLUNGER JAMS/STICKS, DIAPHRAGM JAMS/STICKS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
H20 UP TO 17 PSID PROVIDED THE FEEDWATER TANKS OF THE EMU SHOULD
RESULT IN THE CONDENSATE REGULATOR OPENING AND DRAINING THE TANKS
RESULTING IN AN UNACCEPTABLE CHARGE. MISSION TERMINATION RESULTS
IF SECOND SCU NOT AVAILABLE TO CHARGE FEEDWATER TANKS .......
WITHOUT DEPLETING THEM. POSSIBLE MISSION IMPACT DUE TO EARLY
BATTERY USAGE.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-249
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lo/o8/86
EMU
35O
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WATER SUPPLY PRESSURE REGULATOR (ITEM 419)
FAILED CLOSED OR REGULATES LOW (BELOW 8 PSID)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) scu
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
•PART NUMBER: SV772190-6
CAUSES: SPRING FRACTURE, CONTAMINATION CAUSES PLUNGER TO
JAM/STICK, DIAPHRAM JAMS/STICKS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNACCEPATBLE H20 CHARGE PROVIDED THE EMU. MISSION TERMINATION IF
SECOND SCU NOT AVAILABLE FOR CHARGE. POSSIBLE MISSION IMPACT DUE
TO EARLY BATTERY USAGE.
REFERENCES:
w
u
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-250
lINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/08/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 351 FLIGHT:
ITEM: BACTERIA CARTRIDGE (ITEM 423)
FAILURE MODE: INLET SCREEN BLOCKED/NO FLOW (SUPPLY SIDE)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
HDWIFUNC
312R
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) LSS
3) scu
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE ....HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV784967-I
CAUSES: EXCESSIVE CONT_INATION
B[P] C[P]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LITTLE OR NO FEEDWATER C_GE. MISSION TERMINATIONIF SECOND SCU
UNAVAILBLE, POSSIBLE MISSION IMPACT DUE TO EARLY BATTERY USAGE
REQUIRED TO CHANGE SCU'S.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
].0/08/86
EMU
352
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BACTERIA CARTRIDGE (ITEM 423)
INLET SECREEN BLOCKED/NO FLOW (WASTE SIDE)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) scu
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV784967-I
CAUSES: EXCESSIVE CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO RELIEVE CONDENSATE GENERATED DURING IV OPERATIONS. CAN
RESULT IN H20 CARRYOVER INTO THE PLSS VENT LOOP THEREBY CAUSING
MISSION TERMINATION.
w
w
REFERENCES:
w
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-252
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/08/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 353 FLIGHT: 2/IR
ITEM: BACTERIA CARTRIDGE (ITEM 423)
FAILURE MODE: FAILURE OF CARTRIDGE (SUPPLY OR WASTER) TO CONTROL
BACTERIA
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) SCU
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV784967-I
CAUSES: POOR DISTRIBUTION OF FLOW THROUGH IODINE IMPREGNATED
BEADS, FAILURE OF SEAL TO BACTERIA FILTER HOUSING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE BACTERIA/FUNGUS GROWTH IN THE EMU CAN RESULT IN BLOCKED
FILTERS, INEFFICIENT COOLING, BLOCKED FAN SEPARATOR PITOT VALVE,
ETC. ONE OR MORE OF THESE CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF PLSS COOLING
AND/OR VENTILATION FUNCTION.
POSSIBLE SOP USEAGE IF BLOCKAGE OCCURS EVA. POSSIBLE CREWPERSON
LOSS IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
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C-253REPORT DATE 12/02/86
u
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lo/o8/86
EMU
354
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POTABLE H20 FILTER (ITEM 424)
BLOCKED/CLOGGED (SUPPLY SIDE)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) scu
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV784959-1
CAUSES: EXCESSIVE CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO CHARGE EMU FEEDWATER TANKS.
WILL RESULT IF SECOND SCUUNAVAILABLE.
DUE TO EARLY BATTERY USEAGE.
MISSION TERMINATION
POSSIBLE MISSION IMPACT
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-254
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/08/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 355
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POTABLE H20 FILTER (ITEM 424)
BLOCKED/CLOGGED (WASTE SIDE)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
HDW/FUNC
2/2
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) scu
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
i CRITX_SIT!ES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV784959-I
CAUSES: EXCESSIVE CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO RELIEVE CONDENSATE GENERATED DURING IV OPERATIONS. CAN
REsuLT iN H2OC_ARRY_ER INT0 THE PLSSVENT LOOP THEREBY CAUSING
MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
l
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-255
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w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O8/86
EMU
356
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 FILTER AND ORIFICE (ITEM 420)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) scu
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778504-2
CAUSES: INLET/OUTLET SEAL FAILURE, HOUSING SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOWER OVERALL 02 PRESSURE SUPPLIED THE EMU DURING
CHARGE/RECHARGE. INCREASES AIRLOCK 02 CONCENTRATION THEREBY
REQUIRING VENTILATION DUE TO POSSIBLE FIRE HAZARD. MISSION
TERMINATION IF OTHER SCU FAILED AND UNABLE TO COMPLETE 02 CHARGE.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-256
w
!
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O8/86
EMU
357
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
02 FILTER AND ORIFICE (ITEM 420)
FILTER BLOCKED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) scu
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778504-2
CAUSES: EXCESSIVE CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO OXYGEN PROVIDED THE EMU. MISSION TERMINATION REQUIRED IF
OTHER SCU FAILED AND UNABLE TO PROVIDE 02 CHARGE TO EMU.
m
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REFERENCES: I
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-257
D
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/lO/86
EMU
359
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SUIT PRESSURE GAGE (ITEM 311)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767706-3
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE, BOURDON TUBE LEAK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRIMARY 02. MISSION TERMINATION. IF EVA, POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREWPERSON WITH SOP FAILURE. POSSIBLE HIGH 02 CONCENTRATION IN
AIRLOCK REQUIRING VENTILATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-258
INDEPENDENT ORBITER AssESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 360 FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SUIT PRESSURE GAGE (ITEM 311)
BOURDON TUBE RUPTURE (VIOLENT)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 1/1
EVA: 1/1
POST-EVA: 1/1
REDUNDANCY ScREENs: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767706-3
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: FATIGUE _:
EFFECTS/RATIONAl:
A VIOLENT RUPTURE OF THE BOURDONTUBE CAN RESULT IN AN OXYGEN -_
FIRE-_DLOSS OF CREWPERSON/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-259 -
m
wm
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/lO/B 
EMU
361
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SUIT PRESSURE GAGE (ITEM 311)
SCREEN/VENT(REFERENCE) PORT BLOCKED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767706-3
CAUSES: EXCESSIVE CONTAMINATION/CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REFERENCE WHICH, DEPENDENT UPON WHEN IT OCCURRED, COULD
RESULT IN HIGH OR LOW GAGE READING. WITH LOSS OF SUIT PRESSURE
TRANSDUCER 114, MISSION TERMINATION WOULD RESULT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-260
mm
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 362 FLIGHT:
ITEM: SUIT PRESSURE GAGE (ITEM 311)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS HIGH
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767706-3
B[P] c[P]
CAUSES: LINKAGE JAMS/FAILS, BOURDON TUBE RELAXES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONCURRENT LOSS OF THE 114 T_SDUCER WOULD RESULT IN MISSION _
TERMINATION.
_FERENCES:
m
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C-261REPORT DATE 12/02/86
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/lO/86
EMU
363
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SUIT PRESSURE GAGE (ITEM 311)
FAILS LOW
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION: i
PART NUMBER: SV767706-3
CAUSES: LINKAGE JAMS/FAILS, SENSE LINE BLOCKED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONCURRENT LOSS OF THE 114 TRANSDUCER WOULD RESULT IN MISSION
TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-262
mm
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
iOllOI_6
EMU
364
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DCM PURGE VALVE (ITEM 314)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE/INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV787027-3
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE, HOUSING SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRIMARY OXYGEN. MISSION TERMINATION. IF EVA, LOSS OF
CREWPERSON WITH LOSS OF SOP. IF IN AIRLOCK, POSSIBLE HIGH 02
CONCENTRATION WILL REQUIRE VENTILATION.
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-263
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iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/lO/B6
EMU
365
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DCM PURGE VALVE (ITEM 314)
INLET FILTER BLOCKED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/IR
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [ P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV787027-3
CAUSES: EXCESSIVE CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH A HELMET CPV FAILURE, NO OR LOW FLOW WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF
PURGE CAPABILITY AND THIS SCENARIO FOR LOSS OF REDUNDANCY CAN
RESULT IN THE CAPABILITY TO USE THE SOP IN THE EVENT OF A PLSS
FAILURE. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON; OTHERWISE, MISSION
TERMINATION WILL OCCUR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-264
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
zo/1o/86
EMU
366
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DCM PURGE VALVE (ITEM 314)
FAILED CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIG_{T P-HASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/1R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV787027-3
B[F] C[P]
CAUSES: SPRING FRACTURE, PLUNGER STUCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH A CONCURRENT HELMET CPV FAILURE, ALL PURGE CAPABILITY WOULD
BE LOST. LOSS OF THIS CAPABILITY WOULD REQUIRE A PLSS FAILURE
BEFORE FAILURE WOULD BE LIFE OR VEHICLE CRITICAL WHEN EVA.
OTHERWISE WITH A CPV FAILURE, THE MISSION WILL BE TERMINATED.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-265
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uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/lO/86
EMU
367
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DCM PURGE VALVE (ITEM 314)
FAIL OPEN
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV787027-3
CAUSES: SPRING FRACTURE, PLUNGER STUCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRIMARY OXYGEN. MISSION TERMINATION. IF EVA, LOSS OF
CREWPERSON WITH LOSS OF SOP.
w
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-266
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 368 FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
ITEM: DCM PURGE VALVE (ITEM 314)
FAILURE MODE: REDUCED FLOW
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/IR
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: S_787027-3
CAUSES: PARTIAL BLOCKAGE OF FILTER, SPRING FRACTURE REDUCES
PLUNGER TRAVEL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUCED FLOW WILL RESULT IN AN INEFFICIENT FLUSH OF THE
CREWPERSON'S ORAL-NASAL AREA AND DECREASED THERMAL EFFECTIVITY
FOR SOP USEAGE DURING EVA-ASSUMES A PLSS FAILURE DURING EVA,
RESULTED IN PURGE VALVE AND SOP OPERATIONS.
IF CPV ALSO FAILED AND FLOW WAS SIGNIFICANTLY LOW FOR DCM PURGE
VALVE, CREWPERSON COULD BE LOST, OTHERWISE, MISSION TERMINATION
WOULD OCCUR.
REFERENCES:
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/lO/86
EMU
369
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODEz
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE-OXYGEN
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778872-II
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE, CONNECTOR SEAL FAILURE, UNMATED: POPPET
STICKS OPEN, UNMATED: RETURN SPRING FRACTURES/RELAXES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HARDWARE ITEM II3A PROVIDES REDUNDANCY IN SEALING PRIMARY 02
SUPPLY OUTLET. HOWEVER, FAILURE DURING EVA COULD, WITH A II3A
FAILURE, RESULTS IN LOSS OF PRIMARY OXYGEN REQUIRING SOP USEAGE
AND MISSION TERMINATION.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON COULD THEN RESULT WITH AN SOP
FAILURE. FAILURE WITHIN THE AIRLOCK DURING PRE- AND POST-EVA
OPERATIONS COULD RESULT IN A HIGH 02 CONCENTRATION REQUIRING
VENTILATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-268
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/lO/86
EMU
370
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
COMMON _LTIP_ CO_ECTOR (ITEM 330)
EXTE_AL T._A_GE-FEEDWATER SUPPLY/D_IN LINE
L_AD _ALYST: G. _FFAELLI SUBSYS _AD: G. _FF_LLI
B_DO_ HIE_CHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
__ON:
P_T _MBER: SV778872-II
CAUSES: SEAL FAIL_, CONNECTOR SEAL FAIL_; _TED: POPPET
STICKS OPEN, RE_ SPRING _C_/_ES
EFFECTS/_TIONAT._:
_SS OF P_S FEEDWATER SUPPLY _D COOLING _PABILITY. RESULTS IN
MISSION TE_INATION A POSSIB_ _SS OF C_PE_ON WITH SOP
FAIL_. : _
REFERENCES: ..................
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_PORT DATE 12/02/86 C-269
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uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/lO/86
EMU
371
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE-LCG INLET-LCG OUTLET
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778872-II
B[F] C[P]
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE, CONNECTOR FAILURE UNMATED :POPPET STICKS
OPEN UNMATED: RETURN SPRING FEATURES/RELAXES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LCG H20 AND FEEDWATER SUPPLY RESULTING IN LOSS OF
COOLING. MISSION TERMINATION AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON
WITH LOSS OF SOP.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-270
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/10/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 372
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM: COMMON_LTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO MATE TO SCU
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778872-II
CAUSES: COUPLINGS ARE MISALIGNED, COUPLINGS BIND _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO CHARGE OR RECHARGE EMU. MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
I
m
I
i
!
m
m
m
m
I
I
m
m
m
u
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-271
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/lO/86
EMU
373
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
FAILS TO DEMATE FROM SCU
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778872-II
CAUSES: COUPLINGS BIND, SPRING FRACTURE, CAN BIND
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO DETACH SCU. MISSION TERMINATION DUE TO INABILITY TO
LEAVE AIRLOCK.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-272
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSME_ k
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/1O/86
EMU
374
HIGHEST CRITI_LITY
FLIG_:
HDW/_NC
2/2
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
COMMON _LTIP_ CO_ECTOR (ITEM 330)
OPEN IN PO_R LINE
T_AD _ALYST: G. _FF_LLI SUBSYS _AD: G. _FF_LLI
B_DO_ HIE_Y:
1) ENU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_E HDW/_C
P_-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
_CATION:
P_T _MBER: SV778872-II
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES:
BROWN
CO_OSION, VIB_TION, CONNECTOR DISCO_ECTED, TE_INAL
_AB_ TO PO_R EMU FOR IV OPE_TIONS WI_O_ BATTERYUSEAGE.
_LY BATTERY USEAGE _SULTS IN MISSION D_TION IMPACT DUE TO
_SSER _O_ OF PO_R_SERVE AVAI_BT_.
_FE_NCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/lO/86
EMU
375
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
SHORT IN POWER LINE
HDW/FUNC
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778872-II
c[P]
CAUSES: CORROSION, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION ACROSS
CONNECTOR/CONTACTS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO POWER EMU FOR IV OPERATIONS WITHOUT BATTERY USEAGE.
EARLY BATTERY USEAGE RESULTS IN MISSION IMPACT/TERMINATION DUE TO
LESSER AMOUNT OF POWER RESERVE AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-274
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10110186
EMU
376
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
OPEN IN BATTERY RECHARGE LINE
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778872-II
CAUSES:
BROKEN
CORROSION, VIBRATION, CONNECTOR DISCONNECTED, TERMINAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: __...... ___ =_ ___ _........
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO RECHARGE BATTERY _LESS SECOND EMU IS USED
TO PERFORM RECHARGE. MISSION TERMINATION RESULTS IF SECOND EMU
REC_GE ALSO FAILS. ......._ .........
REFERENCES:
g
m[]
m
mm
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C-275REPORT DATE 12/02/86
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/lO/86
EMU
377
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
SHORT IN BATTERY RECHARGE LINE
HDW/FUNC
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
_)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778872-II
B [ P] c[P]
CAUSES: CORROSION, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION ACROSS
CONNECTOR/CONTACTS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO CHARGE/RECHARGE BATTERY UNLESS SECOND EMU IS USED.
HOWEVER, SINCE SHORT WILL EXISTANY TIME NOT ON BATTERY POWER, NO
CONNECTION TO SCU CAN OCCUR FOR AFFECTED EMU. THEREFORE, MISSION
TERMINATION SHOULD RESULT DUE TO INABILITY TO CHARGE OR
RECHARGE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-276
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lo/lo/86
EMU
378
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
COMMON _LTIPB CO_ECTOR (ITEM 330)
OPEN IN VOLTAGE SENSE LINE
BAD _ALYST: G. _FFAELLI SUBSYS BAD: G. _FFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
-2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITI_LITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C
P_-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/3
_ST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
_CATION:
P_T _MBER: SV778872-II
BCP] C[P]
CAUSES: CO_OSION, VIB_TION, TERMINAL BROWN, CO_ECTOR
DISCO_ECTED
EFFECTS/_TIONA_: ....
_ABT._. TO PO_R EMU FOR IV OPE_TIONS USING VEHICB PO_R. E_LY
BATTERY USE COU_ BE A MISSION D_TION IMPACT. SECOND BATTERY
AVAI_BT._., BUT IF FAIBD MISSION TE_INATION COULD _SULT. _ _
_FE_NCES:
I
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l
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u
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/10/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 379
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM: COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
FAILURE MODE: SHORT IN VOLTAGE SENSE LINE
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778872-11
CAUSES: CORROSION, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION ACROSS CONNECTOR
CONTACTS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO POWER EMU FOR IV OPERATIONS USING VEHICLE POWER. EARLY
BATTERY USE COULD BE A MISSION DURATION IMPACT. SECOND BATTERY
AVAILABLE BUT IF FAILED COULD RESULT IN MISSION TERMINATION.
THIS FAILURE ALSO CAUSE A SLIGHTLY HIGHER LOAD ON THE BATTERY AND
LOSS OF VOLTAGE SENSE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-278
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASS_SSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/10/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 380
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM: COMMONMULTIPLE CONNECTOR(ITEM 330)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN IN HARDLINE AUDIO IN/OUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE _= HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778872-II
CAUSES_ ....co_RRosI6N; V_B-RATI0_, TERMINALB_N, CO_ECTOR _
DISCONNECTED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO OBTAIN HARDLINE COMMUNICATIONS. MISSION TERMINATION IF
EVC FAILS.
REFERENCES:
i
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ww
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1o/lo/s6
EMU
381
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
SHORT IN HARDLINE AUDIO IN/OUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV778872-II
CAUSES: CORROSION, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION ACROSS CONNECTOR
CONTACTS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO OBTAIN HARDLINE VEHICLE COMMUNICATIONS. MISSION
TERMINATION IF EVC FAILS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-280
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
io/Io186
EMU
382
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
BATTERY RECHARGE LINE SWITCH FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778872-II
B[F] C [ P]
CAUSES: SWITCH CONTACT MECHANISM FAILS/STICKS, ELECTRICAL
WELDING FROM ARCING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE|
NO IMPACT.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
I
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REFERENCES:
m
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-281
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
_o/io/86
EMU
383
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
BATTERY RECHARGE LINE SWITCH FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV778872-II
CAUSES: SWITCH CONTACT MECHANISM FAILS, CONTACT BROKEN,
CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO RECHARGE BATTERY. POSSIBLE MISSION TERMINATION IF
SECOND EMU CHARGING CAPABILITY FAILS AND SPARE BATTERY NOT
AVAILABLE.
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-282
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/lO/86
EMU
384
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
OXYGEN FLOW BLOCKED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778872-11
CAUSES: FILTER BLOCKED DUE TO EXCESSIVE CONTAMINANTS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO CHARGE/RECHARGE EMU OXYGEN. MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
m
m
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i
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/lO/86
EMU
385
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
02 FILTER PASSES CONTAMINANTS
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/1R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV778872-II
CAUSES: FILTER RUPTURES, FILTER SEAL TO HOUSING FAILS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF DOWNSTREAM II3A CHECK VALVE AND FILTERS CAN RESULT IN
BLOCKAGE OF THE PRIMARY REGULATOR ASSEMBLY ORIFICE OR
REGULATORS. POSSIBLE BLOCKAGE OF THE II3A FILTERS AND,
THEREFORE, FAILURE OF PLSS. MISSION TERMINATION WITH POSSIBLE
USE OF SOP IF EVA CAN RESULT. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP
ALSO FAILED.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-284
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/lO/86
EMU
386
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
_C IN/OUT VALVE FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFF_LLI SUBSYS T._AD: G. RAFFAELLI
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C
P_-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
P_T_MBER: SV778872-II
CAUSES: LINKAGE MECHANISM FAI_/JAMS, CONTAMINATION/DEPOSITION
CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONAT._:
INEFFICIENT IV OPERATIONS COOLING. POSSIBLY EXPEDITE IV
OPERATIONS TO EMPLOY SUBLIMATOR AT EVA. C_WPERSON DISCOMFORT.
MISSION TERMINATION WITH SUBLIMATOR FAILURE.
REFERENCES:
L_
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1o/1o/86
EMU
387
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/iR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
LCG IN/OUT VALVE FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [ P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV778872-II
CAUSES: LINKAGE MECHANISM FAILS/JAMS,
CONTAMINATION/DEPOSITION/CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO OBTAIN EV OPERATIONS COOLANT FLOW PATH FOR LCG H20
LOOP. CREWPERSON DISCOMFORT. MISSION TERMINATION. POSSIBLE LOSS
OF CREWPERSON WITH LOSS OF SOP IF EVA PERFORMED.
REFERENCES:
m
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-286
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1o/1o/86
EMU
388
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HARD UPPER TORSO (HUT) INTERFACE (ITEM 385)
VENT LOOP INTERFACE LEAKAGE (P2 OR P3)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRIT!CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV779301-I
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE_
LOSS OF PRIMARY OXYGEN. MISSION TERMINATION. POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREWPERSON IF SOP IS FAILED.
REFERENCES:
m
i
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I
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iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/lO/86
EMU
389
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HARD UPPER TORSO (HUT) INTERFACE (ITEM 385)
COOLING LOOP INTERFACE LEAKAGE (P4,PS,P6,OR P7)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV779301-I
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF COOLING EFFICIENCY AND MAKEUP FEEDWATERUNTIL COOLING
FUNCTION LOST. MISSION TERMINATION; POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON
IF SOP IS FAILED.
REFERENCES:
f
q
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-288
DINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT •
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 390 FLIGHT:
ITEM: HARD UPPER TORSO (HUT) INTERFACE (ITEM 385)
FAILURE MODE: POTABLE H20 LEAKAGE (P8)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
HDW/FUNC
211R
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
..........CRITI_CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCAtiOn:
PART NUMBER: SV779301-1
B[P] c[P]
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF FEEDWATER FOR SUBLIMATOR. COOLING FUNCTION LOST. MISSION
TERMINATION. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP IS FAILED
[]
m
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REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/lO/86
EMU
391
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VOLUME CONTROL (ITEM 360)
SHAFT BINDS
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV767784-I
CAUSES: CORROSION, BEARINGS BIND, CONTAMINATION CAUSES SHAFT TO
BE STUCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF VOLUME CONTROL FOR ONE CHANNEL. IF OTHER CHANNEL IS LOST,
MISSION COMPLETION WILL BE DEPENDENT UPON THE VOLUME LEVEL OF THE
REMAINING CHANNEL.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-290
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/10/86
EMU
392
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VOLUME CONTROL (ITEM 360)
OPEN IN ONE COMMUNICATIONS LINE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE __C
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767784-I
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONNECTOR FAILURE, CORROSION, CHAFFING, WIPER
FRACTURES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF VOLUME ANDCONTROL FOR PARTICULAR EVC CHANNEL BEING USED.
TOTAL RADIO COMMUNICATIONS LOSS WITH LOSS OF OTHER CHANNEL WILL
RESULT IN MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
I
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1O/lO/86
EMU
393
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VOLUME CONTROL (ITEM 360)
SHORT IN ONE COMMUNICATIONS CHANNEL
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
A[ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767784-I
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONNECTOR FAILURE, CHAFFING, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF VOLUME FOR ONE EVC CHANNEL. TOTAL RADIO COMMUNICATIONS
LOSS WITH LOSS OF OTHER CHANNEL WILL RESULT IN MISSION
TERMINATION. (NOTE: PROBABLE INCREASE IN VOLUME WILL ACCOMPANY
THIS FAILURE).
REFERENCES:
w
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSME_ __
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10110186
EMU
394
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VOLUME CONTROL (ITEM 360)
SHORT ACROSS TWO COMMUNICATIONS CHANNELS
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLi
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
a)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITiES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[F]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767784-I
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONNECTOR FAILURE, CHAFFING, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TOTAL _SS OF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS WILL RESULT INMISSION
TERMINATION.
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REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1O/lO/86
EMU
395
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VOLUME CONTROL (ITEM 360)
INCREASED RESISTANCE
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767784-I
CAUSES: CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, WIPER WEARS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ASSUMING WORST CASE, HIGH RESISTANCE WILL BE VERY MUCH LIKE AN
OPEN RESULTING IN LOSS OF VOLUME FORAN EVC CHANNEL. MISSION
TERMINATION CAN RESULT WITH LOSS OF OTHER CHANNEL.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-294
lDATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EMU
396 FLIGHT:
DISPLAY INTENSITY CONTROL (ITEM 361)
OPEN IN LINE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
HDW/FUNC
2/2
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767785-I
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONNECTOR FAILURE, CORROSION, CHAFFING, WIPER
FRACTURES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF DISPLAY FOR DCM RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION TIME, CAUTION
AND WARNING MESSAGES, AND OTHER DATA. MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86
=
m_
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/1O/86
EMU
397
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DISPLAY INTENSITY CONTROL (ITEM 361)
SHORT ACROSS DISPLAY LINES
HDW/FUNC
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA" 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [NA ]
SV767785-I
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONNECTOR FAILURE, CHAFFING, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DISPLAY INTENSITY MAY INCREASE TOO MUCH SUCH THAT THE DISPLAY
COULD NOT BE READ. MISSION TERMINATION WOULD THEN RESULT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-296
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/lO/86
EMU
398
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DISPLAY INTENSITY CONTROL (ITEM 361)
INCREASED RESISTANCE
HDW/FUNC
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767785-I
CAUSES: CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, WIPER WEARS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
PROBAB_ DECREASE IN DISPLAY INTENSITY MAY RESULT IN DISPLAY
BEING UNREADABLE. _ MIS_I0_TE_INATION WOULDRESULT, _
u
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REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-297
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/10/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 399
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM: DISPLAY INTENSITY CONTROL (ITEM 361)
FAILURE MODE: SHAFT BINDS
HDW/FUNC
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767785-I
CAUSES: CORROSION, BEARINGS BIND, CONTAMINATION CAUSES SHAFT TO
BE STUCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF DISPLAY INTENSITY CONTROL. IF INTENSITY SETTING IS NOT
ACCEPTABLE FOR THE MISSION, THE DISPLAY WILL BE UNREADABLE AND
THE MISSION WOULD BE TERMINATED.
REFERENCES:
=
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-298
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/10/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 400
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM: EVC SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362) - _
FAILURE MODE: OPEN IN PRIMARY HARDLINE (IV COMMUNICATIONS)
POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767786-I
CAUSES: CONTACT BROKEN/WORN, WIPER FAILURE, CORROSION FAILURE,
CORROSION DUE TO HERMETIC SEAL FAILURE, LEAD SEVERS FROM
CONNECTION .....................................
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF PRIMARY WILL RESULT IN AUTOMATIC USE OF SECONDARY
CIRCUITRY. COMPLETE LOSS OF IV COMMUNICATIONS WILL NOT IMPACT
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS.
HOWEVER, IF ALL COMMUNICATIONS ARE LOST MISSION IS TERMINATED.
REFERENCES :
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-299
=
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1O/lO/86
EMU
401
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POSITION
EVC SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362)
OPEN IN SECONDARY HARDLINE (IV COMMUNICATIONS)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767786-I
A[ 2 ] B [ P] C [P]
CAUSES: CONTACT BROKEN/WORN, WIPER FAILURE, CORROSION DUE TO
HERMETIC SEAL FAILURE, LEAD SEVERS FROM CONNECTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SECONDARY WILL RESULT IN CONTINUED USE OF PRIMARY
CIRCUITRY. COMPLETE LOSS OF IV COMMUNICATIONS WILL NOT IMPACT
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS.
HOWEVER, COMPLETE LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS (IV AND EV) WILL RESULT
IN MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-300
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
iOliO186
EMU
402
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVC SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362)
OPEN IN PRIMARY MODE A POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767786-I
CAUSES: CONTACT BROKEN/WORN, WIPER FAILURE, CORROSION DUE TO
HERMETIC SEAL FAILURE, LEAD SEVERS FROM CONNECTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF MODE A PRIMARY RESULTS IN AUTOMATIC USE OF SEC0_ARY _
CIRCUITRY. COMPLETE LOSS OF REDUNANCY WILL RESULT IN MISSION
TERMINATION DUE TO RADIO COM_ICATIONS LOSS. ..........
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-301
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/10/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 403
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM: EVC SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN IN SECONDARY MODE A POSITION
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: svv6vv86-1
CAUSES: CONTACT BROKEN/WORN, WIPER FAILURE, CORROSION DUE TO
HERMETIC SEAL FAILURE, LEAD SEVERS FROM CONNECTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF MODE A SECONDARY RESULTS IN CONTINUED USE OF PRIMARY
CIRCUITRY. COMPLETE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN MISSION
TERMINATION DUE TO RADIO COMMUNICATIONS LOSS.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-302
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
iOllOlS6
EMU
404
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
F LIGHT •
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVC SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362)
OPEN IN PRIMARY MODE B POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] BCF] cCP]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767786-I
CAUSES: CONTACT BROKEN/WORN, WIPER FAILURE, CORROSION DUE TO
HERMETIC SEAL FAILURE, LEAD SEVERS FROM CONNECTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF MODE B PRIMARY RESULTS IN AUTO'TIC USE OF SECONARY
CIRCUITRY. COMPLETE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN MISSION
TERMINATION DUE TO RADIO COMMUNIC-ATI_N-S L(DSS.......
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 c-_o3
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/10/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 405
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM: EVC SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN IN SECONDARY MODE B POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767786-I
CAUSES: CONTACT BROKEN/WORN, WIPER FAILURE, CORROSION DUE TO
HERMETIC SEAL FAILURE, LEAD SEVERS FROM CONNECTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF MODE B SECONDARY RESULTS IS CONTINUED USE OF PRIMARY
CIRCUITRY. COMPLETE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN MISSION
TERMINATION DUE TO RADIO COMMUNICATIONS LOSS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-304
uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 406 FLIGHT: 3/2R
ITEM: EVC SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN IN PRIMARY BACKUP POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767786-I
CAUSES: CONTACT BROKEN/WORN, WIPER FAILURE, CORROSION DUE TO
HERMETIC SEAL FAILURE, LEAD SEVERS FROM CONNECTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .........
LOSS OF PRIMARY BACKUP RESULTS IN AUTOMATIC USE OF SECONDARY
CIRCUITRY. COMPLETE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN MISSION
TERMINATION DUE TO RADIO COMMUNICATIONS LOSS.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-305
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i0/10/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 407
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM: EVC SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN IN SECONDARY BACKUP POSITION
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767786-I
CAUSES: CONTACT BROKEN/WORN, WIPER FAILURE, CORROSION DUE TO
HERMETIC SEAL FAILURE, LEAD SEVERS FROM CONNECTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SECONDARY BACKUP RESULTS IN CONTINUED USE OF PRIMARY
CIRCUITRY. COMPLETE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN MISSION
TERMINATION DUE TO RADIO COMMUNICATIONS LOSS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-306
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM_ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/lO/86
EMU
408
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
EVC SE_CTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362)
SHORT TO GRO_D PRIMLY
_AD _ALYST: G. _FF_LLI SUBSYS _AD: G. _FFAELLI
B_AKDO_ HIE_CHY:
l) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C
P_-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LO_TION:
PUT _MBER: SV767786-I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CUFFING, VIB_TION
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
LOSS OF PRIMLY CIRCUIT. UPST_AM _NT LIMITER WILL OPE_TE.
_DLINE/_DIO WOULD BE AVAI_BT._. BY SECONDLY CIR_IT. IF
SECONDLY CIR_IT FAILS, MISSION TE_INATION_SULTS DUE TO _DIO
LOSS. _.................
REFERENCES:
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_PORT DATE 12/02/86 C-307 ......
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
_o/Io/86
EMU
409
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVC SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362)
SHORT TO GROUND SECONDARY
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV767786-I
A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CHAFFING, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SECONDARY CIRCUIT. THE PRIMARY EVC CIRCUIT IS REDUNDANT
TO THE SECONDARY AND, IF FAILED, MISSION TERMINATION WOULD
RESULT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-308
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/lO/86
EMU
410
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVC SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362)
SWITCH FAILS IN HARDLINE POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767786-1
B [P] C [P]
CAUSES: BEARINGS BIND, CONTACT WELDS DUE TO ARCING, SHAFT STICKS
DUE TO CONTAMINATION, KNOB TO SHAFT FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALEs .......................................................
UNABLE TO EMPLOY EVC RADIO. MISSION TERMINATION RESULTS.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-309
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/lO/86
EMU
411
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVC SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362)
SWITCH FAILS IN MODE A POSITION
HDW/FUNC
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [NA ]
SV767786-I
CAUSES: BEARINGS BIND, CONTACT WELDS DUE TO ARCING, SHAFT STICKS
DUE TO CONTAMINATION, KNOB TO SHAFT FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EVC RADIO PERMANENTLY ENGAGED. EVA MISSION CAN BE PERFORMED. IV
HARDLINE OPS MUST BE PERFORMED EMPLOYING RADIO.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-310
lINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
io/io/86
EMU
412
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVC SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362)
SWITCH FAILS IN MODE B POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV767786-I
B [ P ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: BEARINGS BIND, CONTACT WELDS DUE TO ARCING, SHAFT STICKS
DUE TO CONTAMINATION, KNOB TO SHAFT FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EVC RADIO PERMANENTLY ENGAGED. EVA MISSION CAN BE PERFORMED. IV
HARDLINE OPS MUST BE PERFORMED EMPLOYING RADIO.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/lO/86
EMU
413
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVC SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362)
SWITCH FAILS IN BACKUP POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
A [ 9. ] B [ P ] C [NA ]
SV767786-I
CAUSES: BEARINGS BIND, CONTACT WELDS DUE TO ARCING, SHAFT STICKS
DUE TO CONTAMINATION, KNOB TO SHAFT FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EVC RADIO PERMANENTLY ENGAGED. EVA MISSION CAN BE PERFORMED. IV
HARDLINE OPS MUST BE PERFORMED EMPLOYING RADIO.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-312
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 414 FLIGHT: 3/2R
ITEM: POWER MODE SELECTOR swITCH (ITEM 364)
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS OPEN FOR BATTERY CHARGE FROM VEHICLE
(T70PEN)-STICKS IN T8 POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778596-2
CAUSES: OPPOSITE CONTACT WELDS CLOSED, HERMETIC SEAL FAILURE
RESULTS IN CORROSION OR CONTAMINATION ON CONTACTS, VIBRATION
FRACTURES CONTACT JOINT, LEAF SPRING FRACTURES/RELAXES-UNABLE TO
CHANGE SWITCH POSITION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO _GE BATTERY. WOULD REQUIRE USE OF SECOND EMU TO
CHARGE BATTERY OR A SPARE BATTERY. LOSS OF THESE REDUNDANCIES CAN
RESULT IN MISSION TERMINATION DUE TO INABILITY TO PERFORM POWERED
EVA.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-313
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 415 FLIGHT: 2/2
ITEM: POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS OPEN FOR BATTERY POWER FROM BATTERY
(T80PEN)-STICKS IN T7 POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778596-2
CAUSES: OPPOSITE CONTACT WELDS CLOSED, HERMETIC SEAL FAILURE
RESULTS IN CORROSION OR CONTAMINATION ON CONTACTS, VIBRATION
FRACTURES CONTACT JOINT, LEAF SPRING FRACTURES/RELAXES-UNABLE TO
CHANGE SWITCH POSITION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BATTERY POWER UNAVAILABLE TO ELECTRONICS DURING EVA. MISSION
TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-314
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/i0/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 416 FLIGHT:
ITEM: PO_R MoDE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS OPEN FOR BATTERY CHARGE CONTACT (T9
OPEN)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
HDW/FUNC
2/2
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) E_m
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV778596-2
CAUSES: OPPOSITE CONTACT WELDS CLOSED, HERMETIC SEAL FAILURE
RESULTS IN CORROSION OR CONTAMINATION ON CONTACTS, VIBRATION
FRACTURES CONTACT JOINT, LEAF SPRING FRACTURES/RELAXES-UNAB_ TO
CHANGE SWITCH POSITION, CONTACT FAILS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO CHARGE BATTERY. WOULD REQUIRE USE OF SECOND EMU TO
CHARGE BATTERY OR A SPARE BATTERY. LOSS OF THESE REDUNDANCIES CAN
RESULT IN MISSION TERMINATION DUE TO INABILITY TO PERFORM EVA.
BATTERY POWER UNAVAILABLE TO ELECTRONICS DURING EVA .....
MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
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C-315REPORT DATE 12/02/86
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 417 FLIGHT: 2/2
ITEM: POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS OPEN FOR VEHICLE POWER (T4 OPEN)-
STICKS IN T5 POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV778596-2
B[P] C [ P]
CAUSES: OPPOSITE CONTACT WELDS CLOSED, HERMETIC SEAL FAILURE
RESULTS IN CORROSION OR CONTAMINATION ON CONTACTS, VIBRATION
FRACTURES CONTACT JOINT, LEAF SPRING FRACTURES/RELAXES-UNABLE TO
CHANGE SWITCH POSITION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF VEHICLE POWER FOR IV OPERATIONS. PROBABLE EARLY USE OF
BATTERY POWER WILL IMPACT MISSION DURATION. POSSIBLE MISSION
TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-316
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 418 FLIGHT: 2/IR
ITEM: POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS OPEN FOR BATTERY POWER TO FAN AND TO
DC/DC CONVERTER (T5 OPEN)-STICKS IN T4 POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV778596-2
CAUSES: OPPOSITE CONTACT WELDS CLOSED, HERMETIC SEAL FAILURE
RESULTS IN CORROSIO__N OR CONTAMINATION ON CONTACTS, VIBRATION
FRACTURES CONTACT JOINT, LEAF SPRING FRACTURES/RELAXES-UNABLE TO
CHANGE SWITCH POSITION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF BATTERY POWERED FAN/PUMP/SEPARATORAND DC/DC CONVERTER
CAUSES MISSION TERMINATION. IF EVA, POSSIBLE CREWPERSON LOSS IF
SOP FAILS.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-317
i
= =
B
uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/10/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 419
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/_C
2/iR
ITEM: POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS OPEN FOR FAN POWER AND DC/DC
CONVERTER (T6 OPEN)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [ P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV778596-2
CAUSES: OPPOSITE CONTACT WELDS CLOSED, HERMETIC SEAL FAILURE
RESULTS IN CORROSION OR CONTAMINATION ON CONTACTS, VIBRATION
FRACTURES CONTACT JOINT, LEAF SPRING FRACTURES/RELAXES-UNABLE TO
CHANGE SWITCH POSITION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF VEHICLE POWER FOR IV OPERATIONS. PROBABLY EARLY USE OF
BATTERY POWER WILL IMPACT MISSION.
LOSS OF BATTERY POWERED FAN/PUMP/SEPARATORAND DC/DC CONVERTER
CAUSES MISSION TERMINATION. IF EVA, POSSIBLE CREWPERSON LOSS IF
SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-318
lINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EMU
420 FLIGHT: 2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)
SWITCH FAILS OPEN (TI OPEN)-STICKS IN T2 POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: _2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778596-2
B[F] C [P]
CAUSES: HERMETIC SEAL FAILURE RESULTS IN CORROSION OR
CONTAMINATION ON CONTACTS, VIBRATION FRACTURES CONTACT JOINT,
LEAF SPRING FRACTURES/RELAXES-UNABLE TO CHANGE POSITION OF
SWITCH, ...................... WELDS CLOSED ....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF VEHICLE POWER FOR EVC, CLIV, AND FEEDWATER VALVE.
PROBABLE EARLY USE OF BATTERY TO OPERATE THESE ITEMS DURING IV
OPERATIONS. POSSIBLE MISSION DURATION IMPACT DUE TO EARLY BATTERY
USE.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-319
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 421 FLIGHT: 2/1R
ITEM: POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS OPEN FOR BATTERY POWER TO EVC (T2
OPEN)-STICKS IN T1 POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778596-2
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: HERMETIC SEAL FAILURE RESULTS IN CORROSION OR
CONTAMINATION ON CONTACTS, VIBRATION FRACTURES CONTACT JOINT,
LEAF SPRING FRACTURES/RELAXES-UNABLE TO CHANGE POSITION OF
SWITCH, OPPOSITE CONTACT WELDS CLOSED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF BATTERY POWER FOR EVC, CLIV, AND FEEDWATER VALVE. UNABLE
TO PERFORM EVA DUE TO COOLING LOSS. MISSION TERMINATION. SOP
USEAGE REQUIRED IF EVA. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO
FAILS. ' ..............
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-320
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10110186
EMU
422
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OPEN)
POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)
SWITCH FAILS OPEN FOR CONTACT TO EVC POWER (T3
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778596-2
CAUSES: HERMETIC SEAL FAILURE RESULTS IN CORROSION OR
CONTAMINATION ON CONTACTS, VIBRATION FRACTURES CONTACT JOINT,
LEAF SPRING FRACTURES/RELAXES-UNABLE TO CHANGE POSITION OF
SWITCH, _LAY F_C_S
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ..................
LOSS OF VEHICLE POWER FOR EVC, CLIV, AND FEEDWATER VALVE.
LOSS OF BATTERY FOR EVC, CLIV, AND FEEDWATER VALVE. UNABLE TO
PERFORM EVA. MISSION TERMINATION. SOP USEAGE REQUIRED IF EVA.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
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qINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/lO/86
EMU
423
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)
SWITCH STAYS IN VEHICLE POWER POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778596-2
A[ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
CAUSES: SWITCH MECHANISM JAMS/FRACaS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: •
UNABLE TO OBTAIN BATTERY POSITION. MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-322
lINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/10/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDACID: 424
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM: POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)
FAILURE MODE: SWITCH STAYS IN BATTERY POWER POSITION
HDW/FLrNC
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 2/2
A[ 2 ]
SV778596-2
B[P] C [P]
CAUSES: SWITCH MECHANISM JAMS/FRACTURES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO OBTAIN VEHICLE_PQWER _PQ$!T!0NTOCHARGE BATTERY OR ........
PERFORM IV OPERATIONS. POSSIBLE MISSION IMPACT DUE TO EARLY
BATTERY USEAGE. MISSION TERMINATION IF BATTERY REQUIRES
ADDITIONAL CHARGE.
REFERENCES:
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D
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/lO/86
EMU
425
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)
SHORT-VEHICLE POWER (ANY CONTACT) TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778596-2
A[2] B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION/WIRE CHAFFING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO USE EMU ON VEHICLE POWER DURING ANY IV OPERATIONS.
EARLY BATTERY POWER USE IMPACTS MISSION DURATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-324
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/10/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 426
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLI GHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM: POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)
FAILURE MODE: SHORT-BATTERY POWER (ANY CONTACT) TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778596-2
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIB_TiON/WIRE CHAFFING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO EMPLOY BATTERY FQR EVA. DISCHARGE OF BATTERY POWER. _
MISSION TERMINATION. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO
FAILS WHEN EVA.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1O/lO/86
EMU
427
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCH (ITEM 365)
OPEN IN PTT POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PARTNUMBER: SV767794
CAUSES: HERMETIC SEAL FAILURE RESULTS IN CORROSION OR
CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION FRACTURES CONTACT JOINT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO EMPLOY PTT POSITION. MISSION TERMINATIONDUE TO
COMMUNICATIONS FAILURE IF EITHER OTHER POSITION FAILS.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-326
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/lO/86
EMU
428
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCH (ITEM 365)
OPEN IN VOX POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767794
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
A [ 2] B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: HERMETIC SEAL FAILURE RESULTS IN CORROSION OR
CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION FRACTURES CONTACT JOINT
EFFECTS/RATIONA_:
_ABLE TO EMPLOY VOX POSITION.MISSION TERMINATIONDUE TO
COM_ICATIONS FAIL_ IF nT POSITIONFAII_.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
mm
D
m
Q
i
J
J
g-
mm
m
mm
l
i
i
w
i
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-327
=_
m
g
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10110186
EMU
429
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PUSH-TO-TALKSWITCH (ITEM 365)
OPEN IN RECEIVE POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER: SV767794
CAUSES: HERMETIC SEAL FAILURE RESULTS IN CORROSION OR
CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION FRACTURES CONTACT JOINT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO RECEIVE ONLY. MISSION TERMINATION WILL RESULT WITH A
VOX POSITION FAILURE.
REFERENCES:
m
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-328
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/lO/86
EMU
430
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCH (ITEM 365)
SHORT IN PTT POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767794
CAUSES: HERMETIC SEAL FAILURE RESULTS _N CONTAMINATION, WIRE
CHAFFING DUE To vIB_TION CO_OSION
EFFECTS/RATIONAl: _-
UNABLE TO USE PTT POSITION. MOMENTARY (YET SMALL) INCREASE IN
POWER CONSUMPTION. MISSION TERMINATION DUE TO COMMUNICATIONS LOSS
IF VOX FAILURE ALSO OCCURS.
REFERENCES:
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vINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10110186
EMU
431
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCH (ITEM 365)
SHORT IN RECEIVE POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HI_CHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C_[ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767794-I
CAUSES: HERMETIC SEAL FAILURE RESULTS IN CONTAMINATION, WIRE
CHAFFING DUE TO VIBRATION CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO USE RECEIVE POSITION. INCREASE IN POWER CONSUMPTION
OCCURS. MISSION TERMINATIONRESULTS IF COMMUNICATIONS ARE LOST
WITH FAILURE OF VOX POSITION ALSO.
REFERENCES:
m
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-330
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10110186
EMU
432
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCH (ITEM 365)
SHORT IN VOX POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV767794-I
CAUSES: HERMETIC SEAL FAILURE RESULTS IN CONTAMINATION, WIRE
CHAFFING DUE TO VIBRATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONAl:
UNABLE TO USE VOX POSITION. INCREASE IN POWER coNs_PTION OCCAS.
MISSION TERMINATION DUE TO COMMUNICATIONS FAILURE RESULTS IF PTT
ALSO FAILS. .................
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/1O/86
EMU
433
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCH (ITEM 365)
FAIL CLOSED IN VOX POSITION
HDW/FUNC
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [F]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767794-I
CAUSES: SPRING FRACTURE JAMS MECHANISM, CAM BINDS, BEARING BINDS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO DISABLE VOICE COMMUNICATIONS. NO IMPACTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-332
gDATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
lO/iO/B6
EMU
434
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCH (ITEM 365)
FAIL CLOSED IN RECEIVE POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767794-I
CAUSES: SPRING FRACTURE JAMS MECHANISM, CAM BINDS, BEARING BINDS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO OBTAIN VOICE COMMUNICATIONS. MISSION TERMINATION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lOliO186
EMU
435
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCH (ITEM 365)
FAIL CLOSED IN PTT POSITION
HDW/FUNC
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) Lss
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [F]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767794-I
CAUSES: SPRING FRACTURE JAMS MECHANISM, CAM BINDS, BEARING
BINDS, LATCH FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO DISABLE VOICE COMMUNICATION. MISSION TERMINATION DUE TO
INABILITY TO RECEIVE COMMUNICATIONS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-334
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/lO/86
EMU
436
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCH (ITEM 365)
SWITCH FAILS OPEN ALL POSITIONS
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) Lss
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767794-I
CAUSES: MECHANISM FAILURE BETWEEN CONTACTS, HERMETIC SEAL
FAILURE CAUSING CONTAMINATIONAND CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO OBTAIN ANY COMMUNIcATIoNS VIA THE EVC. MISSION
TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
m
mm
l
i
D
mm
mm
g
g
l
I
I
i
g
m
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-335
w
vu
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/lO/86
EMU
437
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
FAN POWER ON CONTACT OPEN/FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
•POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV771887-2
B[P] C [P]
CAUSES: HERMETIC SEAL FAILURE CAUSES CORROSION/CONTAMINATION,
CONTACT FRACTURED DUE TO VIBRATION, SWITCH MECHANISM
FAILURE/RELAY FRACTURED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO POWER FAN MOTOR. MISSION TERMINATION. SOP USEAGE
REQUIRED IF EVA. LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-336
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/lO/S6
EMU
438
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
FAN POWER ON CONTACT SHORT TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELL!
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV771887-2
CAUSES: HERMETIC SEAL FAILURE RESULTSINCONTAMINATION ACROSS
CONTACTS, SWITCH MECHANISM FRACTURES ACROSS CONTACTS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ........
LOSS OF AVAILABLE POWER TO MOTOR. HIGH USE RATE OF BATTERY PO_.
SOP USEAGE REQUIRED IF EVA. MISSION IMPACT/TERMINATION. POSSIBLE
CREW'PERSON LOSS IF SOP ALSO FAILS. L
REFERENCES:
m
J
g
g
z
D
ms
m
m
i
w
J
m
i
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-337
U
wr
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/10/86
EMU
439
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
CLIV POWER "OPEN" LINE/CONTACT OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV771887-2
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: HERMETIC SEAL FAILURE CAUSES CORROSION/CONTAMINATION,
CONTACT FRACTURED DUE TO VIBRATION, SWITCH MECHANISM FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO OPEN CLIV. UNAB_ TO CHARGE/RECHARGE EMU. MISSION
TERMINATION WOULD RESULT, (THE VALVE IS ONLY PLACED TO THE "OPEN"
POSITION PRIOR TO EVA). DURINGEVA , SINCE THE VALVE IS NOT SPRING
LOADED, AN OPEN WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-338
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1o/1o/86
EMU
440
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
CLIV POWER "CLOSE" LINE/CONTACT OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV771887-2
CAUSES: HERMETIC SEAL FAILURE CAUSES CORROSION/CONTAMINATION,
CONTACT FRACTURED DUE TO VIBRATION, SWITCH MECHANISM FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONAl:
VALVE REMAINS OPEN. NO IMMEDIATE IMPACT UNLESS A SECOND FAILURE
(THE 134 CHECK VALVE COULD FAIL OPEN) RESULTS TO ALLOW FLOODING
OF VENT LOOP DURING CHARGING. IF THIS OCCURRED, THE PLANNED OR
FUTURE EVA MISSIONS WOULD BE TERMINATED.
m
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REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-339
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/lO/86
EMU
441
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
CLIV POWER SHORT TO GROUND
HDW/FUNC
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV771887-2
CAUSES: HERMETIC SEAL FAILURE CAUSES CORROSION/CONTAMINATION TO
CAUSE A SHORT, VIBRATION, WIRE CHAFFING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE POWER TO THE CLIV IS CURRENT-LIMITEDAND SHOULD LIGHTLY LOAD
THE BATTERY. SUCH A SHORT CAN RESULT IN THE CLIV BEING STUCK IN
POSITION, THE WORST OF WHICH IS CLOSED, THEREBY INHIBITING LCG
CHARGING/RECHARGING FOR THE PRE OR POST EVA.
THE MISSION WILL BE TERMINATED. IF EVA, A FAILURE OF THE LCG
PRESSURE INTEGRITY CAN RESULT IN DEGRADED COOLING AND MISSION
TERMINATION DUE TO INABILITY TO MAKE-UP H20. MISSION DURATION
CAN BE IMPACTED DUE TO THE SLIGHTLY HIGHER POWER USEAGE.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-340
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EMU
442 FLIGHT:
HDW/nmC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
FAN POWER SHORT TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE,EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: ...... 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV771887-2
CAUSES: HERMETIC SEAL FAILURE CAUSES CONTAMINATION/CORROSION
ACROSS LEADS, VIBRATION, WIRE CHAFFING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .....
LOSS OF FAN MOTOR ASSEMBLY. IN_SED DEMAND ON BATTERY POWER.
SOP USEAGE REQUIRED IF EVA. MISSION TERMINATION. POSSIBLE LOSS
OF CREWPERSON WITH SOP FAILURE IF EVA.
REFERENCES:
i
mm
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g
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-341
W
LINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/lO/86
EMU
443
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
SWITCH FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV771887-2
c[P]
CAUSES: BEARING BINDS, CAM BINDS, CORROSION, ROTOR
FAILS/FRACTURES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO POWER AVAILABLE TO FAN OR VALVE. MISSION TERMINATION. IF EVA,
SOP USEAGE REQUIRED AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON WITH FAILURE
OF SOP.
REFERENCES:
E
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-342
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/lO/86
EMU
444
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
SWITCH FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV771887-2
CAUSES: BERING BINDS, CAM BINDS, CORROSION, ROTOR
FAILS/FRACTURES
EFFECTS/RATIONAl: ......
MISSION CAN BE PERFORMED B_ oN/OFF CAPABILITY O? SWITCH WiLL BE
VIA CONNECTION/DISCONNECTION OF SCU POWER.
REFERENCES:
m
u
m
l
g
J
J
Q
I
g
J
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-343
J
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i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lo/lo/86
EMU
445
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FEEDWATER VALVE SWITCH (ITEM 367)
ELECTRICAL OPEN ON FEEDWATER OPEN LINE
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767795-2
CAUSES: HERMETIC SEAL FAILURE CAUSES CONTAMINATION/CORROSION,
CONTACT FRACTURED DUE TO VIBRATION, SWITCH MECHANISM FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FEEDWATER VALVE REMAINS CLOSED. NO COOLING AVAILABLE TO THE
CREWPERSON. IF DETECTED PRE-EVA OR POST-EVA MISSION TERMINATION
RESULTS. IF EVA, MISSION IS TERMINATED AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREWPERSON CAN RESULT IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
w
L_
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-344
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/10/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 446_
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FEEDWATER VALVE SWITCH (ITEM 367)
ELECTRICAL OPEN ON FEEDWATER CLOSE LINE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
HDW/FUNC
2/2
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLI GHTP-HASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767795-2
CAUSES: HERMETIC SEAL FAILURE CAUSES CONTAMINATION/CORROSION,
CONTACT FRACTURED DUE TO VIBRATION, SWITCH MECHANISM FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WORST CASE IS FOR POST-EVAWHEN THE SUBLIMATOR, UNABLE TO CLOSE,
CAN BE FLOODED RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF FUTURE MISSIONS.
REFERENCES:
U
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-345
m
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lo/lo/86
EMU
447
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FEEDWATER VALVE SWITCH (ITEM 367)
ELECTRICAL SHORT ON FEEDWATER OPEN LINE
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767795-2
CAUSES: HERMETIC SEAL FAILURE CAUSES CONTAMINATION ACRoss LEADS,
VIBRATION, WIRE CHAFFING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POWER IS CURRENT LIMITED. VALVE OPERATION IS PROBABLY IMPAIRED.
VALVE MAY REMAIN CLOSED. MISSION TERMINATION. IF OCCURRENCE OF
FAILED CLOSED OR SHORT IS TO "CLOSED" LINE IS DURING EVA,
THE EMU WILL LOSE ALL COOLING AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON CAN
RESULT IF SOP ALSO FAILS. POSSIBLE MISSION DURATION IMPACT DUE
TO HIGHER THAN NORMAL USE OF BATTERY POWER.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86
C-346 C" _
mm
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EMU
448 FLIGHT:
ITEM: FEEDWATER VALVE SWITCH (ITEM 367)
FAILURE MODE: ELECTRICAL SHORT ON FEEDWATER CLOSE LINE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
HDW/FUNC
2/2
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 2/2
A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767795-2
CAUSES: HERMETIC SEAL FAILURE CAUSE CONTAMINATION ACROSS LEADS,
VIBRATION, WIRE CHAFFING
EFFEcTs/RATIONALE: __ i_
POWER IS CURRENT LIMITED. VALVE OPERATION IS PROBABLY IMPAIRED
SUCH THAT VALVE MAY REMAIN OPEN CAUSINGPOST-EVA SUBLIMATOR
FLOODING AND TERMINATION OF FUTURE MISSION_ IF SHORT IS TO OPEN
LINE SUBLIMATOR MAY BE FLOODED PRE-EVARESULTING IN MISSION
TERMINATION. IF CURRENT LIMITER FAILS, HIGHER THAN NORMAL USE OF
BATTERY POWER COULD REDUCE MISSION DURATION.
REFERENCES:
J
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C-347REPORT DATE 12/02/86
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10110186
EMU
449
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FEEDWATER VALVE SWITCH (ITEM 367)
SWITCH FAILS IN THE CLOSED POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767795-2
A[ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
CAUSES: BEARING BINDS, CAM BINDS, CORROSION, ROTOR
FAILS/FRACTURES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO PERFORM EMU COOLING VIA SUBLIMATOR. MISSION
TERMINATION. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS DURING
THE EVA.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-348
mm
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/lO/86
EMU
45O
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FEEDWATER VALVE SWITCH (ITEM 367)
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OPEN POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767795-2
C [P]
CAUSES: BEARING BINDS, CAM BINDS, CORROSION, ROTOR
FAILS/FRACTURES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN POSITION IS ACCEPTABLE FOR EVA; HOWEVER, IN THE AIRLOCK THIS
FAILURE CAN RESULT IN FLOODING THE SUBLIMATORAND MISSION
TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-349
U
n
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/10/S6
EMU
451
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CAUTION AND WARNING SWITCH (ITEM 368)
OPEN IN STATUS LINE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [NA ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV767792-2
CAUSES: HERMETIC SEAL FAILURE CAUSES CONTAMINATION/CORROSION ON
CONTACTS, CONTACT FRACTURED DUE TO VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO OBTAIN CAUTION AND WARNING STATUS AND LOSS OF VISUAL
MISSION STATUS. MISSION TERMINATION DUE TO THESE LOSSES RESULTS.
REFERENCES:
m
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-350
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lo/lo/86
EMU
452
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CAUTION AND WARNING SWITCH (ITEM 368)
OPEN IN PROGRAM LINE
HDW/FUNC
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767792-2
CAUSES: HERMETIC SEAL FAILURE CAUSES CONTAMINATION/CO_OSION ON
CONTACTS, CONTACT FRACTURED DUE TO VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO EMPLOY LOGIC PROGRAM FOR IV OPERATIONS. A_O, UNABLE TO
ACKNOWLEDGE CAUTION AND WARNING SIGNAL THEREBY MAINTAINING
HIGHEST PRIORITY SIGNAL ON DISPLAY AND POSSIBLY MASKING OTHER
SIGNAl.
i
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REFERENCES:
S
m
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-351 _ _
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/lO/86
EMU
453
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CAUTION AND WARNING SWITCH (ITEM 368)
SHORT TO GROUND IN STATUS LINE
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
a)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767792-2
A[ 2 ] B [ P] C [P]
CAUSES: HERMETIC SEAL FAILURE RESULTS IN CONTAMINATION/COOROSION
CAUSING SHORT, WIRE CHAFFING, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORT IN THE SWITCH WILL RESULT IN THE DC-DC CONVERTER (WHICH
PROVIDES THE POWER) SHUTTING DOWN. THIS WILL DEPRIVE THE MAJORITY
OF THE EMU OF POWER AND MONITORING. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON
CAN RESULT IF SOP FAILS DURING EVA.
m
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-352
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1o/1o/86
EMU
454
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CAUTION AND WARNING SWITCH (ITEM 368)
SHORT TO GROUND IN PROGRAM LINE
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767792-2
CAUSES: HERMETICSEAL FAILURE REsuLTs IN CONTAMINATION/COOROSION
CAUSING SHORT, WIRE CHAFFING, VIBRATION
SHORT IN THE SWITCH WILLRESULT IN THE DC-DC CONVERTER (WHICH
PROVIDES THE POWER) SHUTTING DOWN. THIS WILL DEPRIVE THE MAJORITY
OF THE E_OF POWER ANDMONITORING, POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON
CAN RESULT IF SOP FAILS DURING EVA.
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REFERENCES:
J
I
m
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-353
I
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
iOllOle6
EMU
455
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CAUTION AND WARNING SWITCH (ITEM 368)
BEARING FAILS IN_'STATUS ''POSITION
HDW/FUNC
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767792-2
CAUSES: BEARING BINDS, CAM BINDS, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALEz
UNABLE TO EMPLOY PROGRAM FOR IV OPERATIONS. ALSO UNABLE TO
ACKNOWLEDGE CAUTION AND WARNING THEREBY MAINTAINING HIGHEST
PRIORITY SIGNAL ON DISPLAY AND POSSIBLY MASKING OTHER SIGNALS.
TERMINATE MISSION.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-354
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
zo/1o/86
EMU
456
HIGHEST CRITI_LITY
FLIG_:
HDW/_NC
2/2
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
CA_ION _D W_ING SWITCH (ITEM 368)
SWITCH FAI_ IN "PROG_" POSITION
_D _ALYST: G. _FFAELLI SUBSYS _AD: G. _FF_LLI
B__ HIE_C_:
i) E_
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITI_LITIES
FLiG_ P_SE .....HDW/_C
P_-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
_D_D_CY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
_TION:
P_T_MBER: SV767792-2
CAUSES: BERING BINDS, CAM BINDS, CO_OSION
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
_AB_ TO OBTAIN CAUTION _D W_ING _D MISSION STA_S. MISSION
TE_INATION.
_FE_NCES:
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_PORT DATE 12/02/86 C-355
i
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/10/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 457
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM: BITE INDICATOR (ITEM 363)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN IN ELECTRICAL INPUT/FAILED OFF
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
HDW/FUNC
2/2
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV722651
CAUSES: CORROSION, FRACTURED CONTACT TO LIGHT SOURCE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL RESULT IN NO LIGHT INDICATION OF CAUTION AND WARNING
FAILURE. A TONE MAY OCCUR BUT THIS TOO CAN BE CONSTRUED AS A
FAILURE BY THE CREWPERSON. IF DETECTED, THE MISSON SHOULD
TERMINATE.
(NOTE: THE BITE LITE IS TO BE DELETED IN THE FUTURE, IF THIS
OCCURS NO IMPACT WILL RESULT OTHER THAN GREATER DEPENDENCE UPON
THE TONE.)
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-356
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 458 FLIGHT:
ITEM: BITE INDICATOR (ITEM 363)
FAILURE MODE: SHORT TO BITE INDICATOR CIRCUIT/FAILED ON
HDW/FUNC
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV722651
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION ACROSS CONTACTS, FAILED ELECTRONICS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ...........................................
CONTINUOUS LIGHT ON INDICATING CAUTION AND WARNING FAILURE;
HOWEVER, IT IS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY THE TONE. SINCE FAILURE IS NOT
ISOLABLE AND MAY MASK A TRUE FAILURE, THE MISSION SHOULD BE
TERMINATED.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-357
I
ww
w
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/10/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 459
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM: ALPHANUMERIC DISPLAY (ITEM 369)
FAILURE MODE: SUPPLY VOLTAGE (VCC) OPEN TO ALL THREE
CHIPS/DISPLAY FAILS OFF TOTALLY
HDW/FUNC
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
A [ ] B [ ]
SV791145-1&2
cc ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION/FRACTURING, CORROSTION, PIN-CONTACT FAILURE,
THERMAL CYCLING DUE TO HEAT SINK FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ENTIRE DISPLAY FOR IV AND MISSION OPERATIONS AND CAUTION
AND WARNING. TONES REMAIN. MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-358
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
Io/io/86
EMU
460
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FAILURE
ALPHANUMERIC DISPLAY (ITEM 369)
ERRATIC DISPLAY/LED DRIVER OR COLUMN DRIVER
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] C C ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV791145-1&2
CAUSES: THERMAL DAMAGE TO ELECTRONICS DUE TO HEAT SINK FAILURE,
VIBRATION, CORROSION ON INPUT CONTACTS, OPEN ON CLOCK SIGNAL,
DATA IN CONTACT OPEN/CORRODED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE OR MORE OF THE THREE PARTS OF THE DISPLAY CAN BE
EQUATED TO A NON-USEABLE DISPLAY AND, THEREFORE, MISSION
TERMINATION.
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REFERENCES: lib
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REPORT DATE°f2/02/86 C-359
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lo/16/86
EMU
461
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CAUTIONAND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
DISPLAY I/O PORT FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) C&W
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
A [ ] B [ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV785970-5
CAUSES: ELECTRONICS FAILURE, VIBRATION/CORROSION, THERMAL
CYCLING CAUSES FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF DISPLAY CAPABILITY FOR CAUTION AND WARNING.
GENERATOR REMAINS. MISSION TERMINATION.
TONE
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
w
l
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-360
mm
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 462 FLIGHT:
ITEM: CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
FAILURE MODE: MEMORY 5.V POWER-IN FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) C&W
3)
4)
S)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV785970-5
CAUSES: VIBRATION CAUSES OPEN, THERMAL CYCLING STRESS
ELECTRONICS, SHORT DUE TO CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF MEMORY USE FOR CAUTION AND WARNING AND CPU IMPACT.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CAUTION AND WARNING FUNCTION. MISSION
TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-361
iu.
u
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/16/86
EMU
463
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
SYSTEM CLOCK OUTPUT OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) c_w
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV785970-5
CAUSES: THERMAL CYCLING CAUSES OPEN, VIBRATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CAUTION AND WARNING CPU FAILURE. MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
m
=
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-362
iDATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
lO/16/86
EMU
464
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
MULTIPLEXER INPUT POWER FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) c_w
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRIITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
A [ ] B [ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV785970-5
CAUSES: THERMAL CYCLING CAUSES OPEN, VIBRATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF MOST DATA MONITORED/SENSED IN EMU. MISSION TERMINATION.
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-363
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/16/86
EMU
465
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
ANALOG TO DIGITAL CONVERTER FAILURE
HDW/FUNC
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) C&W
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C ] c C ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV785970-5
CAUSES: ELECTRONICS FAILURE, THERMAL CYCLING STRESSES
ELECTRONICS, REFERENCE VOLTAGE INPUT SHORTS/OPENS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO DETERMINE ENGINEERING UNITS FOR VARIOUS
ANALOG PARAMETERS AND THEIR SUBSEQUENT DISPLAY USEAGEAND CAUTION
AND WARNING USEAGE. MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 c-36_
IB
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM :
MDAC ID:
10116186
EMU
466
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
BITE CIRCUIT FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) C_W
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV785970-5
] B [ ] C [
CAUSES: VIBRATION CAUSES SHORT, ELECTRONICS FAILURE,
CONTAMINATION CAUSES SHORT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ..... _..........................
BITE LITE ON WITHOUT ACCOMPANYING TONE. THIS WILL REQUIRE_ ......
JUDGMENT CALL BY CREWPERSON TO DETERMINE FAILURE.
MASK SUBSEQUENT FAILURE. MISSION TERMINATION.
MAY POSSIBLY
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-365
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/16/86
EMU
467
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
BITE CIRCUIT FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) c_w
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV785970-5
CAUSES: OPEN IN CIRCUITRY, ELECTRONICS FAILURE, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE CIRCUIT WERE REQUIRED, THE TONE GENERATOR WOULD ANNUNCIATE
ITSELF BUT NOT BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE BITE LITE OR A FAILURE
MESSAGE WILL REQUIRE A CREWPERSONJUDGMENT CALL REGARDING
FAILURE. MISSION TERMINATION WOULD RESULT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-366
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 468
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM: CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
FAILURE MODE: UART FAILS
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
s) c_w
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
A [ ] B [ ] c C ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV785970-5
CAUSES: THERMAL CYCLING CAUSES OPEN, VIBRATION CAUSES OPEN,
CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF C&W RTDS DATA INTERFACE. NO IMPACT.
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REFERENCES :
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-367
wu
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/16/86
EMU
469
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DCM ELECTRONICS
OPEN IN CURRENT SENSE LINE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: THERMAL CYCLING, CORROSION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMPACTS. LOSS OF C&W CURRENT MONITORING CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-368
EINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/16/86
EMU
470
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DCM ELECTRONICS
SHORT IN CURRENT SENSE TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA:" 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ P ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: THERMAL CYCLING, CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SMALL INCREASE IN LOAD ON BATTERY CAN RESULT IN POSSIBLE IMPACT
TO MISSION DURATION. LOSS OF C&W CURRENT MONITORING CAPABILITY.
IF BATTERY IS DRAWN DOWN, MISSION TERMINATION WILL RESULT.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-369
m
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10116186
EMU
471
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DCM ELECTRONICS
OPEN IN VOLTAGE SENSE LINE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] cc ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: THERMAL CYCLING, CORROSION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF VOLTAGE MONITORING CAPABILITY. NO IMPACTS.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-370
mm
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/16/86
EMU
472
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDWIFUNC
312R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DCM ELECTRONICS
SHORT IN VOLTAGE SENSE LINE TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT _E ...... HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
] B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: THERMAL CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF VOLTAGE MONITORING CAPABILITY. SMA_ LOAD MAY EFFEL'T
BATTERY FOR MISSION DURATION. MISSION TERMINATION IF BATTERY
FAILS ALSO.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-371
l
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/16/86
EMU
473
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
EMI FILTER SHORTS TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
A[ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: WIRE CHAFFING, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SCU POWER-IN IS CURRENT LIMITED FROM THE ORBITER AND CIRCUIT
PROTECTED. LOSS OF SCU POWER TO EMU IS THE RESULT. EARLY USEAGE
OF BATTERY POWER IS NECESSARY TO PERFORM MISSION ALTHOUGH EARLY
USE CAN IMPACT MISSION DURATION.
SPARE BATTERY AVAILABLE FOR USE IF FULL MISSION DURATION
REQUIRED. IF SPARE IS FAILED, THE MISSION IS PROBABLE IMPACTED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-372
am
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1o/16/86
EMU
474
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
EMI FILTER OPEN ELECTRICALLY
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2 R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CORROSION
B [P] C [P]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SCU POWER TO EMU. EARLY USEAGE OF BATTERY POWER IS
NECESSARY TO PERFORM MISSION ALTHOUGH EARLY USE CAN IMPACT
MISSION DURATION. SPARE BATTERY AVAILABLE FOR USE IF FULL MISSION
DURATION REQUIRED. .........
IF SPARE IS FAILED MISSION IS PROBABLY IMPACTED.
REFERENCES :
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EMU
475 FLIGHT: 2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AT INLET
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
EVC PRIMARY/CLIV-CURRENTLIMITER SHORTS TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
A[2 ] B[P] C [P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORT IMPOSED ON SCU/BATTERY POWER INLET CAUSING INCREASED LOAD
ON SOURCE AND LOSS OF EVC PRIMARY CURRENT LIMITER & THE CLIV
POWER FOR POSITION CHANGE. MISSION TERMINATION. IF EVA, INCREASED
LOAD ON BATTERY WHEN COMBINED WITH AN SOP FAILURE CAN RESULT
IN LOSS OF VENT LOOP AND LOSS OF CREWPERSON.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-374
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 476 FLIGHT: 3/2R
ITEM: DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
FAILURE MODE: EVC PRIMARY/CLIV CURRENT LIMITER SHORTS TO GROUND
AT EVC PRI POWER OUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORT RESULTS IN CURRENT LIMITATION OCCURING ON OUTLETAND LOSS
OF EVC PRI POWER. MISSION TERMINATES IF EVC SEC FAILS.
REFERENCES:
mm
111
mm
mm
mm
m
g
g
mm
mm
l
m
g
i
mmm
I
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-375
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 477 FLIGHT: 2/IR
ITEM: DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
FAILURE MODE: EVC SEC/FEEDWATER VALVE CURRENT LIMITER SHORTS TO
GROUND AT INLET
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
A[ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORT ON SCU/BATTERY POWER INLET CAUSES INCREASED LOAD ON SOURCE
AND LOSS OF THE EVC SECONDARY AND POWER FOR FEEDWATER VALVE
POSITION CHANGE. MISSION TERMINATION. IF EVA, INCREASED LOAD ON
BATTERY, WHEN COMBINED WITH AN SOP FAILURE, CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF
VENT LOOP AND LOSS OF CREWPERSON.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-376
Mmm
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 478 FLIGHT: 3/2R
ITEM: DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
FAILURE MODE: EVC SEC/FEEDWATER VALVE CURRENT LIMITER SHORTS TO
GROUND AT EVC SEC POWER
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ................................ _L.;_:o_._-L
SHORT RESULTS IN CURRENT LIMITATION ON OUTLET AND LOSS OF EVC SEC
POWER. MISSION TERMINATES IF EVC PRI FAILS.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-377
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 479 FLIGHT: 2/1R
ITEM: DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
FAILURE MODE: EVC PRIMARY/CLIV CURRENT LIMITER SHORTS TO GROUND
AT CLIV POWER OUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
A[ 2 ] B [F] C [P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORT RESULTS IN CURRENT LIMITATION ON OUTLET AND LOSS OF CLIV
POWER. CLIV FAIL IN POWER. WORST-CASE POSITION IS CLOSED IN THAT
NO MAKEUP WATER TO LCG IS AVAILABLE, SUCH THAT OVER THE MISSION,
COOLING EFFICIENCY DECREASES AS LCG BECOMES FULL DEGASSED.
MISSION TERMINATION. POSSIBLE CREWPERSON LOSS IF SOP ALSO FAILS
DURING EVA.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-378
DINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 480 FLIGHT: 2/IR
ITEM: DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
FAILURE MODE: EVC SEC/FEEDWATER VALVE CURRENT LIMITER SHORTS TO
GROUND AT FEEDWATER VALVE POWER OUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
A[ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF COOLING FUNCTION OF SUBLIMATOR IF VALVE IS CLOSED.
MISSION TERMINATION. POSSIBLE CREWPERSON LOSS WITH LOSS OF SOP
DURING EVA.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-379
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 481 FLIGHT: 2/1R
ITEM: DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
FAILURE MODE: EVC PRI/CLIV CURRENT LIMITERHAS ELECTRICAL OPEN
ON POWER IN OR POWER OUT LINE FOR CLIV
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
A[2 ] B [P] C [P]
CAUSES: THERMAL CYCLING, VIBRATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CLIV OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY. IF CLOSED, MISSION MUST
TERMINATE AND LCG CANNOT BE CHARGED/RECHARGED. IF EVA; THE CLIV
IS NORMALLY OPEN TO PROVIDE MAKEUP WATER TO TH_ LCG; BUT IF IT
HAD FAILED CLOSED, GRADUAL COOLING LOSS WOULD RESULT IN MISSION
TERMINATION AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-380
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 482
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM: DCM E_CTRONICS (ITEM 350) ....
FAILURE MODE: EVC SEC/FEEDWATER VALVE CURRENTLIMITERHAS
ELECTRICAL OPEN ON EVC SEC POWER OUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: THERMAL CYCLING, VIBRATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF EVC SEC POWER. MISSION IMPACT IF EVC PRI POWER FAILS.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-381
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uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 483
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM: DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
FAILURE MODE: EVC SEC/FEEDWATER VALVE CURRENT LIMITERHAS
ELECTRICAL OPEN ON FEEDWATER VALVE POWER IN/OUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
A[ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
CAUSES: THERMAL CYCLING, VIBRATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO CHANGE FEEDWATER VALVE POSITION. IF PRE-EVA, MISSION
TERMINATED DUE TO NO EVA COOLING CAPABILITY. IF EVA, LOSS OF
FEEDWATER CONTROL TO OPEN WOULD RESULT IN MISSION TERMINATION AND
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON IF SOP ALSO FAILED.
IF POST-EVA, BEING UNABLE TO CLOSE VALVE CAN CAUSE THE SUBLIMATOR
AND VENT LOOP TO FLOOD.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-382
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 484 FLIGHT: 3/2R
ITEM: DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
FAILURE MODE: EVC PRIMARY/CLIV CURRENT LIMITERHAS ELECTRICAL
OPEN ON EVC PRI POWER OUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
s)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRiTICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
A[2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: THERMAL CYCLING, VIBRATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF EVC PRIMARY POWER. MISSION TERMINATION IF EVC SEC POWER
ALSO FAILS.
_ :_!_!_ _ _ _ _!_ _ _ .... _ _ .....
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-383
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nINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 485
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM: DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN IN POWER IN TO DC/DC CONVERTER TAP T1
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
A[ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
CAUSES: THERMAL CYCLING, VIBRATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 18 VOLT OUTPUT AND 3.8-VOLT OUTPUT. 18 VOLT OUTPUT IS NOT
USED. THE 3.8V OUTPUT LOSS WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF THE DISPLAY
COLUMN DRIVERS AND THEREFORE THE DISPLAY. MISSION TERMINATION
WOULD RESULT. ALSO, THIS LOSS WOULD FAIL THE SUIT PRESSURE
GAGE LIGHT AND THE BITE INDICATOR LIGHT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-384
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 486
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM: DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN IN POWER IN TO DC/DC CONVERTER TQP T3
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
A[2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: THERMAL CYCLING, VIBRATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF +14.2V, 12V, 5.6V, AND 5.0V OUTPUTS. IMMEDIATE LOss DF .......
STATUS FOR FEEDWATER VALVE, FAN, VEHICLE POWER AND BATTERY POWER,
AND BITE; ALSO, LOSS OF DISPLAY CONTROL AND VARIOUS TRANSDUCERS
AND SENSORS, THE RTDS, AND VARIOUS OTHER SENSE CIRCUITS.
MAJOR LOSS OF INSTRUMENTATIONAND CAUTION AND WARNING. MISSION
TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-385
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 487
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM: DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN IN POWER IN TO DC/DC CONVERTER TAP 2
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
A[ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: THERMAL CYCLING, VIBRATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF DC/DC CONVERTER FUNCTION WHICH SUPPORTS THE DCM
ELECTRONICS CWS, RTDS, DISPLAY, AND MONITORING. MISSION
TERMINATION.
HDW/FUNC
2/2
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-386
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 488 FLIGHT: 2/1R
ITEM: DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
FAILURE MODE: SHORT TO GROUND IN ANY DC/DC CONVERTER INPUT LINE
(DOWNSTREAM OF CONVERTER CURRENT LIMITER)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
CRIT_A_TiES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: THERMAL CYCLING, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CURRENT LIMITING TO DC/DC CONVERTER RESULTS WITH LOSS OF
CONVERTER FUNCTION WHILE CONSTANT RATE OF DRAIN ON BATTERY
OCCURS. MISSION TERMINATION. POSSIBLE CREWPERSON LOSS IF POWER
DEGRADES AND SOP ALSO FAILS.
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-387
W
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 489
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM: DCM ELECTRONICS
FAILURE MODE: SHORT TO GROUND AT INPUT OF DC/DC CONVERTER
CURRENT LIMITER
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
A[2 ] B [P] C [P]
CAUSES: THERMAL CYCLING, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DRAIN ON SCU/BATTERY POWER SOURCE. DEGRADATION OF DC/DC CONVERTER
FUNCTION SUCH THAT FUNCTION IS IN EFFECT LOST. MISSION
TERMINATION. POSSIBLE CREWPERSON LOSS IF BATTERY FAILS AND SOP IS
ALSO FAILED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-388
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/16/86
EMU
490
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DCM ELECTRONICS
SHORT TO GROUND ON DC/DC CONVERTER 5V DC OUT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE
PRE-EVA:
EVA:
POST-EVA:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
2/2
_CP] c[P]
CAUSES: THERMAL CYCLING, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF DISPLAY DUE TO LOSS (DEGRADATION) OF 5V POWER TO COLUMN
DRIVERS AND LOGIC. WITH NO DISPLAY AVAILABLE MISSION TERMINATION
IS REQUIRED. ALSO, CONVERTER WILL SHUT DOWN DUE TO CURRENT DRAW.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-389
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/16/86
EMU
491
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DCM ELECTRONICS
OPEN IN DC/DC CONVERTER 5V DC OUT
LEAD A/_ASYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
v)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
A[ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
CAUSES: THERMAL CYCLING, VIBRATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF DISPLAY DUE TO LOSS (DEGRADATION) OF 5V POWER TO COLUMN
DRIVERS AND DISPLAY LOGIC. WITH NO DISPLAY AVAILABLE MISSION
TERMINATION IS REQUIRED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-390
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1o/16/86
EMU
492
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DCM ELECTRONICS
OPEN IN +14.2V OUT (FROM DC/DC CONVERTER)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: THERMAL CYCLING, VIBRATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF C&W REFE_NCE VOLTAGE AND_WERFOR VARIOUS C&W BUFFERS,
MULTIPLEXERS, AND SENSORS. MISSION TEI_INATION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/16/86
EMU
493
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DCM ELECTRONICS
OPEN IN 3.8V OUT FROM DC/DC CONVERTER
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
_)
s)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
I
A[2] SIP] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: THERMAL CYCLING, VIBRATION, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF DISPLAY DUE TO FAILURE/DEGRADATION OF POWER TO DISPLAY
COLUMN DRIVERS. ALSO, LOSS OF SUIT PRESSURE GAGE LIGHT AND BITE
INDICATOR. MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-392
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 494 FLIGHT: 2/2
ITEM: DCM ELECTRONICS
FAILURE MODE: SHORT IN 3.8V OUT FROM DC/DC CONVERTER
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
A[ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
CAUSES: THERMAL CYCLING, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF DISPLAY DUE TO FAILURE/DEGRADATIQN OF POWER TO DISPLAY
COLUMN DRIVERS. ALSO, LOSS OF SUIT PRESSURE GAGE LIGHT AND BITE
INDICATOR. MISSION TERMINATION. CONVERTER SHUTDOWN DUE TO CURRENT
LIMITER TRIP.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/16/86
EMU
495
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DCM ELECTRONICS
SHORT IN +14.2V OUT (FROM DC/DC CONVERTER)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
HDW/FUNC
2/2
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY sCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
A[ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
CAUSES: THERMAL CYCLING, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS/DEGRADATION OF C&W REFERENCE VOLTAGEAND POWER FOR VARIOUS
C&W BUFFERS, MULTIPLEXERS, AND SENSORS. MISSION TERMINATION.
ALSO, THE CONVERTER WILL SHUTDOWN DUE TO CURRENT LIMITER TRIP.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-394
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/16/86
EMU
496
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DCM ELECTRONICS
OPEN IN 18V OUTPUT FROM DC/DC CONVERTER
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) _
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: •3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: THERMAL CYCLING, CONTAMINATION VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
18-VOLT OUTPUTIS NOT USED IN DCM ELECTRONICS.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
l
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-395
i
i
=INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/16/86
EMU
497
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DCM ELECTRONICS
SHORT IN 18V OUTPUT FROM DC/DC CONVERTER
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
A [ ] B [ ]
SV792291
cc ]
CAUSES: THERMAL CYCLING, CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONVERTER SHUTDOWN DUE TO _NT LIMITERTRIP. MISSION
TERMINATION.
HDW/FUNC
2/2
o REFERENCES:
u
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-396
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
_o/16/86
EMU
498
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DCM ELECTRONICS
OPEN IN LINE TO TONE GENERATOR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: THERMAL CYCLING, CORROSION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF WARNING TONES AND STATUS TONES. MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
m
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-397
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/16/86
EMU
499
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DCM ELECTRONICS
FAILED ON TONE GENERATOR
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: ELECTRONICS FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONSTANT TONES TO CREWPERSON WILL CAUSE MISSION TERMINATION DUE
TO CREWMEMBER DISCOMFORT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-398
mm
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 500
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM: COOLING CONTROL VALVE (ITEM 321)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV789693
CAUSES:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
_POST-EVA: 2/2
A[ 2 ] B [ F] C [ P]
HOUSING SEAL FAILURE, SEAL FAILURE TO COOLANT LOOPS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DURING PRE- AND POST-EVA, LOSS OF COOLANT WATER RESULTS IN
INSUFFICIENT COOLING AND POSSIBLE DIFFICULTY IN CHARGE/RECHARGE
OPERATIONS. DURING EVA, LOSS OF COOLANT WATER RESULTS IN A LIKE
LOSS OF FEEWATER (DUE TO MAKEUP REQUIREMENTS) UNTIL SUPPLY IS
EXHAUSTED. MISSION TERMINATION. POSSIBLE SOP USEAGE REQUIRED IF ......
EVA. POSSIBLE CREWPERSON LOSS IF SOP FAILS.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-399
mm
am
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10116186
EMU
501
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
21XR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COOLING CONTROL VALVE (ITEM 321)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
A[ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV789693
CAUSES: SPOOL SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF HIGH-FIDELITY COOLING CONTROL. POSSIBLE CREWPERSON
DISCOMFORT. POSSIBLE MISSION TERMIANTION. IF HEAT LOAD TOO HIGH,
CREWPERSON MAY REQUIRE USE OF SOP. POSSIBLE CREWPERSON LOSS WITH
SOP FAILURE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12102186 C-400
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 502
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM: COOLING CONTROL VALVE (ITEM 321)
FAILURE MODE: JAMS FULL COLD OR FULL HOT
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) DCM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV789693
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION oR CORROSION ON STEM/DRUM
c[P]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREWPERSON SUBJECTED TO FULL COLD OR MAJOR LOSS OF COOLING,
MISSION TERMINATION. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON WITH LOSS OF SOP
IF EVA.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-401
[]
u
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/16/86
EMU
503
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY (I15)
"IV" POSITION SWITCH FAILS CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, MECHANICAL FAILURE OF RELAY
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO EMPLOY IV PROGRAM SEQUENCE WHICH WOULD TRIGGER ON THIS
INDICATOR. VISUAL INSPECTION AND PRESSURE VALVES AVAILABLE. NO
MISSION IMPACT. EVA POSITION IS DETERMINED VIA A DIFFERENT
SWITCH.
REFERENCES:
m
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-402
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
io/16/86
EMU
504
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY (I15)
"OFF" POSITION SWITCH FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, MECHANICAL FAILURE OF RELAY
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO VERIFYBY POSITION SWITCH, ACTUATOR IN OFF POSITION.
VISUAL INSPECTION AND GRADUAL PRESSURE DECAY WOULD SO INDICATE
THE POSITION.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-403
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w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
Io/16/56
EMU
505
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY (115)
"PRESS" POSITION SWITCH FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLS S
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/3
A[2 ] B[P] C CP]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, MECHANICAL FAILURE OF RELAY
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRESS POSITION WOULD BE VERIFIABLE VISUALLY AND BY SUIT PRESSURE
VALUE; HOWEVER, FAILURE TO OPEN WOULD IMPACT EMUCAPABILITY TO
PERFORM THE LEAK CHECK FOR PRESSURE INTEGRITY. ALSO, IV
PROGRAMMED OPERATIONS WILL BE IMPACTED.
POSSIBLE MISSION IMPACT IF SUIT LEAKS.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-404
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/16/86
EMU
506
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/_C
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
IV POSITION SWITCH FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION , CORROSION, MECHANICAL FAILURE OF
RELAY/FRACTURES, LEAD CHAFFES OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONA_LE._i:__-_ _i_i_ __ _ _:_ _i_ J_
SIGNAL WILL APPEAR TO ELECTRONICS AS iF IN "P_SS" POS_ON
IN "OFF" POSITION. NO IMPACT TO LEAK CHECK IN PRESS, ALTHOUGH IT
MAY CAUSE ERRORS IN IV PROGRAMMED OPERATIONS. EVA POSITION IS BY
AN ALTERNATE SWITCH.
VISUAL VERIFICATIONS AVAILABLE IN ADDITION TO PRESSURE VALUES.
REFERENCES :
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-405 _
m
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nw
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1o/16/86
EMU
507
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
OFF POSITION SWITCH FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
AC ]_ B[ ] cc ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, MECHANICAL FAILURE OF
RELAY/FRACTURES, LEAD CHAFFES OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SIGNAL WILL APPEAR TO ELECTRONICS AS IF IN "PRESS" POSITION WHEN
IN "IV" POSITION. POSSIBLE IV PREPROGRAMMED OPERATIONS ERRORS MAY
RESULT. LEAK CHECK IN PRESS POSITION WOULD STILL BE VALID.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-406
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 508 FLIGHT:
ITEM: SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: PRESS POSITION SWITCH FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) LSS
3) PLSS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, MECHANICAL FAILURE OF
RELAY/FRACTURES, LEAD CHAFFES OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE • - ..............
UNABLE TO PERFORM IV PROGRAMMED SEQUENCES APPLICABLE TO IV
POSITION. NO IMPACT TO OBTAINING POSITIONS FOR REGULATOR. NO
MISSION IMPACT.
REFERENCES:
l
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-407 ....
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/02/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 509
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM: EVC
FAILURE MODE: +I4V HL REGULATOR FAILS HIGH/LOW
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) EVCS
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: ELECTRONICS OPEN, CONTAMINATION, SHORT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF HANDLING COMMUNICATIONS. REQUIRES LOSS OF REDUNDANT
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
w
w
REFERENCES:
m
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-408
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/02/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 510
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM: EVC
FAILURE MODE: +14V A, BU REGULATOR FAILS HIGH/LOW
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) EVCS
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: ELECTRONICS OPEN, CONTAMINATION, SHORT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE TRANSMITTER/RECEIVER SET.
MISSION IS TERMINATED.
IF REDUNDANT SETS FAIL,
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-409
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/02/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 511
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM: EVC
FAILURE MODE: +14V B REGULATOR FAILS HIGH/LOW
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
_) EVCS
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ P] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: ELECTRONICS OPEN, CONTAMINATION, SHORT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE TRANSMITTER/RECEIVER SET.
MISSION IS TERMINATED.
IF REDUNDANT SETS FAIL,
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-410
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/02/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 512
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM: EVC
FAILURE MODE: MODE A/BACKUP TRANSMITTER LOSS OF SIGNAL
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) LSS
3) EVCS
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
PoST-EVA: 3/2R
A[2 ] B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: INTERNAL TRANSMITTER, ELECTRONICS FAIL OPEN, ELECTRICAL
SHORT, RELAY TO ANTENNA FAILS OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONA_ ....._
IF REDUNDANT TRANSMITTER WERE T0_ALSO FAIL, MiSStON_kWOULD BE
TERMINATED.
REFERENCES:
qm
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-411
m
um
m
mm
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/02/86
EMU
513
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVC
MODE B/TRANSMITTER, LOSS OF SIGNAL
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) EVCS
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
A[ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: INTERNAL TRANSMITTER, ELECTRONICS FAIL OPEN, ELECTRICAL
SHORT, RELAY TO ANTENNA FAILS OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF REDUNDANT TRANSMITTER WERE TO ALSO FAIL, MISSION WOULD BE
TERMINATED.
REFERENCES:
w
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-412
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/02/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 514
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM: EVC
FAILURE MODE: 296.8 MHZ RECEIVER LOSS OF SIGNAL
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) EVCS
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
.........CRITI_LITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: ELECTRONIC OPEN, ELECTRICAL SHORT, LOSS OF POWER
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF REDUNDANT RECEIVERS WERE ALSO LOST, MISSION WOULD BE
TERMINATED.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
i
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REPORT DATE 12102186 C-413 _ : _--_
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mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/02/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 515
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM: EVC
FAILURE MODE: 259.7 MHZ RECEIVER LOSS OF SIGNAL
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) EVCS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
A[2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: ELECTRONICS OPEN, ELECTRICAL SHORT, MUTE LATCH FAILS
CLOSED FOR TRANSMITTER, LOSS OF POWER
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF REDUNDANT RECEIVERS WERE ALSO LOST, MISSION WOULD BE
TERMINATED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-414
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/02/86
EMU
516
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EVC
279.0 MHZ RECEIVER LOSS OF SIGNAL
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) LSS
3) EVCS
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
A[2 ] B[P] cCP]
CAUSES: ELECTRONICS OPEN, ELECTRICAL SHORT, LOSS OF POWER
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF REDUNDANT RECEIVERS WERE ALSO LOST, MISSION WOULD BE ......
TERMINATED.
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REFERENCES:
mE
M
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-415 ....
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B
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/02/86
EMU
517
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ANTENNA
LOSS OF SIGNAL (ANY ONE OF THREE)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) LSS
3) EVCS
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
A[2 ] B [P] C [ P]
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMPACT FOR SINGLE FAILURE. LOSS OF OTHER REDUNDANT TRANSMIT
OR RECIEVE FUNCTIONS WILL RESULT IN MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-416
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 600 FLIGHT: 2/2
ITEM: NECK RING AND VENT SEAL ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: JAM OF LOCK MECHANISM (CANNOT MATE TO HELMET FROM
NECK RING 1)
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) SSA
3 ) HUT
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 3/3
A [NA ] B [NA ] c [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9357-10/9713-03
CAUSES: BROKEN/LOOSENDED SPRING IN LOCK. MECHANISM, MATERIAL
CAUGHT IN MECHANISM) MISALIGNED LOCKING PINS.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF CANNOT MATE EVA, MISSION IS TERMINATED.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-417 ........ _
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 601
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NECK RING)
NECK RING AND VENT SEAL ASSEMBLY
JAM OF LOCK MECHANISM (CANNOT DEMATE HELMET FROM
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3 ) HUT
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: /
POST-EVA: 2/2
A [NA ] S [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9357-10/9713-03
CAUSES: FAULTY SPRING IN LOCK MECHANISM, MATERIAL CAUGHT IN
MECHANISM, MISALIGNED LOCKING PINS.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DEMATE CAN BE FORCED OR SUIT DOFFED WITHOUT HELMET REMOVAL,
SUBSEQUENT MISSIONS PROBABLY TERMINATED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-418
DINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: L
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 602
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM: NECK RING AND VENT SEAL ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: LEAKAGE OF NECK RING.
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) SSA
3) HUT
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRIT_CALIT!ES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY sCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9357-10/9713-03
CAUSES: FAULTY OR ERODED LIP SEALS OR GASKETS, MISINSTALLED OR
MISSING SCREWS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF LEAKAGE OUT OF MAKE UP TOLERANCE MISSION WOULD BE TERMINATED.
IF LEAK LARGE ENOUGH WITH A CONCURRENT SOP FAILURE, CREWPERSON
POSSIBLY LOST.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 603
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
ITEM: NECK RING AND VENT SEAL ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: NECK RING FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3 ) HUT
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 1/1
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9357-10/9713-03
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: BROKEN/LOOSENED SPRING, BROKEN LOCKING PINS.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THIS FAILURE WERE TO OCCUR EVA IT WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
CREWPERSON DUE TO PROBABLE LARGE LEAK EXCEEDING SOP MAKEUP
CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-420
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 604
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WATER LINE AND VENT TUBE ASSMEBLY
WATER FLOWN BLOCKAGE.
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) HUT
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0102-82437-18
CAUSES:
A [2 ] B [P] C [P]
MATERIAL _IN LINES, CONTAM_INATION _-_
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ....................................
BLOCKAGE COULD CAUSE MISSION TERMINATION DUE TO DEGRADATION OF
COOLING FOR CREWPERSON._POSSIBLEsoP U_EREQUIRED. POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREWPERSON WITH LOSS OF SOP.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-421
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 605
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM: WATER LINE AND VENT TUBE ASSMEBLY
FAILURE MODE: WATER LINE LEAKAGE.
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) SSA
3 ) HUT
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0102-82437-18
B[P] C [P]
CAUSES: FAULTY TUBING OR SEALS.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF FEEDWATER CAPACITY RESULTS IN LOSS OF COOLING. PROBABLE
SOP USEAGE REQUIRED. ADDITIONALLY, WATER IN THE SUIT COULD RESULT
IN BLOCKAGE OF THE PURGE VALVBES BY ICE FORMATION THEREBY
INHIBITING SOP OPERATION. IF SOP WERE REQUIRED AND THE VALVES
WERE
BLOCKED, POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON WOULD RESULT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-422
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 606
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
ITEM: WATER LINE AND VENT TUBE ASSMEBLY
FAILURE MODE: 02 LEAKAGE DIRECTLY TO HUT.
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) SSA
3) HUT
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0102-82437-18
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE 0 RINGS, ERODED TUBING, IMPROPER BONDING AT
FLANGE MOUNT.
EFFECTS/RATIONAl;
POSSIBLE DEGRADATION OF 0RALINASAL FLUSH CAN RESULT IN HIGH LEVEL
OF HUMIDITY AND C02 IN CREWPERSONS ORAL NASAL AREA. IF CREWPERSON
DOES NOT DETECT C02 BUILDUP (THEY ARE TAUGHT THE SYMPTONS),
POSSIBLE CREWPERSON LOSS CAN RESULT.
(NO ALTERNATE/REDUNDANT PATH EXISTS).
REFERENCES :
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 607
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MULTIPLE WATER CONNECTOR (HUT HALF)
LEAKAGE WHEN UNMATED TO LCVG HALF OF CONNECTOR.
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3 ) HUT
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9694-08
CAUSES: O'RINGS OR POPPETS DEFECTIVE, MATERIAL IN MECHANISM.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE OF WATER INTO AIRLOCK.
RECHARGE.
REQUIRES USAGE OF MORE WATER FOR
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-424
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 608 FLIGHT: 2/2
ITEM: MULTIPLE WATER CONNECTOR (HUT HALF)
FAILURE MODE: JAM. FAIL TO MATE WITH LCVG HALF OF CONNECTOR.
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) HUT
4)
5)
6)
_)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9694-08
CAUSES: BROKEN/LOOSENED RING LATCH IN LOCK POSITION, MATERIAL IN
MECHANISM.
EFFECTS/RATIQNALE: ......
MISSION TERMINATION DUE TO INABILITY TO MATE LCVG TO HUT.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 609
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MULTIPLE WATER CONNECTOR (HUT HALF)
JAM. FAIL TO DEMATE WITH LCVG HALF OF CONNECTOR.
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3 ) HUT
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9694-08
CAUSES: MATERIAL IN COUPLING MECHANISM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WOULD HAVE TO BE FORCED OPEN. POSSIBLE TERMINATION OF SUBSEQUENT
MISSIONS IF DAMAGE OCCURS DURING OPENING.
REFERENCES:
w
w
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-426
mm
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 610
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MULTIPLE WATER CONNECTOR (HUT HALF)
LEAKAGE-MATED.
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) SSA
3 ) HUT
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9694-08
CAUSES: CUT 0-RINGS, DEFECTIVE SURFACE FOR SEALING OF SPRING.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF DISCOVERED PRE OR POST EVA, WOULD TERMINATE UPCOMING AND
SUBSEQUENT MISSIONS. IF EVA, GRADUAL H20 LOSS CAN CAUSE WATER TO
MIGRATE TO AND FAIL THE VENT LOOP. SOP USEAGE WOULD THEN BE
REQUIRED; HOWEVER THE PURGE VALVES COULD BE BLOCKED BY ICE DU E TO
THE
FREE WATER. IF THIS OCCURS, POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON COULD
RESULT.
REFERENCES:
I
i
i
mm
B
m
g
m
I
D
l
I
W
g
m
_m
m
w
==
w
C-427REPORT DATE 12/02/86
mi
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 611
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HARD UPPER TORSO SHELL
LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) SSA
3) HUT
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV772375-21
c[P]
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE MATERIALS, DAMAGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRIMARY PRESSURE MAINTENANCE VIA THE PLSS COULD RESULT IN
SOP USEAGE. IF THE SOP FAILS, CREWPERSON COULD BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-428
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 612
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HARD UPPER TORSO SHELL
UNABLE TO MATE EEH. TO CCA
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3 ) HUT
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: /
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV772375-21
CAUSES: IMPROPER BONDING, BAD MATERIALS.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TERMINATE MISSION IF UNABLE TO MATE TO CCA DUE TO LOSS OF
COMMUNICATIONS.
REFERENCES:
HDW/_NC
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-429
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 613
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GIMBAL ASSY.
DISATTACHMENT OF PIVOTS.
HDW/FUNC
i/i
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3 ) HUT
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 1/1
POST-EVA: 2/2
A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
PART NUMBER: SV772302-1/SV772308-5
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE MATERIAL, DAMAGING IMPACTS.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF DISSATTACHMENT OCCURS EVA, ARMS COULD SEPARATE FROM HUT AND
RAPID SOP DEPLETION WOULD OCCUR WITH LOSS OF CREWPERSON.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-430
ms
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 614
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM: BELLOWS ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: LEAKAGE.
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3 ) HUT
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: .... 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0102-82438-16
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE ATTACHMENT, IMPACT DAMAGE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRESSURE INTEGRITY. LEAKAGE OF PRIMARY 02 SUPPLY. IF
LEAKAGE EXCEEDS SOP MAKEUP OR SIMULTANEOUS SOP FAILURE OCCURS,
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON CAN RESULT.
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REFERENCES:
u
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-431
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IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 615
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BODY SEAL CLOSURE (HUT SIDE)
LEAKAGE.
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) SSA
3) HUT
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY sCREENS :
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
A[2 ] B[P] C[F]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: A/L 9786-05
CAUSES: DAMAGE, DETERIORATING 0-RING, MATERIAL CAUGHT IN
INTERFACE, DAMAGE DUE TO IMPACT.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRESSURE INTEGRITY. LEAKAGE OF PRIMARY 02 SUPPLY. IF
LEAKAGE EXCEEDS SOP MAKEUP OR SIMULTANEOUS SOP FAILURE OCCURS,
CREWMEMBER COULD BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-432
uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 616
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BODY SEAL CLOS_ (_T SIDE)
FAILLE TO MATE,
_AD _ALYST: J. _ITM_ SUBSYS _AD: G. _FFAELLI
BREAKDO_ HIE_CHY:
I) EMU
2) SSA
3 ) HUT
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C
P_-EVA: 2/2
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUND_CY SC_ENS: A [ ] BC ] cC ]
_CATION:
P_T _MBER: A/L 9786-05
CAUSES: MATERIAL IN MEC_ISM, MISALIGNED _CKING PINS,
BRO_N/_OSENED SPRING.
EFFECTS/_TIONAT._.z ........ i_ ......
INABILITY TO MATE _ TO LTA_SULTS IN MISSION TE_INATION.
_FE_NCES:
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_PORT DATE 12/02/86 C-433
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 617
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BODY SEAL CLOSURE (HUT SIDE)
FAILURE TO DEMATE.
HDW/FUNC
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) HUT
4) BODY SEAL CLOSURE (HUT SIDE)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: /
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9786-05
CAUSES: MATERIAL IN MECHANISM, UNEVEN LOADS ON HALFS OF
MECHANISM, BROKEN/LOOSENED SPRING DEVICE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WOULD HAVE TO BE FORCED OPEN RESULTING IN PROBABLE DAMAGE TO
MECHANISM. TERMINATION OF SUBSEQUENT MISSIONS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-434
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 618
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BODY SEAL CLOSURE (HUT SIDE)
LOCK MECHANISM FAILURE-OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) SSA
3 ) HUT
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 1/1
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[F]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9786-05
CAUSES: DAMAGE OR DEFECTIVE LOCKING MECHANISM.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF FAILURE OCCURRED EVARESULTINGLEAKAGE WOULDDEPLETE PRIMARY
02 SUPPLY AND WOULD LIKELY EXCEED SOP CAPABILITY TO MAKEUP LOST
OXYGEN. PROBABLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON. MISSION TERMINATION IF PRE
OR POST EVA.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-435
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 619
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HARNESS STRAP ANDHARNESS PAD ASSMEBLY
DISLOCATION OF STRAP AND/OR PAD ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3 ) HUT
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0102-82718-09/10;0102-82717-01/02
c [
CAUSES: MATERIALS ORATTACHMENT FAILURE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DEVICE IS MAINLY FOR I-G EXERCISES AND WETF.
IN ACTUAL FLIGHT. NO IMPACT.
OFTEN NOT USED
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-436
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 620 FLIGHT:
ITEM: COMBINATION PURGE VALVE
FAILURE MODE: FAIL CLOSED.
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3 ) HELMET
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9819-07
CAUSES: MECHANISM DAMAGED, BAD 0-RINGS, SCREW DAMAGED OR SEATED
IMPROPERLY, OUTSIDE MATERIAL IN MECHANISM, CORROSION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ....
IF SIMULTANEOUS CPV AND DCM PURGE VALVE FAILUR_ES OC_MISSION
SHOULD BE TERMINATED DUE TO LOSS OF PURGE CAPABILITY EMPLOYING
THE SOP.
REFERENCES:
mm
mm
m
i
g
i
m
m
i
l
I
mm
l
m
i
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-437
w
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 621
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMBINATION PURGE VALVE
FAIL OPEN/INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) SSA
3) HELMET
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9819-07
CAUSES: MECHANISM DAMAGED, BAD 0-RINGS, SCREW DAMAGED OR SEATED
IMPROPERLY, OUTSIDE MATERIAL IN MECHANISM.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF CPV WERE TO FAIL OPEN EVA IT WOULD RESULT IN MISSION
TERMINATION AND DEPLETION OF PRIMARY 02 SYSTEM REQUIRING SOP
USEAGE. IF SOP IS FAILED, POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON CAN RESULT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-438
mm
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 622 FLIGHT: 2/1R
ITEM: HELMET ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: LEAKAGE.
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
mm
I
mm
I
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) "SSA m
3) HELMET
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9) "
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_sE ......._W/FUNC []
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9672-01
IMPACT TO HELMET, IMPROPER SEATING OF HELMET TO NECKCAUSES:
RING.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF LEAKAGE EXCEEDS PRIMARY 02 SYSTEM AND SOP MAKEUP OR HAVE
SIMULTANEOUS SOP FAILURE WITHDEPLETION OF PRIMARY SYSTEM, COULD
ENDANGER CREWMEMBERS. -........................
REFERENCES:
n
l
L_
mm
D
I
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-439 I
E-w
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 623
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EXTRAVEHICULAR VISOR ASSEMBLY
JAM OF SUN VISOR (SUN VISORS) IN OPEN POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) HELMET
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9813-12
CAUSES: WARPED EVVA SHELL, IMPACT DAMAGE, MATERIAL TRAPPED IN
MECHANISM.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE MISSION TERMINATION DUE TO INABILITY OF CREWPERSON TO
SEE IN BRIGHT SUN.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-440
lDATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
EMU
624 FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EXTRAVEHICULAR VISOR ASSEMBLY
JAM OF SUN VISOR (SUN VISORS) IN CLOSED POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) SSA
3) HELMET
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9813-12
CAUSES: WARPED EVVA SHELL, IMPACT DAMAGE, MATERIAL TRAPPED IN
MECHANISM.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMPACTS TO MISSION.
REFERENCES:
I
mm
mm
I
l
M
i
i
g
m
i
I
I
!
g
M
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-441
I
ww
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 625
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EXTRAVEHICULAR VISOR ASSEMBLY
CRACK IN SUN VISOR (SUN VISORS)
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) SSA
3) HELMET
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: A/L 9813-12
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: IMPACT DAMAGE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE MISSION TERMINATION DUE TO IMPAIRED ABILITY OF
CREWPERSON TO SEE IN BRIGHT SUN.
HDW/FUNC
2/2
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-442
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 626
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM: EXTRAVEHICULAR VISOR ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: CRAZING (SCRATCHING) IN GOLD SUN VISOR
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) HELMET
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_E HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9813-12
CAUSES: IMPACT DAMAGE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IMPAIRED MISSION DURING EVA AND POSSIBLE INCREASE OF UV LIGHT
THROUGH VISOR WOULD RESULT IN MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
g
m
I
==i
I
I
D
R
g
i
mm
I
m
m
I
REPORT DATE 12/02/86
_m
is
i
mm
iw
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 627 FLIGHT: 2/IR
ITEM: UPPER/LOWERARM RESTRAINT AND BLADDER ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) ARM ASSEMBLY
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0103-82318-22 0103-82351-16
CAUSES: PUNCTURE HOLE, DEFECTIVE MATERIAL, LOOSE/IMPROPERLY
INSTALLED SCREWS AT FLANGE MOUNTS, MATERIAL TRAPPED IN FLANGE
MOUNT.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DEPLETION OF PRIMARY OXYGEN SUPPLY. IF LEAKAGE IS IN EXCESS OF
SECONDARY OXYGEN SUPPLY OR IF SECONDARY OXYGEN SUPPLY IS LOST
LEAKAGE WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREWMEMBER.
REFERENCES:
v
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-444
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 628 FLIGHT: 2/IR
ITEM: UPPER/LOWER ARM RESTRAINT AND BLADDER ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF PRIMARY AXIAL RESTRAINT
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) SSA
3) ARM ASSEMBLY
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0103-82318-22 0103-82351-16
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE MATERIAL, TORN OR RIPPED RESTRAINT. LOOSE SET
SCREW ALLOWING RESTRAINT TO UNSEAT BEFORE PRESSURIZATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
IF SECONDARY RESTRAINT AND SOP ALSO LOST, COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
PRESSURE CONTAINMENT/MAKEUP AND CREWPERSON.
REFERENCES :
l
m
m
m
m
m
i
g
i
c
I
m
m
B
m
m
g
J
m
D
i
C-445REPORT DATE 12/02/86
Iw
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 629
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SCYE BEARING ASSEMBLY
LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
211R
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) SSA
3) ARM ASSEMBLY
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ F]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9782-04°
CAUSES: SEPARATOR SEAL NOT FUNCTIONING PROPERLY, DAMAGED 0-
RINGS, FOREIGN MATTER IN MECHANISM.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROBABLE DEPLETION OF PRIMARY OXYGEN. IF LEAKAGE IS OUTSIDE SOP
MAKEUP CAPABILITY OR SOP IS LOST, THEN CREWMEMBER MAY BE LOST IF
EVA.
REFERENCES:
w
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-446
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 630
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SCYE BEARING ASSEMBLY
BEARING TORQUES HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) SSA
3) ARM ASSEMBLY
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] cc ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9782-04
CAUSES: ENVIRONMENTAL SEAL OUT OF TRACK. OVER LUBRICATION,
FOREIGN MATTER IN THE MECHANISM.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
BEARING JAMS DUE TO HIGH TORQUE, SHOULDERS UNABLE TO ROTATE.
CANCEL OR TERMINATE MISSION.
REFERENCES :
u
l
nm
i
U
g
am
i
M
----4
m
m
u
I
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m
J
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-447
m
ww
m
w
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 631
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/]_R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ARM BEARING ASSEMBLY
LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) SSA
3) ARM ASSEMBLY
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9657-06
CAUSES: SEPARATOR SEAL NOT FUNCTIONING PROPERLY.
RINGS, FOREIGN MATTER IN MECHANISM.
DAMAGED 0-
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DEPLETION OF PRIMARY 02. IF LEAKAGE EXCEEDS SOP MAKEUP OR SOP
FAILS, THEN CREWMEMBER MAYBE LOST.
REFERENCES:
l
w
REPORT DATE !2/02/86 C-448
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 632
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ARM BEARING ASSEMBLY
BEARING TORQUES HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) SSA
3) ARM ASSEMBLY
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9657-06
A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: ENVIRONMENTAL SEAL OUT OF TRACK. OVER LUBRICATION
FOREIGN MATTER IN THE MECHANISM.
i
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ................
BEARING JAMS DUE TO HIGH TORQUE. ARMS UNABLE TO ROTATE. CANCEL OR
TERMINATE MISSION.
REFERENCES:
m
i
=_
mm
I
U
m
g
m
J
I
I
m
g
i
I
m
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-449 ......
M
B
wi
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 633
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WRIST DISCONNECT
LOCK/JAM OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) SSA
3) ARM ASSEMBLY
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9813-02 A/L 9814-02
CAUSES: FOREIGN MATERIAL IN MECHANISM. DEFECTIVE OR DAMAGED
MECHANISM.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A JAM IN OPEN POSITION WOULD CANCEL EVA MISSION DUE TO INABILITY
TO DON SUIT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-450
lINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 634 FLIGHT: 2/2
mm
I
ITEM: WRIST DISCONNECT
FAILURE MODE: LOCK JAM CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G, RAFFAELLI
I
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) SSA J
3) ARM ASSEMBLY
4)
S) ,,
6)
7)
8)
9) u
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: /
POST'EVA: 2/2
B [NA ] C [NA ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
A/L 9813-02 A/L 9814-02
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: FOREIGN MATERIAL IN MECHANISM. DEFECTIVE OR DAMAGED
MECHANISM.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A JAM IN CLOSED POSITION WOULD CANCEL SUBSEQUENT EVA MISSION.
I
I
mm
m
l
REFERENCES:
m
m
i
m
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-451
iu
u
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 635
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WRIST DISCONNECT
LEAKAGE
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) SSA
3) ARM ASSEMBLY
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9813-02 A/L 9814-02
C[F]
CAUSES: SCREWS IMPROPERLY SEATED.
MATERIAL IN MECHANISM.
DEFECTIVE 0-RINGS. FOREIGN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DEPLETION OF PRIMARY 02 SUPPLY. IF LEAKAGE EXCEEDS SOP MAKEUP OR
SOP FAILS DURING EVA, POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON CAN RESULT.
REFERENCES:
E :
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-452
INDEPENDENToRBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 636
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WRIST DISCONNECT
LOCK FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
J
m
mm
i
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) SSA
3) ARM ASSEMBLY
4)
s) =
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 1/1
POST-EVA: 2/2 _.
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
A/L 9813-02 A/L 9814-02
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: FOREIGN MATERIAL IN MECHANISM.
LOCKING MECHANISM. MATERIAL FATIGUE.
DEFECTIVE OR DAMAGED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ......... _
...................... _i:_: / _ _ T=_:_!_ _ :, _: : _ "
IF FAILURE WERE TO OCCUR DURING EVA GROSS LOSS OF OXYGEN AND
PRESSURE RESULTS. LOSS OF CREWPERSON.
REFERENCES:
m
m
m
I
m
m
I
m
C-453REPORT DATE 12/02/86
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 637
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESTRAINT MODIFIED
RESTRAINT LAYER AND BLADDER SEPARATION
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) SSA
3) GLOVE ASSEMBLY
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0106-85894-11/12
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE ADHESION AT FINGER CAPS AND OR ATTACH POINTS.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MISSION WOULD BE TERMINATED DUE TO TOTAL LOSS OF GLOVE FUNCTION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-454
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 638
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM: RESTRAINT MODIFIED
FAILURE MODE: SIZING LINES IN FINGERS FAILED
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) GLOVE ASSEMBLY
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: 0106-85894-11/12
C [NA ]
CAUSES: D ........
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SIZING OF G_VES WOULD BE LOST AND LOSS OF CREWMEMBER DEXTERITY
WOULD TERMINATE OR IMPACT THE MISSION.
REFERENCES:
B
B
[]
i
ms
M
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-455
I
[]
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 639
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM: RESTRAINT MODIFIED
FAILURE MODE: PALM BAR SEPARATED FROM POSITION.
HDW/FUNC
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) SSA
3) GLOVE ASSEMBLY
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY scREENs:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0106-85894-11/12
CAUSES: RESTRAINT LOOP MATERIAL DAMAGED OR DEFECTIVE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF GLOVE DEXTERITY AND CREWMEMBER DISCOMFORT,
MISSION TERMINATION RESULTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-456
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 640 FLIGHT:
ITEM: RESTRAINT MODIFIED
FAILURE MODE: PRIMARY AXIAL RESTRAINT SEPARATED.
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
HDW/FUNC
211R
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) SSA
3) GLOVE ASSEMBLY
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_E ..... HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0106-85894-11/12
B[F] C [P]
CAUSES:
SEATED.
DEFECTIVE, DAMAGED MATERIAL. SET SCREW IMPROPERLY
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SECONDARYAXIALRESTRAINTWILL TAKE LOAD iF PRIMARY FAILS. IF
SECONDARY AXIAL RESTRAINTS FAIL, CREWMEMBER MAY BE LOST. MISSION
IS TERMINATED IF FAILURE DETECTED.
REFERENCES:
I
m
l
=_
B
mm
z
mm
D
I
m
I
E
m
I
I
B
I
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-457
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 641
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BLADDER ASSEMBLY
LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) GLOVE ASSEMBLY
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ F]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: 0106-87543-01/02
CAUSES: PUNCTURE, WEAR ON BLADDER AT FLANGE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DEPLETION OF PRIMARY OXYGEN SUPPLY. IF LEAKAGE OCCURS DURING EVA
AND EXCEEDS THE SOP CAPACITY OR IF THE SOP FAILS, LOSS OF
CREWMEMBER COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-458
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 642
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WRIST DISCONNECT (GLOVE SIDE)
LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
m
m
om
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA "
3) GLOVE ASSEMBLY
4)
5) i
6)
7)
8) i
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC --
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2 i
mR
B [P] C [P]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: AL 9924-01
CAUSES:
SCREWS.
IMPROPERLY SEATED OR DAMAGED SEALS, IMPROPERLY SEATED
DEFECTIVE 0-RINGS. FOREIGN MATTER IN MECHANISM.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DEPLETION OF PRIMARY OXYGEN SUPPLY. IF LEAKAGE EXCEEDS SOP
CAPACITY OR SOP FAILS DURING EVA, LOSS OF CREWMEMBER IS POSSIBLE.
REFERENCES:
a
I
R
mm
ms
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-459
m
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 643
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WRIST DISCONNECT (GLOVE SIDE)
BEARING TORQUE HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) SSA
3) GLOVE ASSEMBLY
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HDW/FUNC
2/2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: AL 9924-01
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES:
ROUND.
SEALS TORN. LUBRICATION OUT OF SPEC. BEARING OUT OF
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BEARING COULD JAM. LIMITING WRIST MOVEMENT. MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-460
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 644
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PALM RESTRAINT
PALM BAR RESTRAINT SLIPPED
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI _
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) GLOVE ASSEMBLY
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE _HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION:
PART _MBER: 0106-23421-03/8_0S9-01
] c C ]
CAUSES: MATERIAL FATIGUED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF PALM FIT IS COMPROMISED, EVA MISSION WOULD BE TERMINATED OR
ADVERSELY AFFECTED.
REFERENCES:
I
mm
m
mm
mm
z
m
l
I
m
D
g
I
D
g
mR
M
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-461
I
ww
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 645
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PALM RESTRAINT
PALM BAR BENT
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) GLOVE ASSEMBLY
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0106-23421-03/86059-01
c[ ]
CAUSES: MATERIAL FATIGUED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PALM BAR COULD PINCH CREWMEMBER'S HAND RESULTING IN MISSION
TERMINATION OR IMPACT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-462
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 646
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WAIST RESTRAINT AND BLADDER
LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3 ) LTA
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0104-82347-107 0104-84811-05
CAUSES: STITCH SEPARATION, PUNCTURE, FOREIGN MATERIAL TRAPPED AT
FLANGE, LOOSE OR MISSEATED SCREWS AT FLANGE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ...................
DEPLETION OF PRIMARY OXYGEN SUPPLY. IF LEAKAGE EXCEEDS SOP MAKEUP
OR IF SOP FAILS DURING EVA, THIS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREWMEMBER.
REFERENCES:
l
ms
m
mm
mm
l
i
I
m
g
D
mm
m
J
w
w
i
D
C-463REPORT DATE 12/02/86
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 647
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM: WAIST RESTRAINT AND BLADDER
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF PRIMARY AXIAL RESTRAINT
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) SSA
3) LTA
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
A [ 2 ] B [F] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0104-82347-107 0104-84811-05
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE MATERIAL OR MANUFACTURE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SECONDARY AXIAL RESTRAINT IS THE REDUNDANT ITEM. FAILURE OF BOTH
OF THESE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREWMEMBER DUE TO LOSS OF
STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF LTA (WAIST).
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-464
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 648
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WAIST BEARING
LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
z) EMU
2) SSA
3) LTA
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
A[ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9698-08
CAUSES: MISSEATED SEAL, MISSEATED OR MISSING SCREWS, BAD 0-
RINGS, MISMATCH OF PRESSURE SEAL AND BEARING RACE WIDTHS.
EFFECTS/_TIQNAL_[_%_ % _ i:_ _ _ _ i ....i_ _ _
DEPLETION OF PRIMARY OXYGEN IF LEAKAGE EXCEEDS SOP MAKEUP OR sop
FAILS DURING EVA, POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWMEMBER.
REFERENCES:
g
g
I
U
I
I
ms
=
i
I
m
l
==
i
J
u
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-465
U
g
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 649
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WAIST BEARING
BEARING TORQUES HIGH
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) SSA
3 ) LTA
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HDW/FUNC
2/2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9698-08
CAUSES: FOREIGN MATERIAL IN MECHANISM, MISEATED SEALS, OR UNDER-
LUBRICATION.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BEARING TORQUES HIGH OR BEARING JAMMING RESULTS IN MISSION
TERMINATION DUE TO DEGRADATION OF MOBILITY.
7
W
REFERENCES:
m
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-466
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 650
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM: LOWER TORSO RESTRAINT/BLADDER ASSEMBLY
FAILURE_ MODE: LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3 ) LTA
4)
s)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITI_ES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0104-82335-22
CAUSES: PUNCTURE OF BLADDER. SEAM SEPARATION OF BLADDER
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DEPLETION OF PRIMARY OXYGEN SUPPLY. IF LEAKAGE RATE EXCEEDS SOP
MAKEUP OR IF SOP FAILS DURING EVA, THIS COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
CREW'MEMBER.
REFERENCES:
m
l
i
J
mm
M
mm
B
I
g
m
i
I
m
I
==
mm
D
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-467
i
l
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 651
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LOWER TORSO RESTRAINT/BLADDER ASSEMBLY
LOSS OF PRIMARY AXIAL RESTRAINT
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) SSA
3) LTA
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: 0104-82335-22
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE MATERIAL KEEPERSCREW MISSING FROM RESTRAINT
BRACKET.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SECONDARY AXIAL RESTRAINTS PROVIDE REDUNDANCY. FAILURE OF BOTH
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREWMEMBER DUE TO LOSS OF LTA STRUCTURAL
INTEGRITY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-468
mB
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 652
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BOOT DISCONNECT
LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) LTA
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CR!TICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9752-01
A[ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE 0-RING MISSEATED SCREWS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DEPLETION OF PRIMARy OXYGEN SUPPLY. IF LEAKAGE EXCEEDS SOP MAKEUP
OR SOP FAILS DURING EVA, CREWMEMBER COULD BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
R
m
R
I
D
Q
nm
D
I
==
mm
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-469
mm
mm
R
ww
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 653
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE BOOT ASSEMBLY
LEAKAGE
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) LTA
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA" 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0104-82403-29/30
CAUSES: PUNCTURE. DEFECTIVE MATERIAL.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DEPLETION OF PRIMARY OXYGEN SUPPLY. IF LEAKAGE EXCEEDS SOP MAKEUP
OR IF SOP FAILS DURING EVA, CREWMEMBERS COULD BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-470
mm
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT_
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 654
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE BOOT ASSEMBLY
LOSS OF PRIMARY AXIAL RESTRAINT
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) SSA
3 ) LTA
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0104-82403-29/30
CAUSES: LOOSE SCREW AT KEEPER BRACKET, MATERIAL FATIGUED/WORN,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SECONDARY AXIAL RESTRAINT IS REDUNDANT. LOSS OF BOTH RESTRAINTS
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF SUIT PRESSURE INTEGRITY AND CREWPERSON.
REFERENCES:
i
mm
i
z
l
i
mm
mm
m
J
m
D
m
mm
I
I
U
m
l
I
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-471
B
im
m
- k
i
i
w
i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 655
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BOOT SIZING INSERT
BOOTS INSERTS OUT OF PLACE
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) SSA
3 ) LTA
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0104-82664-17/18
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE VELCRO
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INSERTS ARE NOT MISSION OR LIFE/VEHICLE CRITICAL. NO IMPACTS.
REFERENCES:
i
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-472
lINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM_ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 656
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAIL--MODE:
BODY SEAL C_S_ (LTA SIDE)
J_MED OPEN
T_AD _ALYST: J. _ITM_ SUBSYS _AD: G. _FF_LLI
B_AKDO_ HIE_CHY:
1) EMU
2) SSA
3 ) LTA
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITI_LITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C
P_-EVA: 2/2
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 2/2
_D_D_CY SC_ENS: A [ ] B [
_CATION:
P_T _MBER: A/L 9787-05
CAUSES: FO_IGN MATTER IN MEC_ISM
] c [ ]
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
IF J_MED OPEN MISSION WOULD BE _CEL_D OR SUBSEQUENT MISSIONS
TE_INATED.
_FE_NCES:
mm
m
g
m
i
m
I
l
D
l
B
Bm
J
m
m
J
_PORT DATE 12/02/86 C-473
i
m
=w
w
w
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 657
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BODY SEAL CLOSURE (LTA SIDE)
JAMMED CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) SSA
3 ) LTA
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9787-05
c[ ]
CAUSES: FOREIGN MATTER IN MECHANISM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF JAMMED CLOSED IT WOULD HAVE TO BE PRIED OPEN (PRYBAR
AVAILABLE), THIS WOULD DAMAGE THE MECHANISM OF THE LOCK AND THUS
CANCEL ANY UPCOMING EVAS.
REFERENCES:
m
i
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-474
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 658
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BODY SEAL CLOSURE (LTA SIDE)
LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) SSA
3) LTA
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9787-05
CAUSES: IMPROPER LIP SEAL DAMAGED 0-RINGS.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DEPLETION OF PRIMARY OXYGEN SUPPLY. IF LEAKAGE EXCEEDS SOP MAKEUP
CAPABILITY OR IF SOP FAILS DURING EVA, CREWMEMBERS COULD BE LOST.
i
I
D
m
=__
m
m
I
D
M
D
m
l
m
REFERENCES: _zI
u
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-475
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 659
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BODY SEAL CLOSURE (LTA SIDE)
LOCK MECHANISM FAILURE
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3 ) LTA
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9787-05
CAUSES: LOCK SPRING BROKEN OR RELAXED.
c[p]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A TWO LOCK MECHANISM WHERE IF EITHER OR BOTH FAIL THE
MISSION SHOULD BE TERMINATED. IF BOTH LOCKS FAIL EVA, CREWMEMBER
COULD BE LOST DUE TO SEPARATION OF HUT FROM LTA.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-476
ms
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/23186
EMU
660
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESTRAINT ASSEMBLY
ZIPPER JAMMED
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) SSA
3) LCVG
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRIT!CAL_ITIES
FLIGHT PHASE ....... HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0107-82968-07
CAUSES: TRAPPED MATERIAL, DEFECTIVE ZIPPER
c[
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMPACT ON MISSION.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
m
ms
ms
[]
m
m
mm
I
i
ms
I
i
REFERENCES:
l
mm
mmm
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-477
m
mm
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/23/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 661
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM: RESTRAINT ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: MATERIAL TORN
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) SSA
3) LCVG
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0107-82968-07
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: MATERIAL PUNCTURED DUE TO CONTACT WITH HEAD OBJECT (SUCH
AS A CONNECTOR).
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON EVA.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-478
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/23/86
EMU
662
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESTRAINT ASSEMBLY
PUNCTURED OR LEAKING WATER TUBING
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) LCVG
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0107-82968-07
CAUSES: FAULTY MATERIAL, DEFECTIVE BOND _ _ _ _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF WATER. MISSION TERMINATED. VENT LOOP FLOODING W_ILL _
REQUIRE SOP USEAGE. IF PURGE VALVE (USED WITH SOP) IS BLOCKED BY
WATER FREEZING IN IT, CREWPERSON CAN BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
m
mm
l
i
I
i
B
J
m
m
D
m
l
m
B
I
B
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-479
D
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/23/8_
EMU
663
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LINER ASSEMBLY
LINER TORN OR HAS HOLE IN IT
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) SSA
3) LTA
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0107-82973-02
CAUSES: TEAR, PUNCTURE, DEFECTIVE MATERIAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A COMFORT DEVICE NOT REQUIRED FOR MISSION.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-480
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9123186
EMU
664
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUN C
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VENT MANIFOLD AND DUCTS
IMPAIRMANT OF FLOW THROUGH DUCTS AND MANIFOLD
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) LCVG
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0107-811060-08/82568-09/81057-19/20
CAUSES: HOLE, TEAR, COLLAPSE, OR BLOCKAGE BY FOREIGN MATERIAL OF
DUCT OR MANIFOLD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IMPAIRED VENT FLOW WOULD REDUCE COOLING, C02REMOVAL, AND
HUMIDITY CONTROL. MISSION TERMINATION. POSSIBLE SOP USEAGE
REQUIRED. CREWPERSON LOSS IS POSSIBLE IF SOP ALSO FAILED.
REFERENCES:
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l
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-481
R
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/23/86
EMU
665
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MANIFOLDS
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
VENT MANIFOLD AND DUCTS
COMPLETE BLOCKAGE OF FLOW THROUGH DUCTS AND
SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLILEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) LCVG
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
B[P] c[p]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
0107-811060-08/82568-09/81057-19/20
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: BLOCKAGE OF DUCTS OR MANIFOLD BY FOREIGN MATERIAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS WOULD GREATLY IMPAIR COOLING CO2 CONTROL, AND OXYGEN
DELIVERY TO CREWPERSON. THE SOP IS THE REDUNDANT SYSTEM.
OF SOP WOULD ENDANGER THE CREW MEMBER.
REFERENCES:
LOSS
w
= REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-482
INDEPENDENToRBITER ASSESSME_
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/23/86
EMU
666
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MULTIUPLE CONNECTOR (LCVG HALF)
WILL NOT MATE WITH HUT HALF
HDW/FUNC
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) LCVG
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE _ HDW/_C
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: /NA
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9693-03/9697-04
CAUSES: ALIGNMENT PIN BROKEN
B [ ] C [ ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF HALVES CANNOT BE MATED, MISSION WOULD BE TERMINATED.
REFERENCES:
[]
R
m
[]
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mm
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I
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-483
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/23/86
EMU
667
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MULTIUPLE CONNECTOR (LCVG HALF)
LEAKAGE WHEN DEMATED
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) SSA
3) LCVG
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9693-03/9697-04
CAUSES: SPRING BROKEN OR LOOSENED, DEFECTIVE 0-RING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE WHEN NOT MATED WILL NOT IMPACT EVA MISSION.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-484
gINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/23/86
EMU
668
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MULTIUPLE CONNECTOR (LCVG HALF)
LEAKAGE WHEN MATED
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) LCVG
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRiTi_CKLTTIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/1R
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ F]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9693-03/9697-04
CAUSES: BAD 0-RINGS, MISSING HOSE CLAMP SCREWS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:.
GRADUAL LOSS/DEGRADATION _QF COOLI_G_DUETO LOSS OF WATE R SUPPLY
INTO THE EMU. THE WATER WOULD EVENTUALLY MIGRATE INTO AND FAIL
THE VENT LOOP THEREBY REQUIRING SOP USEAGE. BECAUSE THE SOP
REQUIRES A PURGE VALVE BE OPENED TO BE ACTIVATED, THIS TOO COULD
BE FAILED BY WATER FREEZING IN THE PURGE VALVE AND BLOCKING IT.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWSPERSON.
REFERENCES:
i
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I
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-485
mmm
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/22/86
EMU
669
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BITE VALVE ASSEMBLY
LEAKAGE
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) IDB
4)
s)
6)
7)
8.)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0110-24777-05
CAUSES: SEAL THREADS BROKEN DEFECTIVE Q-RING BROKEN SPRING
PUNCTURE IN DIAPHRAM FOREIGN MATTER IN VALVE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IDB NOT MANDATORY TO PERFORM EVA, HOWEVER, IF EVA, LEAKAGE WOULD
CAUSE CREWPERSON DISCOMFORT AND COULD RESULT IN MISSION
TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-486
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10122186
EMU
670
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BITE VALVE ASSEMBLY
CANNOT GET WATER FROM VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
HDW/FUNC
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) SSA
3) IDB
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE H_W/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/ 3
EVA: 3/3
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: 0110-24777-05
CAUSES: FOREIGN MATTER IN VALVE. BROKEN OR LOOSE MOUTH PIECE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IDB NOT MANDATORY TO PERFORM EVA.
REFERENCES:
m
ms
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-487
i
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/22/86
EMU
671
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BLADDER ASSEMBLY
LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) IDB
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C ] c C
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0110-82829-10
CAUSES: PUNCTURE, HEAT SEAL FAILURE AT SEAM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IDB NOT MANDATORY FOR EVA. LEAKAGE WOULD CAUSE CREWMAN
DISCOMFORT. POSSIBLE MISSION TERMINATION.
HDW/FUNC
2/2
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-488
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/22/86
EMU
672
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BLADDER ASSEMBLY
BAG DISLODGED
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) IDB
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: /
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0110-82829-10
CAUSES: FAULTY VELCRO. FAULTY ADHES--IVE ON VELCRO. BAG DISLODGED
DURING DONNING
EFFECTS/RATiONALE:
IDB NOT MANDATORY FOR EVA. MISPOSITIONEDBAGC6ULDCAUSE CREWMAN
DISCOMFORT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-489
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uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/22/86
EMU
673
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INLETVALVEASSEMBLY
LEA_GE
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) SSA
3) IDB
4)
s)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0110-80010
CAUSES:
VALVE
SEAL THREADS BROKEN FOREIGN MATTER IN VALVE. STREATCHED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IDB NOT MANDATORY FOR EVA. LEAKAGE WOULD CAUSE CREWMEMBER
DISCOMFORT AND MAY IMPAIR VISIBILITY. POSSIBLE MISSION
TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-490
INDEPENDENToRBITER ASSESS_ME--_
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/22/86
EMU
674
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INLET VALVE ASSEMBLY
VALVE FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) SSA
3) IDB
4) INLET VALVE ASSEMBLY
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
..... CRITIt.ALiTIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: /
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0110-80010
c [
CAUSES: FOREIGN MATTER IN VALVE. VALVE DEFECTIVE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BAG WILL NOT FILL. IDB NOT MANDATORY FOR EVA.
REFERENCES:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-491
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/22/86
EMU
675
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ROLLON CUFF
LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) UCD
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PUNCTURE IN ROC, ROC UNSEATED FROM UCD FLANGE OR CREWMAN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UCD NOT MANDATORY TO PERFORM EVA. HOWEVER, LEAKAGE DURING AN EVA
WOULD CAUSE CREW PERSON DISCOMFORT AND CAN PRESENT AHAZARD TO
THE PURGE VALVE (BY FREEZING AND BLOCKING IT) IF SOP WERE
REQUIRED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-492
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/22/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 676
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM: VALVE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) UCD
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: /
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: /
A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE FLAPPER
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ...........................................
UCD NOT MANDATORY FOR EVA; HOWEVER, IF IT WERE TO FAIL CLOSED
URINE WOULZY_LIq_ELIrESCAPE TO THE SUIT ENVIRONMENT. POSSIBLE
_PERSON DISCOMFORTAND MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-493
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE •
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/22/86
EMU
677
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EMU
2) SSA
3) UCD
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: /
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: /
A [ ] B [ ] c[ ]
CAUSES: PUNCTURE OF BLADDER
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
UCD NOT MANDATORY FOR EVA, BUT LEAKAGE COULD LEAD TO CREWMAN
DISCOMFORT. POSSIBLE MISSION TERMINATION.
l
REFERENCES :
w
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-494
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/22/86
EMU
678
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BLADDER
MISPOSITIONED
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EMU
2) SSA
3) UCD
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: /
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: BAD ADHESIVE ON VELCRO. BAD VELCRO. MISSIZED OR TORN
HARNESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UCD NOT MANDATORY FOR EVA. BUT MISPOSITIONING COULD LEAD TO ....
CREWMAN DISCOMFORT AND MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-495
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/22/86
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 679
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM: HARNESS
FAILURE MODE: HARNESS LOOSE
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3) UCD
4) HARNESS
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/3
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MISSIZED HARNESS TORN HARNESS
c [ ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UCD NOT MANDATORY TO EVA. IF EVA MISSIZED OR TORN HARNESS COULD
LEAD TO MISPOSITIONED UCD WHICH COULD CAUSE SIGNIFICANT
CREWPERSON DISCOMFORT AND MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-496
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/02/86
EMU
680
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CCA
LOSS OF POWER TO MIKE/LOSS OF SIGNAL
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. _FF_LLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) EMU
2) SSA
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 2/2
EVA: 2/2
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: ELECTRONICS OPEN, ELECTRONICS SHORT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSMIT CAPABILITY, MISSION TERMINATION.
HDW/_NC
2/2
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REFERENCES:
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m
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-497 __ _
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/02/86
EMU
681
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CCA
LOSS OF SIGNAL TO EARPHONE (i OF 2)
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EMU
2) SSA
3)
4)
s)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-EVA: 3/2R
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA: 3/2R
A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: ELECTRONICS OPEN, ELECTRONICS SHORT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF RECEIVE CAPABILITY IF BOTH EARPHONES FAIL, MISSION
TERMINATION WOULD THEN RESULT.
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/02/86 C-498
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APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
ITEM FAILURE MODE
PRIMARY H20 TANK 1
(ITEM 131)
PRIMARY H20 TANK 1
(ITEM 131)
PRIMARY H20 TANK 1
(ITEM 131)
PRIMARY H20 TANK 1
(ITEM 162)
PRIMARY H20 TANK 1
(ITEM 162)
PRIMARY H20 TANK 1
(ITEM 162)
RESERVE H20 TANK
(ITEM 148)
RESERVE H20 TANK
(ITEM 148)
RESERVE H20 TANK
(ITEM 148)
FDW SUPPLY PRESSURE
SENSOR (ITEM 132B)
FDW SUPPLY PRESSURE
SENSOR (ITEM 132B)
FDW SUPPLY PRESSURE
SENSOR (ITEM 132B)
FDW SUPPLY PRESSURE
SENSOR (ITEM 132B)
WATER RELIEF VALVE
(ITEM 142)
WATER RELIEF VALVE
(ITEM 142)
WATER RELIEF VALVE
(ITEM 142)
WATER CHECK VALVE
(ITEM 143)
WATER CHECK VALVE
(ITEM 143)
WATER CHECK VALVE
(ITEM 143)
FEEDWATER PRESSURE
REGULATOR (ITEM 136)
FEEDWATER PRESSURE
REGULATOR (ITEM 136)
FEEDWATER PRESSURE
REGULATOR (ITEM 136)
FEEDWATER PRESSURE
REGULATOR (ITEM 136)
FEEDWATER RELIEF VALVE
(ITEM 135)
BLADDER FAILURE (02/H20)
LEAK-O2 SIDE EXTERNAL
LEAK-H20 SIDE, EXTERNAL (OR
VIA TPJ)
BLADDER FAILURE (O2/H20)
LEAK-02 SIDE, EXTERNAL
LEAK-H20 SIDE, EXTERNAL
(AND/OR VIA TPK)
BLADDER FAILURE (02/H20 MIX)
LEAK-02 SIDE, EXTERNAL
LEAK-H20 SIDE, EXTERNAL
(AND/OR VIA TPC OR TPL)
BIASED HIGH (OR FAILED HIGH)
BIASED LOW (OR FAILED LOW)
EXTERNAL H20 LEAKAGE
INTERNAL SHORT
INTERNAL LKG/FAIL OPEN TO
(PRIMARY TANKS TO RESERVE AND
VICE VERSA)
FAILURE TO OPEN/FAIL CLOSED
EXTERNAL LKG
INTERNAL LKG (FROM RESERVE
TO PRI)
FAILS CLOSED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (RESERVE TANK
SIDE OR PRIMARY TANK SIDE)
REGULATES HIGH (BIASED OR FULL
OPEN)
REGULATES LOW (BIASED OR FULL
CLOSED)
INTERNAL LKG.
EXTERNAL LKG.
INTERNAL LKG. - FAILS OPEN
D-I
IMDAC- ID
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
145
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
ITEM
FEEDWATER RELIEF VALVE
(ITEM 135)
FEEDWATER RELIEF VALVE
(ITEM 135)
FEEDWATER SHUTOFF VALVE
(ITEM 137)
FEEDWATER SHUTOFF VALVE
(ITEM 137)
FEEDWATER SHUTOFF VALVE
(ITEM 137)
FEEDWATER SHUTOFF VALVE
(ITEM 137)
FEEDWATER SHUTOFF VALVE
(ITEM 137>
FEEDWATER SHUTOFF VALVE
(ITEM 137)
FEEDWATER PRESSURE
SENSOR (ITEM 138)
FEEDWATER PRESSURE
SENSOR (ITEM 138)
SUBLIMATOR (ITEM 140)
SUBLIMATOR (ITEM 140)
SUBLIMATOR (ITEM 140)
SUBLIMATOR (ITEM 140)
SUBLIMATOR (ITEM 140)
SUBLIMATOR (ITEM 140)
SUBLIMATOR (ITEM 140)
TEMPERATURE SENSOR &
HARNESS (ITEM 139)
TEMPERATURE SENSOR &
HARNESS (ITEM 139)
PITOT ACTUATED VALVE
(ITEM 125)
PITOT ACTUATED VALVE
(ITEM 125)
PITOT ACTUATED VALVE
(ITEM 125)
PITOT ACTUATED VALVE
(ITEM 125)
PITOT ACTUATED VALVE
(ITEM 125)
CHECK VALVE AND
HOUSING (ITEM 128)
CHECK VALVE AND
HOUSING (ITEM 128)
CHECK VALVE AND
HOUSING (ITEM 128)
PUMP INLET FILTER
(ITEM 127)
D-2
FAILURE MODE
EXTERNAL LKG - FDW. SIDE
FAILS TO OPEN
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (EITHER SIDE)
FAILS CLOSED
FAILS OPEN
ELECTRONICS SHORT
EXCESSIVE/CONTINUOUS CURRENT
DRAW - (WILL NOT SHUT OFF)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
INTERNAL SHORT
EXTERNAL H20 FDW LEAKAGE
SUBLIMATOR BLOCKED
EXTERNAL LCG H20 LEAKAGE
INTERNAL LCG-TO-FDW LEAKAGE
INTERNAL LCG-VENT LOOP
LEAKAGE (H20 AND 02)
EXTERNAL VENT LOOP LEAKAGE
SLURPER BLOCKED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF H20
ELECTRICAL SHORT
INTERNAL LEAKAGE VIA NORMAL TRAP
FLOW PATHS (GAS TRAP INLET TO
VALVE OUTLET TO WATER SEPARATOR)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE FROM GAS TRAP
INLET TO SENSE PORT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (INLET FROM GAS
TRAP, OUTLET TO H20 SEPARATOR,
AND VIA SHAFT SEAL)
INLET FILTER BLOCKED
FAILS CLOSED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF H20
INTERNAL H20 LEAKAGE/FAILED
OPEN
FAILED CLOSED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
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MDAC-ID
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
167
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
ITEM FAILURE MODE
PUMP INLET FILTER
(ITEM 127)
PUMP INLET FILTER
(ITEM 127)
GAS TRAP (ITEM 141)
GAS TRAP (ITEM 141)
GAS TRAP (ITEM 141)
GAS TRAP (ITEM 141)
CONDENSATE H20 RELIEF
VALVE (ITEM 134)
CONDENSATE H20 RELIEF
VALVE (ITEM 134)
CONDENSATE H20 RELIEF
VALVE (ITEM 134)
CONDENSATE H20 RELIEF
VALVE (ITEM 134)
H20 SHUTOFF VALVE
(_ITEM 171)
H20 SHUTOFF VALVE
(ITEM 171)
H20 SHUTOFF VALVE
(ITEM 171)
H20 SHUTOFF VALVE
(ITEM 171)
H20 SHUTOFFVALVE
(ITEM 171)
COOLANT RELIEF VALVE
(ITEM 172)
COOLANT RELIEF VALVE
(ITEM 172)
COOLANT RELIEF VALVE
(ITEM 172)
COOLANT RELIEF VALVE
(ITEM 172)
ROTARY H20 SEPARATOR
(ITEM 123B)
ROTARY H20 SEPARATOR
(ITEM 123B)
ROTARY H20 SEPARATOR
(ITEM 123B)
WATER PUMP (ITEM 123C)
BLOCKED
PASSAGE OF CONTAMINANTS
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
GAS BREAKTHROUGH
SCREEN BLOCKED
INTERNAL LEAKAGE (H20 INLET
TO GAS OUTLET)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF H20
FAILS OPEN
BLOCKED INLET FILTER (FAILS
CLOSED)
VALVE FAILS CLOSED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS CLOSED (NO FDW FLOW
PATH TO LCG COOLING LOOPS)
CONTINUOUS MOTOR DRAW OF
CURRENT
FILTER ELEMENT BLOCKED
ELECTRICAL SHORT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS OPEN
BLOCKED INLET FILTER
VALVE FAILS CLOSED
PITOT TUBE (H20 OUTLET)
BLOCKED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (H20 OUTLET
OR H20/GAS INLET)
BEARINGS BIND
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (H20 INLET
WATER PUMP (ITEM 123C)
WATER PUMP (ITEM 123C)
FAN (ITEM 123A)
FAN (ITEM 123A)
BRUSHLESS MOTOR
(ITEM 123B)
BRUSHLESS MOTOR
(ITEM 123B)
_ ii_i OR OUTLET)
REDUCED FLOW
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE-O2
LOW FLOW
BEARINGS BIND OR SEIZE
FAILS OFF
D-3
MDAC-ID
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
2O0
201
202
203
204
2O5
206
207
2O8
211
212
213
214
215
ITEM
BRUSHLESS MOTOR
(ITEM 123B)
BRUSHLESS MOTOR
(ITEM 123B)
BRUSHLESS MOTOR
(ITEM 123B)
MUFFLER (ITEM 170)
CONTAMINANT CONTROL
CARTRIDGE (ITEM 480)
CONTAMINANT CONTROL
CARTRIDGE (ITEM 480)
CONTAMINANT CONTROL
CARTRIDGE (ITEM 480)
CONTAMINANT CONTROL
CARTRIDGE (ITEM 480)
CONTAMINANT CONTROL
CARTRIDGE (ITEM 480)
CHECK VALVE AND VENT
FLOW SENSOR (ITEM 121)
CHECK VALVE AND VENT
FLOW SENSOR (ITEM 121)
CHECK VALVE AND VENT
FLOW SENSOR (ITEM 121)
CHECK VALVE AND VENT
FLOW SENSOR (ITEM i21)
CHECK VALVE AND VENT
FLOW SENSOR (ITEM 121)
CHECK VALVE AND VENT
FLOW SENSOR (ITEM 121)
C02 TRANSDUCER
(ITEM 122) .....
C02 TRANSDUCER
(ITEM 122)
C02 TRANSDUCER
(ITEM 122)
C02 TRANSDUCER
(ITEM 122)
FILTER AND ORIFICE
(ITEM 126)
FILTER AND ORIFICE
(ITEM 126)
PRESSURE SUIT SENSOR
(ITEM 114)
PRESSURE SUIT SENSOR
(ITEM 114) _ ....._
RELIEF VALVE AND
ORIFICE (ITEM 145)
RELIEF VALVE AND
ORIFICE (ITEM 145)
RELIEF VALVE AND
ORIFICE (ITEM 145)
D-4
FAILURE MODE
LOW SPEED
HIGH SPEED (EXCESSIVE)
SHORT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (INLET OR
OUTLET)
EXTERNAL £EAKAGE
PARTICULATE FILTER PARTIALLY
BLOCKED
TEFLON SCREEN PARTIALLY
BLOCKED
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LiOH RELEASED TO VENT LOOP
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
VALVE FAILS CLOSED
SENSORFAILS LOW
vALVEFAILSOPEN-INTERNAL
LEAKAGE
SENSOR FAILS HIGH
SHORT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
SENSOR FAILS HIGH
SENSOR FAILS LOW
ELECTRICAL SHORT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
ORIFICE BLOCKED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
INTERNAL SHORT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
INTERNAL LEAKAGE/FAILS OPEN
FAILS CLOSED
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MDAC-ID
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
ITEM FAILURE MODE
POSITIVE PRESSURE
RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 146)
POSITIVE PRESSURE
RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 146)
POSITIVE PRESSURE
RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 146)
NEGATIVE PRESSURE
RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 147)
NEGATIVE PRESSURE
RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 147)
NEGATIVE PRESSURE
RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 147)
CHECK VALVE AND FILTER
(ITEM II3A)
CHECK VALVE AND FILTER
(ITEM II3A)
CHECK VALVE AND FILTER
(ITEM II3A)
CHECK VALVE AND FILTER
(ITEM II3A)
CHECK VALVE AND FILTER
(ITEM II3A)
CHECK VALVE AND FILTER
(ITEM II3A)
CHECK VALVE AND FILTER
(ITEM II3A)
ADJUSTABLE ORIFICE
(ITEM II3B)
ADJUSTABLE ORIFICE
(ITEM II3B)
ADJUSTABLE ORIFICE
(ITEM II3B)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS OPEN/INTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS CLOSED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAIL OPEN
FAIL CLOSED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE AT INLET
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE AT OUTLET
INLET OR OUTLET FILTER
BLOCKED
INLET FILTER FAILS-PASSES
CONTAMINANTS
OUTLET FILTER FAILS-PASSES
CONTAMINANTS
VALVE FAILS CLOSED
VALVE FAILS OPEN-INTERNAL
LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
NO FLOW-BLOCKED
HIGH FLOW
ON/OFF VALVE (ITEM ll3C) EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
ON/OFF VALVE (ITEM ll3C) FAILED CLOSED
ON/OFF VALVE (ITEM I13C) FAILED OPEN/INTERNAL LEAKAGE
PRIMARY REGULATOR EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
INTERNAL LEAKAGE FAILED OPEN
FAILS CLOSED
REGULATES LOW/DRIFTS LOW
REGULATES HIGH/DRIFTS HIGH
IV-EV LINKAGE FAILURE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS OPEN-INTERNAL LEAKAGE
(ITEM ll3D)
PRIMARY REGULATOR
(ITEM ll3D)
PRIMARY REGULATOR
(ITEM ll3D)
PRIMARY REGULATOR
(ITEM ll3D)
PRIMARY REGULATOR
(ITEM II3D)
PRIMARY REGULATOR
(ITEM ll3D)
H20 REGULATOR
(ITEM II3E)
H20 REGULATOR
(ITEM II3E)
D-5
MDAC-ID
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
25O
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
268
270
ITEM
H20 REGULATOR
(ITEM II3E)
H20 REGULATOR
(ITEM II3E)
H20 REGULATOR
(ITEM II3E)
PRIMARY OXYGEN BOTTLES
(ITEM III)-QTY-2
PRIMARY OXYGEN BOTTLES
(ITEM III)-QTY-2
PRIMARY 02 PRESSURE
SENSOR (ITEM 112)
PRIMARY 02 PRESSURE
SENSOR (ITEM 112)
PRIMARY 02 PRESSURE
SENSOR (ITEM 112)
PRIMARY 02 PRESSURE
SENSOR (ITEM 112)
PRIMARY 02 PRESSURE
SENSOR (ITEM 112)
PRIMARY 02 PRESSURE
SENSOR (ITEM 112)
PRIMARY 02 PRESSURE
SENSOR (ITEM 112)
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
(ITEM 115)
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
(ITEM 115)
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
(ITEM 115)
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
(ITEM i15)
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
(ITEM i15)
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
(ITEM 115)
SHE_ PLATE ASSEMBLY
(ITEM 115)
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
(ITEM llL)
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
(ITEM 115)
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
(ITEM I15)
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY
(ITEM i15)
D-6
FAILURE MODE
REGULATES HIGH
REGULATES LOW
FAILSCLOSED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (NON-VIOLENT)
RUPTURE-VIOLENT OXYGEN RELEASE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
DRIFTS LOW (NOT FULL SCALE)
FAILS FULL LOW
DRIFTS HIGH (NOT FULL SCALE)
FAILS HIGH-FULL SCALE
BOURDON TUBE RUPTURE
ELECTRICAL SHORT
02 MANIFOLD FILTER BLOCKED
02 MANIFOLD FILTER PASSES
CONTAMINANTS
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF OXYGEN
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF OXYGEN
FAILS IN THE "OFF" POSITION
FAILS IN THE "IV" POSITION
FAILS IN THE "PRESS" POSITION
FAILS IN THE "EVA" POSITION
FAILURE TO OPEN THE PRIMARY
I13C SHUTOFF VALVE
FAILURE TO CLOSE THE PRIMARY
113 SHUTOFF VALVE
FAILURE TO OPEN SOP SHUTOFF
VALVE
FAILURE TO CLOSE SOP SHUTOFF
VALVE
FAILURE TO PLACE PRIMARY
REGULATOR IN 4.3 PSI POSITION
EVA POSITION LOCK FAILURE
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271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
295
296
297
298
299
301
302
ITEM
EVA POSITION SWITCH
(ITEM 116)
EVA POSITION SWITCH
(ITEM 116)
BLEED ORIFICE
(ITEM 120A)
BLEED ORIFICE
(ITEM 120A)
BLEED ORIFICE
(ITEM 120A)
DUAL MODE RELIEF VALVE
(ITEM 120B)
DUAL MODE RELIEF VALVE
(ITEM 120B)
DUAL MODE RELIEF VALVE
(ITEM 120B)
DUAL MODE RELIEF VALVE
(ITEM 120B)
FEEDWATER CHECK VALVE
(ITEM 120C)
FEEDWATER CHECK VALVE
(ITEM 120C)
FEEDWATER CHECK VALVE
(ITEM 120C)
FDW SUPPLY PRESSURE
SENSOR-02 SIDE
(ITEM 132A)
FDW SUPPLY PRESSURE
SENSOR-02 SIDE
(ITEM 132A)
BATTERY (ITEM 490)
BATTERY (ITEM 490)
BATTERY (ITEM 490)
BATTERY (ITEM 490)
BATTERY (ITEM 490)
BATTERY (ITEM 490)
SECONARY OXYGEN BOTTLE
(ITEM 210)
SECONARY OXYGEN BOTTLE
(ITEM 210)
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
(ITEM 215)
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
(ITEM 215)
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
(ITEM 215)
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
(ITEM 215)
IST STAGE REGULATOR
(ITEM 213B)
FAILURE MODE
FAILS OPEN-NO SIGNAL
FAILS CLOSED-CONTINUOUS SIGNAL
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
BLOCKED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
INTERNAL LEAKAGE/(HI OR LOW
FLOW) FAILS OPEN
FAIL CLOSED ("LO" MODE)
FAILS CLOSED ("HI" MODE)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILED OPEN
FAILED CLOSED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
INTERNAL SHORT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
RELIEF VALVE FAILS OPEN
(INTERNAL LEAKAGE)
RELIEF VALVE FAILS CLOSED
GENERATION OF HYDROGEN GAS
HIGH RESISTANCE OR OPEN
SHORT
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (NON-VIOLENT)
BOTTLE RUPTURE (VIOLENT)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
ELECTRONICS SHORT
READS LOW
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
D-7
MDAC-ID
303
304
305
306
307
3O8
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
318
320
321
322
324
326
327
336
337
338
339
340
341
ITEM FAILURE MODE
IST STAGE REGULATOR
(ITEM 213B)
IST STAGE REGULATOR
(ITEM 213B)
IST STAGE REGULATOR
(ITEM 213B)
IST STAGE REGULATOR
(ITEM 213B)
IST STAGE REGULATOR
(ITEM 213B)
2ND STAGE REGULATOR
(ITEM 213D)
2ND STAGE REGULATOR
(ITEM 213D) ........
2ND STAGE REGULATOR
(ITEM 213D)
2ND STAGE REGULATOR
(ITEM 213D)
2ND STAGE REGULATOR
(ITEM 213D)
2ND STAGE REGULATOR
(ITEM 213D)
SOP PRESSURE GAGE
(ITEM 213E)
SOP PRESSURE GAGE
(ITEM 213E)
SOP FILL PORT QD AND
FILTER (ITEM 213F)
SOP FILL PORT QD AND
FILTER (ITEM 213F)
SOP ASSEMBLY (ITEM 200)
INTERNAL LEAKAGE/FAIL OPEN
REGULATES HIGH
REGULATES LOW
FAILS CLOSED
DIAPHRAM RUPTURE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
INTERNAL LEAKAGE/FAIL OPEN
REGULATES HIGH
REGULATES LOW
FAILS CLOSED
MECHANICAL LINKAGE FAILS
ENGAGED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
BOURDN TUBE RUPTURE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE/INTERNAL
LEAKAGE
FILTER PASSES CONTAMINANTS
SOP ASSEMBLY (ITEM 200)
COMMON MULTIPLE
CONNECTOR (ITEM 410)
COMMON MULTIPLE
CONNECTOR (ITEM 410)
COMMON MULTIPLE
(ITEM 410)
HIGH PRESSURE OXYGEN EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LINE (ITEM 411)
PORTABLE H20 LINE
(ITEM 412A)
COOLING H20 IN-LINE
(ITEM 412B)
COOLING H20 OUT-LINE
(ITEM 412C)
BACTERIAL FILTER
HOUSING (ITEM 416)
CONDENSATE H20
REGULATOR (ITEM 418)
BOTTLE INLET FILTER BLOCKED
(ONE FILTER FOR EACH BOTTLE)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE-FEEDWATER
SUPPLY/DRAIN LINE
CONNECTOR DOES NOT LATCH
CLOSED
CONNECTOR DOES NOT RELEASE
OPEN
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (EMU SIDE)
D-8
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344
346
348
352
353
355
359
360
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
377
384
387
388
389
390
ITEM
CONDENSATE H20
REGULATOR (ITEM 418
CONDENSATE H20
REGULATOR (ITEM 418)
WATER SUPPLY PRESSURE
REGULATOR (ITEM 419)
BACTERIA CARTRIDGE
(ITEM 423)
BACTERIA CARTRIDGE
(ITEM 423)
POTABLE H20 FILTER
(ITEM 424)
SUIT PRESSURE GAGE
(ITEM 311)
SUIT PRESSURE GAGE
(ITEM 311)
DCM PURGE VALVE
(ITEM 314)
DCM PURGE VALVE
(ITEM 314)
DCM PURGE VALVE
(ITEM 314)
DCM PURGE VALVE
(ITEM 314)
DCM PURGE VALVE
(ITEM 314)
COMMON MULTIPLE
CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
COMMON MULTIPLE
CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
COMMON MULTIPLE
CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
COMMON MULTIPLE
CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
COMMON MULTIPLE
CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
COMMON MULTIPLE
CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
COMMON MULTIPLE
CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
COMMON MULTIPLE
CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
COMMON MULTIPLE
CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
COMMON MULTIPLE
CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
HARD UPPER TORSO (HUT)
INTERFACE (ITEM 385)
HARD UPPER TORSO (HUT)
INTERFACE (ITEM 385)
HARD UPPER TORSO (HUT)
INTERFACE (ITEM 385)
D-9
FAILURE MODE
FAILS CLOSED
REGUALTES HIGH
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
INLET SECREEN BLOCKED/NO FLOW
(WASTE SIDE)
FAILURE OF CARTRIDGE (SUPPLY
OR WASTER) TO CONTROL BACTERIA
BLOCKED/CLOGGED (WASTE SIDE)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
BOURDON TUBE RUPTURE (VIOLENT)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE/INTERNAL
LEAKAGE
INLET FILTER BLOCKED
FAILED CLOSED
FAIL OPEN
REDUCED FLOW
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE-OXYGEN
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE-FEEDWATER
SUPPLY/DRAIN LINE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE-LCG INLET-LCG
OUTLET
FAILS TO MATE TO SCU
FAILS TO DEMATE FROM SCU
OPEN IN POWER LINE
SHORT IN POWER LINE
SHORT IN BATTERY RECHARGE LINE
OXYGEN FLOW BLOCKED
LCG IN/OUT VALVE FAILS CLOSED
VENT LOOP INTERFACE LEAKAGE
(P2 OR P3)
COOLING LOOP INTERFACE LEAKAGE
(P4,PS,P6, OR P7)
POTABLE H20 LEAKAGE (P8)
MDAC-ID
394
396
397
398
399
4O0
402
404
406
408
410
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
ITEM
VOLUME CONTROL
(ITEM 360)
DISPLAY INTENSITY
CONTROL (ITEM 361)
DISPLAY INTENSITY
CONTROL (ITEM 361)
DISPLAY INTENSITY
CONTROL (ITEM 361)
DISPLAY INTENSITY
CONTROL (ITEM 361)
EVC SELECTOR SWITCH
(ITEM 362)
EVC SELECTOR SWITCH
(ITEM 362)
EVC SELECTOR SWITCH
(ITEM 362)
EVC SELECTOR SWITCH
(ITEM 362)
EVC SELECTOR SWITCH
(ITEM 362)
EVC SELECTOR SWITCH
(ITEM 362)
POWER MODE SELECTOR
SWITCH (ITEM 364)
POWER MODE SELECTOR
SWITCH (ITEM 364)
POWER MODE SELECTOR
SWITCH (ITEM 364)
POWER MODE SELECTOR
SWITCH (ITEM 364)
POWER MODE SELECTOR
SWITCH (ITEM 364)
POWER MODE SELECTOR
SWITCH (ITEM 364)
POWER MODE SELECTOR
SWITCH (ITEM 364)
POWER MODE SELECTOR
SWITCH (ITEM 364)
POWER MODE SELECTOR
SWITCH (ITEM 364)
POWER MODE SELECTOR
SWITCH (ITEM 364)
POWER MODE SELECTOR
SWITCH (ITEM 364)
POWER MODE SELECTOR
SWITCH (ITEM 364)
D-10
FAILURE MODE
SHORT ACROSS TWO COMMUNICATIONS
CHANNELS
OPEN IN LINE
SHORT ACROSS DISPLAY LINES
INCREASED RESISTANCE
SHAFT BINDS
O-PEN fN PRIMARY HARDLINE (IV
COMMUNICATIONS) POSITION
OPEN IN PRIMARY MODE A
POSITION
OPEN IN PRIMARY MODE B
POSITION
OPEN IN PRIMARY BACKUP
POSITION
SHORT TO GROUND PRIMARY
SWITCH FAILS IN HARDLINE
POSITION "
SWITCH FAILS OPEN FOR BATTERY
POWER FROM BATTERY (T8 OPEN)
STICKS IN T7 POSITION
SWITCH FAILS OPEN FOR BATTERY
CHARGE CONTACT (T9 OPEN)
SWITCH FAILS OPEN FOR VEHICLE
POWER (T4 OPEN)-STICKS IN T5
POSITION
SWITCH FAILS OPEN FOR BATTERY
POWER TO FAN AND TO DC/DC
CON_VERTER (T5 OPEN)-STICKS IN
T4 POSITION
SWITCHFAILS 0PEN FOR FAN
POWER AND DC/DC CONVERTER
(T6 OPEN)
SWITCH FAILS OPEN (TI OPEN)-
STiCKS iN T2 POSITION
SWITCH FAILS OPEN FOR BATTERY
POWER TO EVC (T20PEN)-STICKS
IN T1 POSITION
SWITCH FAILS OPEN FOR CONTACT
TO EVC POWER (T3 OPEN)
SWITCH STAYS IN VEHICLE POWER
POSITION
SWITCH STAYS IN BATTERY POWER
POSITION _
SHORT-VEHICLE POWER (ANY
CONTACT) TO GROUND
SHORT-BATTERY POWER (ANY
CONTACT) TO GROUND
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434
435
436
437
438
439
440
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443
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCH
(ITEM 365)
PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCH
(ITEM 365)
PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCH
(ITEM 365)
PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCH
(ITEM 365)
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
FEEDWATER VALVE SWITCH
(ITEM 367)
FEEDWATER VALVE SWITCH
(ITEM 367)
FEEDWATER VALVE SWITCH
(ITEM 367)
FEEDWATER VALVE SWITCH
(ITEM 367)
FEEDWATER VALVE SWITCH
(ITEM 367)
FEEDWATER VALVE SWITCH
(ITEM 367)
CAUTION AND WARNING
SWITCH (ITEM 368)
CAUTION AND WARNING
SWITCH (ITEM 368)
CAUTION AND WARNING
SWITCH (ITEM 368)
CAUTION AND WARNING
SWTICH (ITEM 368)
CAUTION AND WARNING
SWITCH (ITEM 368)
CAUTION AND WARNING
SWITCH (ITEM 368)
BITE INDICATOR
(ITEM 363)
BITE INDICATOR
(ITEM 363)
ALPHANUMERIC DISPLAY
(ITEM 369)
ALPHANUMERIC DISPLAY
(ITEM 369
SHORT IN PTT POSITION
FAIL CLOSED IN RECEIVE
POSITION
FAIL CLOSED IN PTT POSITION
SWITCH FAILS OPEN ALL
POSITION
FAN POWER ON CONTACT OPEN/FAILS
OFF
FAN POWER ON CONTACT SHORT TO
GROUND
CLIV POWER "OPEN" LINE/CONTACT
OPEN
CLIV POWER "CLOSE" LINE/CONTACT
OPEN
CLIV POWER SHORT TO GROUND
FAN POWER SHORT TO GROUND
SWITCH FAILS OFF
ELECTRICAL OPEN ON FEEDWATER
OPEN LINE
ELECTRICAL OPEN ON FEEDWATER
CLOSE LINE
ELECTRICAL SHORT ON FEEDWATER
OPEN LINE
ELECTRICAL SHORT ON FEEDWATER
CLOSE LINE
SWITCH FAILS IN THE CLOSED
POSITION
SWITCH FAILS IN THE OPEN
POSITION
OPEN IN STATUS LINE
OPEN IN PROGRAM LINE
SHORT TO GROUND IN STATUS
LINE
SHORT TO GROUND IN PROGRAM
LINE
BEARING FAILS IN "STATUS"
POSITION
SWITCH FAILS IN "PROGRAM"
POSITION
OPEN IN ELECTRICAL
INPUT/FAILED OFF
SHORT TO BITE INDICATOR
CIRCUIT/FAILED ON
SUPPLY VOLTAGE (VCC) OPEN TO
ALL THREE CHIPS/DISPLAY FAILS
OFF TOTALLY
ERRATIC DISPLAY/LED DRIVER OR
COLUMN DRIVER FAILURE
D-11
JMDAC-ID
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
475
477
479
48O
481
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
ITEM
CAUTION AND WARNING
ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
CAUTION AND WARNING
ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
CAUTION AND WARNING
ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
CAUTION AND WARNING
ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
CAUTION AND WARNING
ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
CAUTION AND WARNING
ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
CAUTION AND WARNING
ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
DCM ELECTRONICS
(ITEM 350)
DCM ELECTRONICS
(ITEM 350)
DCM ELECTRONICS
(ITEM 350)
DCM ELECTRONICS
(ITEM 350)
DCM ELECTRONICS
(ITEM 350)
DCM ELECTRONICS
(ITEM 350)
DCM ELECTRONICS
(ITEM 350)
DCM ELECTRONICS
(ITEM 350)
DCM ELECTRONICS
(ITEM 350)
DCM ELECTRONICS
(ITEM 350)
DCM ELECTRONICS
(ITEM 350)
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
D-12
FAILURE MODE
DISPLAY I/O PORT FAILS OFF
MEMORY 5.V POWER-IN FAILURE
SYSTEM CLOCK OUTPUT OPEN
MULTIPLEXER INPUT POWER
FAILURE
ANALOG TO DIGITAL CONVERTER
FAILURE
BITE CIRCUIT FAILS ON
BITE CIRCUIT FAILS OFF
EVC PRIMARY/CLIV-CURRENT
LIMITER SHORTS TO GROUND AT
INLET
EVCSEC/FEEDWATER VALVE CURRENT
LIMITER SHORT TO GROUND AT
INLET
EVC PRIMARY/CLIV CURRENT
LIMITER SHORTS TO GROUND AT
CLIV POWER OUT
EVC SEC/FEEDWATER VALVE
CURRENT LIMITER SHORTS TO
GROUND AT FEEDWATER VALVE
POWER OUT
EVC PRI/CLIV CURRENT LIMITER
HAS ELECTRICAL OPEN ON POWER
IN OR POWER OUT LINE FOR CLIV
EVC SEC/FEEDWATER VALVE
CURRENT LIMITER HAS ELECTRICAL
OPEN ON FEEDWATER VALVE POWER
IN/OUT
EVC PRIMARY/CLIV CURRENT
LIMITER HAS ELECTRICAL OPEN
ON EVC PRI POWER OUT
OPEN IN POWER IN TO DC/DC
CONVERTER TAP T1
OPEN IN POWER IN TO DC/DC
CONVERTER TQP T3
OPEN IN POWER IN TO DC/DC
CONVERTER TAP 2
SHORT TO GROUND IN ANY DC/DC
CONVERTER INPUT LINE
(DOWNSTREAM LINE OF CONVERTER
CURRENT LIMITER)
SHORT TO GROUND AT INPUT OF
DC/DC CONVERTER CURRENT
LIMITER
SHORT TO GROUND ON DC/DC
CONVERTER 5V DC OUT
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491
492
493
494
495
497
498
499
500
501
502
6OO
601
602
603
604
605
606
608
609
610
611
612
613
614
615
616
617
ITEM
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
DCM ELECTRONICS
COOLING CONTROL VALVE
(ITEM 321)
COOLING CONTROL VALVE
(ITEM 321)
COOLING CONTROL VALVE
(ITEM 321)
NECK RING AND VENT
SEAL ASSEMBLY
NECK RING AND VENT
SEAL ASSEMBLY
NECK RING AND VENT
SEAL ASSEMBLY
NECK RING AND VENT
SEAL ASSEMBLY
WATER LINE AND VENT
TUBE ASSEMBLY
WATER LINE AND VENT
TUBE ASSEMBLY
WATER LINE AND VENT
TUBE ASSEMBLY
MULTIPLE WATER
CONNECTOR (HUT HALF)
MULTIPLE WATER
CONNECTOR (HUT HALF)
MULTIPLE WATER
CONNECTOR (HUT HALF)
HARD UPPER TORSO SHELL
HARD UPPER TORSO SHELL
GIMBAL ASSY.
BELLOWS ASSEMBLY
BODY SEAL CLOSURE
(HUT SIDE)
BODY SEAL CLOSURE
(HUT SIDE)
BODY SEAL CLOSURE
(HUT SIDE)
D-13
FAILURE MODE
OPEN IN DC/DC CONVERTER 5V DC
OUT
OPEN IN +14.2V OUT (FROM DC/DC
CONVERTER)
OPEN IN 3.8V OUT FROM DC/DC
CONVERTER
SHORT IN 3.8V OUT FROM DC/DC
CONVERTER
SHORT IN +14.2V OUT (FROM DC/DC
CONVERTER)
SHORT IN 18V OUTPUT FROM DC/DC
CONVERTER
OPEN IN LINE TO TONE GENERATOR
FAILED ON TONE GENERATOR
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
JAMS FULL COLD OR FULL HOT
JAM OF LOCK MECHANISM (CAN NOT
MATE TO HELMET FROM NECK RING
1)
JAM OF LOCK MECHANISM (CAN NOT
DEMATE HELMET FROM NECK RING)
LEAKAGE OF NECK RING
NECK RING FAILURE
WATER FLOWN BLOCKAGE
WATER LINE LEAKAGE
02 LEAKAGE DIRECTLY TO HUT
JAM. FAIL TO MATE WITH LCVG
HALF OF CONNECTOR
JAM. FAIL TO DEMATE WITH LCVG
HALF OF CONNECTOR
LEAKAGE-MATED
LEAKAGE
UNABLE TO MATE EEH° TO CCA
DISATTACHMENT OF PIVOTS
LEAKAGE
LEAKAGE
FAILURE TO MATE
FAILURE TO DEMATE
/MDAC-ID
618
621
622
623
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
65O
651
652
653
ITEM
BODY SEAL CLOSURE
(HUT SIDE)
COMBINATION PURGE VALVE
HELMET ASSE_
EXTRAVEHICULAR VISOR
ASSEMBLY
EXTRAVEHICULAR VISOR
ASSEMBLY
EXTRAVEHICULAR VISOR
ASSEMBLY
UPPER/LOWER ARM
RESTRAINT AND BLADDER
ASSEMBLY
UPPER/LOWER ARM
RESTRAINT AND BLADDER
ASSEMBLY
SCYE BEARING ASSEMBLY
SCYE BEARING ASSEMBLY
ARM BEARING ASSEMBLY
ARM BEARING ASSEMBLY
WRIST DISCONNECT
WRIST DISCONNECT
WRIST DISCONNECT
WRIST DISCONNECT
RESTRAINT MODIFIED
RESTRAINT MODIFIED
RESTRAINT MODIFIED
RESTRAINT MODIFIED
BLADDER ASSEMBLY
WRIST DISCONNECT
(GL0 VE SI DE) c_!_i
WRIST DISCONNECT
(GLOVE SIDE)
PALM RESTRAINT
PALM RESTRAINT
WAIST RESTRAINT AND
BLADDER
WAIST RESTRAINT AND
BLADDER
WAIST BEARING
WAIST BEARING
LOWER TORSO
RESTRAINT/BLADDER
ASSEMBLY
LOWER TORSO
RESTRAINT/BLADDER
ASSEMBLY
BOOT DISCONNECT
PRESSURE BOOT ASSEMBLY
D-14
FAILURE MODE
LOCK MECHANISM FAILURE-OPEN
FAIL OPEN/INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAKAGE
JAM OF SUN VISOR (SUN VISORS)
IN OPEN POSITION
CRACK IN SUN VISOR (SUN
VISORS)
CRAZING (SCRATCHING) IN GOLD
SUN VISOR
LEAKAGE
LOSS OF PRIMARY AXIAL
RESTRAINT
LEAKAGE
BEARING TORQUES HIGH
LEAKAGE
BEARING TORQUES HIGH
LOCK/JAM OPEN
LOCK JAM CLOSED
LEAKAGE
LOCK FAILURE
RESTRAINT LAYER AND BLADDER
SEPARATION
SIZING LINES IN FINGERS FAILED
PALM BAR SEPARATED FROM
POSITION
PRIMARY AXIAL RESTRAINT
SEPARATED
LEAKAGE
LEAKAGE
BEARING TORQUE HIGH
PALM BAR RESTRAINT SLIPPED
PALM BAR BENT-
LEAKAGE
LOSS OF PRIMARY AXIAL
RESTRAINT
LEAKAGE
BEARING TORQUES HIGH
LEAKAGE
LOSS OF PRIMARY AXIAL
RESTRAINT
LEAKAGE
LEAKAGE
w
mm
m
I
I
l
mm
R
l
m
I
I
J
I
g
w_ i
w
MDAC-ID
654
656
657
658
659
662
664
665
666
668
669
671
672
673
675
676
677
678
679
68O
ITEM
PRESSURE BOOT ASSEMBLY
BODY SEAL CLOSURE
(LTA SIDE)
BODY SEAL CLOSURE
(LTA SIDE)
BODY SEAL CLOSURE
(LTA SIDE)
BODY SEAL CLOSURE
(LTA SIDE)
RESTRAINT ASSEMBLY
VENT MANIFOLD AND
DUCTS
VENT MANIFOLD AND
DUCTS
MULTIUPLE CONNECTOR
(LCVG HALF )
MULTIUPLE CONNECTOR
(LCVG HALF )
BITE VALVE ASSEMBLY
BLADDER ASSEMBLY
BLADDER ASSEMBLY
INLET VALVE ASSEMBLY
ROLLON CUFF
VALVE
BLADDER
BLADDER
HARNESS
CCA
FAILURE MODE
LOSS OF PRIMARY AXIAL
RESTRAINT
JAMMED OPEN
JAMMED CLOSED
LEAKAGE
LOCK MECHANISM FAILURE
PUNCTURED OR LEAKING WATER
TUBING
IMPAIRMANT OF FLOW THROUGH
DUCTS AND MANIFOLD
COMPLETE BLOCKAGE OF FLOW
THROUGH DUCTS AND MANIFOLDS
WILL NOT MATE WITH HUT HALF
LEAKAGE WHEN MATED
LEAKAGE
LEAKAGE
BAG DISLODGED
LEAKAGE
LEAKAGE
FAILS CLOSED
LEAKAGE
MISPOSITIONED
HARNESS LOOSE
LOSS OF POWER TO MIKE/LOSS
OF SIGNAL
D-15
_r
I
IB
m
II
D
r_
II
M
I
IB
I
Im
Im
mg
gz
mm
M
i
m_
II
g
m
mm
II
